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HUMANISM AND THEISM

A Thesis Presented to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts

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April, 1948

THE UNIVERSITY OF WINNIPEG
PORTAGE & SALMERAL
WINNIPEG 2, MAN. CANADA

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INTRODUCTION

Wordsworth has said:

"late and soon,
Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers;"¹

but if ever there was an age to which those words could be more suitably applied than the one in which he wrote, now is probably that age. We are beset with the dilemma of a society which does not seem to realize, nor take the pains to examine, its plight. We are swayed by the whims and fancies of a moment, but lack the sagacity of sustained effort to achieve the great purpose which is ours to fulfil. The film of the hour is the inspiration but for a memory. The call of the astute and more dependable leaders falls upon exultant ears, but the 'Lydian airs' of a listless society soon inhibit it.

We live in an era which is reaping the results of two devastating and disintegrating wars. These wars were not the mere clamoring of two races in a small area of a remote corner of the world, but, in the light of a 'Copernican Revolution', they were wars of such moment and force as to claim the attention of the entire world population; and only the more remote corners were unaffected. Even though the immediate causes of these wars were of either a political or economic nature, the ultimate cause of both was the general lack of intellectual integrity displayed on the part of leaders, and ultimately on the part of the common man. Such deficiencies were bound to have tragic effects upon an already affected world.

¹ From The World is Too Much with Us.

But let us pause for a moment to examine a little more carefully the position of the average man. Where lies the body of his interest? Of what does he think? And how does he think about it? Surely he, with the aid of the greatest advances in television, transportation, recreational and domestic facilities, and with the security of atomic energy, will be the 'man of the hour.' But he, alas, is too overwhelmed by possibilities of the future to be expressly concerned with the things at hand. This eye for the future is focused upon two extremes: the one is a quest for the infinitely large, the other a quest for the infinitely small. In essence, man is so swayed by the advancement in contemporary fields of science, and especially its possibilities, that he has ignored rather dangerously the necessity of developing within himself an integrated and noble character. He is scarcely worthy of his being.

In addition, the general disregard for principles which the Nazi leader displayed in his international dealings has been so publicized as to be caught up by the common man, and now the promise of one moment may be rejected in the thrill of another. For himself, this is dangerous to man, especially in the short run; but observed in the light of a society over a decade, it becomes the prism which deflects a hue so ghastly that even he may shudder - dare he but pause to look.

In the industrial and commercial fields we find ourselves in the throes of a specialized economy. A man has little opportunity to garner a comprehensive knowledge of the organs of production outside his own special function. The man pushing a button every other second, which in turn releases a lever, which in turn caps a bottle is possibly one who has

little interest in objects of intellectual import. His greatest hobbies may be betting on the horse races or following the life story of his favorite screen star. His own capacity for thought is so inhibited and discouraged that his intellectual progress may be thoroughly suppressed. This is a sad tale, but it is one which is being spun today, before our very eyes. It is the duty of those who are witnesses to work assiduously and untiringly for some solution.

The first question that one now poses takes the form of why this must be? How did it happen thus? The next question is, What, if any, is the solution? An answer to the first part of the first question is practically impossible for mere humans. An answer to the second part of the first question, however, will be the aim of the first part of this work. The answer to the second will be touched upon in the last pages of the work.

The purpose of posing humanism against theism is to allow us to view the fallacies of both when they are examined analytically and objectively. It is obvious today that humanism is playing, and has played, a great rôle in the history of the culture of the modern world; but whether this rôle has been a good or an evil will be the subject of a considerable portion of this work. In addition, it is even more obvious that theism has figured extensively in the history of the ages. It will be the purpose of this work to point out the necessity of maintaining a theistic belief if society and mankind are to carry on in a commendable fashion in the days to come.

CHAPTER I

A HISTORICAL SURVEY OF HUMANISM

From time immemorial men have attempted to express their desire or feeling for liberty. Occasionally some of these men have been so inspired with the ideals of this liberty that they have uttered profound and commanding phrases in its support. These phrases have endured for posterity. One of the many 'greats' in this respect was Protagoras, a Greek of the fifth century B.C. One of his sayings which marks the rudimentary development of a later humanism was that "man is a measure of all things."² The underlying principle in this statement is that man is capable of shaping his own future; that man has no need for a power outside himself; that any attempts to establish the logical existence of a being of supernatural qualities are entirely misguided.

It is highly improbable that Protagoras anticipated the extensive possibilities of his remarks on man, but he surely saw and felt within himself that man was a creature who had a magnificent body and mind. He must have felt as did Shakespeare when he wrote:

"What a piece of work is man! how noble in reason! how infinite in faculty! in form and moving how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals."³

So the note which Protagoras struck was not to lie dormant. It was revived in the philosophical arguments of Plato and Aristotle, who, under the influence of a liberal culture, constructed a metaphysics and philosophy wholly apart from any element of

² Charles Bakewell: Source Book in Ancient Philosophy, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939, p. 67.

³ William Shakespeare, Hamlet.

'a personal divine being'. Both men believed that man had within himself the means of greatness. Plato's Republic, showing that man had faculties which could be developed if given the proper stimulus and encouragement, is typical of his beliefs. Aristotle's logical categories are the rational means whereby man may carry out his destiny. These two men have been the fountain-heads of all later philosophy.

Of course, all these trends toward humanism in the days before Christ bore the influence of earlier and more formidable philosophies of far Eastern cultures. We are aware today, through excavation, of the fine cultures of the East that at one time existed. It was inevitable that they should realize, in philosophical considerations, that man was a wondrous piece of handiwork. In addition, as is characteristic of many Eastern religions, the idea of a personal God was rejected. The rational development of mankind to a higher plane was due to the attractive and compelling beauty of an intellectual ideal. It was this element from the Eastern religions that influenced Grecian speculations.

Nevertheless, the culture of a religious Hebrew nation was not to go unnoticed. Although the travel hazards and communication difficulties retarded any extensive exchange of ideas, it is most probable that even the Greek ancients - Plato and Aristotle - were aware (though perhaps only superficially) of the Hebrew divinity. It is significant, then, that these men should have preferred their own gods (of finite qualities) above the God of the Hebrews.

However, after the birth and death of Christ, and with the establishment of the Christian church, there came the

inculcation of Christian beliefs with the Hebrew God. Now this, we must realize, was not in opposition to the will of Christ. Not seldom did Christ align himself with God. His greatest plea to his hearers was a reconsideration of their estate, and of their purpose in life. This life was to be lived in tune with the father God. He wished them to retain their then present ideas of God's magnificence, but he in turn wished that God might be for them a loving and moving spirit.

With the further development of the Christian Church after Paul there came about the formation of two church heads - one at Rome, the other at Constantinople. In addition to this, there were developed newer and more intricate insights into the nature of God. It was inevitable that divergent beliefs should arise between the two church heads, and in the ensuing rivalry and conflict that arose the church of Constantinople was destroyed. The church of Rome then became the guiding light of continental theology. Gradually the influence of the Pope grew and almost the entire continent was subjected to his authority. With the growth of the church, there was a contemporary growth of the idea of the world-wide purpose of the Church. Hence the name Catholic, which remained even after the immediate achievement of this was frustrated.

As the Roman church gained in prestige and power, the position of the common man under its guiding hand became more and more one of subjection. The extent of his reading was regulated, the interpretation of his reading was restricted to the church fathers, the whole life of man was subject to papal jurisdiction. As well as these burdensome regulations, it was imperative that men should believe in the cosmological principles

and ensuing metaphysics as enunciated by the church authorities.

Although the influence of the church was great during the Middle Ages, it would be an untruth to say that the authority of it went unquestioned. There are in every age some individuals or groups who have enough conviction to uphold the truth in the face of unpleasant consequences. It was, therefore, this conviction on the part of some men to stand up for freedom of thought that marked the growth of the Renaissance. Those men who have this conviction were rigorously opposed by church leaders, but there were in turn some church scholars who grasped the very words of these Renaissance men with an eagerness that comes from intellectual starvation.

Two of the more prominent men of the Renaissance humanism were Petrarch and Erasmus. This humanism bore the seeds of the later humanism of today. These men, in their search for truth and beauty, displayed a fervor and diligence which have ennobled them in the hearts and minds of scholars through the ages. It was largely due to their influence that the period of enlightenment began when it did.

Now this particular part of the Renaissance is one which has often been a topic for discussion. Statements regarding its significance have more often than not gone to extremes; but the fact remains that there was a general clamour for people to become very concerned with things not coming under papal jurisdiction. Scientific study, especially in the fields of physics and astronomy, received a new impetus with the advent of Galileo's and Copernicus' theories on the nature of the universe. Man was faced with the necessity of readjust-

ing his ideas about the relation of the earth to the rest of the solar system. Explorers brought back to the continent wondrous stories of other lands, and the proof of the spherical nature of the earth was soon to be established with the naval feats of Vasco da Gama and Magellan.

All this advancement had two effects upon man. First, it revealed to him the insignificance of himself and the earth in comparison to the entire universe. Second, with the advent of technical improvements, man became aware of a power within himself - a power with which he could 'have dominion over' the world around him. He had almost conquered the water, he could overcome many of the obstacles upon the land, and in the words of a later poet he saw "argosies of magic sails grappling in the central blue".⁴

Perhaps the words of Giordano Bruno, of the Renaissance period, best express the spirit of the age. Exultantly he cries:

"Let space be infinite, let there be an infinite number of universes, let man be infinitesimal, let there be no paradise beyond the stars, tenanted by God and his angels. Reality is all the more sublime."⁵

The human mind had become incited to explore and meditate upon itself; and as in the words of one man "the pressure of heaven and the threat of hell paled in comparison with the prospect of a success or failure of his earthly career."⁶

Coupled with this spirit of free thought came the

⁴ Tennyson, Locksley Hall.

⁵ B.A.G. Fuller, A History of Philosophy, New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1945, Part 2, p. 31.

⁶ Ibid., Part 2, p. 6.

Church Reformation under the prime influence of Martin Luther. The corrupt nature of the Church and its utter disregard for any possibility of thought on the part of common man were signs of gross error. Luther set about following his convictions: disregarding the authority of the church at Rome in preference for his own faith and reason. Had the episcopal church borne a more conciliatory front in the light of the then modern advancement, perhaps the reformation would have been delayed. Nevertheless, the time was ripe and then happen it did.

To the layman, any relation between the growth of humanism and the Reformation might seem to have little significance. But we see from the effects of this humanism today that it was inevitable that it should be a prime cause in the break-up of the Church. Men simply could not maintain their intellectual integrity and display an allegiance to the Church if they believed in freedom of thought. There were two choices for man; one offered a clouded and distorted picture in comparison to astronomical and other scientific advancement; the other offered the world as a domain and man as an all powerful being in it. Luther made the desperate and gallant effort to afford a place for both a belief in God and the universe in the mind of man. By such an effort Luther was retaining his belief in God but was acknowledging the place of reason in the life of man.

Although we must abstain from too much sentimentalism with regard to the development of humanism through the Renaissance period, we cannot but recognize the fact that its development coincided with the advancement in industry. Under an industrialized economy men became interested in the means of expansion along trade lines. Imperialism became a policy of the

nations. In the mad rush for the better lands, people overlooked the spiritual side of life and were interested only in gleaning wealth. It appeared that theism had served its day.

In addition to the heartaches it suffered due to the industrial revolution, theism was to receive one of its greatest blows so far in the early nineteenth century. This blow took the form of a theory of evolution by Charles Darwin. Of course, it was not necessarily Darwin who first believed in evolution. There were many who had contemplated its possibilities previously. We could name such people as Lamarck, Hegel, Lucretius, and even some of the Greek philosophers. Although Darwin, in publishing his papers on the "Origin of Species", apparently found no problem existing as to what it would do to theology, to many others it did present a problem. If man was developed from the lower forms of nature, how would it be possible to believe the first chapters of Genesis in the Bible?

To many, the theory of evolution was detestable. Even today we have many who do not think that there is any validity in the theory of evolution. However, it is, and has been, those people who have tenaciously held to the dogmatism of theism that have so opposed the theory. They have closed their minds completely to the idea of it, not because they necessarily believe that there is no proof for it, but rather because they will have to change some of their metaphysics.

The above statements are made concerning the so-called 'Christians' of today and yesterday, at least a majority of them. Their disbelief in evolution has then been a further cause of the great gulf that has been wrought between religion and science. If people could not credit evolution as valid, they could not

credit scientific knowledge as valid, because the very proof of evolution lay in scientific research and discovery. Consequently, the scientist has looked upon religion with scorn and Christianity has not 'turned the other cheek', but has returned the scornful attitude. The scientist has taken more seriously than was intended the words of the poet:

"Alas! what boots it with incessant care
To tend the homely, slighted, shepherd's trade,
And strictly meditate the thankless Muse?
Were it not better done, as others use,
To sport with Amaryllis in the shade,⁷
Or with the tangles of Neaera's hair?"

The fields of science and theistic religion through time then became more and more restricted, and men of intolerance on both sides have only tended to widen the already existent gulf between them.

With the dawn of the twentieth century; with the continual shrinkage of the earth due to the advancements along industrial lines; with the urbanization of populations, and with the modernization of printing, man has been faced with the necessity of re-adjusting his manner of thinking. Because of its seeming infinitude, the galactic universe of infinite numbers of solar systems seems beyond our comprehension. The world about us is full of wonders, and requires much intense contemplation and examination if we are to understand even a very small part of it. With this in mind let us pause briefly to examine some of the trends of theism in philosophy which all this has brought about.

We generally ascribe to Descartes the honour of being the first of modern philosophers. He presented problems of such

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John Milton, Lycidas.

import that they have remained problems for philosophers since his time. His great accomplishment was to establish a system of thought along the lines of mathematics. However, before he could do this, it was necessary for him to prove his existence and the existence of the world about him. He began by doubting everything about himself, but he concluded that in so doing he was thinking. He then went on to say that because he thought logically, he must exist, and if he existed, God must also exist. Consequently, a God of little importance in the system itself was established as the head of it, but one could in no wise tolerate this sort of God as a living and dynamic force in this life. God became then, for Descartes, the mere rational abstraction at the head of an architectonic.

Had this been the philosophy of only one man it would have been of little consequence, but there are many students of philosophy. Often they are faced with these abstract systems - some of which they accept. Now, consider the places of influence which these students will hold in society. Then, consider that beside Descartes we may also place the systems of Spinoza, Locke, Hume, Kant, Hegel, and many others. To the student of philosophy, who begins his studies with a steadfast belief in God as a personal and dynamic personality, and yet has an open mind, there is little danger of being misled. However, to the student who has no such set with which to begin his studies, and who is still searching for faith, there is a grave danger that he may be overwhelmed and led into endless and meaningless

⁸ Although we ascribe to Descartes the honour of being first in the field of modern philosophy, his system is almost entirely (on metaphysical grounds at least) from the philosophy of Aquinas and Augustine.

abstraction. It would appear that this is what has happened in many of the higher circles of thought - the people have been led astray. Consider Santayana and his matter; John Dewey and his pragmatism ("which pragmatism," in the words of a prominent theologian, "has been the cause of the disinterested attitude of the general run of people in America today to any form of religion.")⁹ Both systems are a form of this humanism about which we are concerned. Certainly, these systems may not permanently disallow the possibility of a God, but they surely do not take pains to allow him a place of any significance. Those people whose field of thought has been in man-made systems alone are ultimately bound to a degradation in intellect. Deprive man of a personal, dynamic, and living ideal outside himself, and you destroy the very seeds of progress within him.

This last statement is made in view of the fact that our universities and colleges are putting great confidence in the ability of man to govern the material and scientific world about him. His trust is placed in and around himself. His belief is maintained only in those things of rational possibility. If he is asked what faith is, he replies that it is a fundamental element in the religion of Christianity - about which he knows almost nothing. On the other hand, he may say that it is a belief in something which may be useful because of its solution of rational systems, or that it is a rational system itself. Both answers are gravely inadequate. This certainly is not the faith of which Christ spoke. True, the something in which faith is placed may be rationally conceived by those out-

⁹ William Creighton Graham, in an address given in United College, January 16, 1948.

side of the person having the faith, but who can say that the person having that faith can explain it rationally? Certainly the people who received healing at the hands of Christ had a faith! It was a faith which showed no trace of doubt, but it was a faith that was not rationally explicable to them. Christ himself had a faith in God; this was imperative, but who would dare to whisper a rational explanation for it all? Can a man have a faith in something when he is already aware of a logical explanation of that towards which he bears that faith? Rational psychology in this respect would be nothing short of vanity.

We have now viewed some of the humanistic elements in our society. We have traced in a general way the development of these elements - beginning with the classical research in the Middle Ages and concluding with the recent trends in philosophy. In the process we have paused occasionally to examine the influence of certain discoveries and new theories upon the common man, and the consequent encouragement which these theories have given to the cause of humanism. Bearing these things in mind, we would be prepared to state that although the cause of humanism was at first a very creditable one in that it served as a check to religious and theistic dogmatism, yet the movement has become a definite force in directing the process towards present world conditions, which may be regarded as anything but cheerful.

CHAPTER II

SOME VIEWS ON HUMANISM

As we have come to realize in the preceding chapter, we are today faced with a problem of choice. This choice is of prime significance. It was one that was posed in the time of Joshua in the Old Testament: "Choose ye this day whom ye will serve". Coincidental with this choice is the statement of Christ: "Ye cannot serve God and mammon"¹⁰. Today the choice has a modern touch, but its essential nature has been maintained throughout the centuries; and any thinking person of any integrity cannot escape it. The choice is now between a philosophy of humanism and the maintenance of belief in a personal, everlasting, and omniscient God. In this chapter we will try to examine, as impartially as possible, some of the implications of humanism. Theism will be touched upon to a certain extent, but the body of the discussion on theism will come in a later chapter.

The discussion of any subject becomes one of confusion unless we have some definite statement to make upon the subject. In view of this we will now examine a definition of humanism as found in the "Encyclopedia of Religion" by Vergilius Ferm.¹¹

"Humanism is the belief that man is on his own in an indifferent universe. His only satisfaction is ability to control part of the Universe. He is entirely this worldly. Science is the key to his hope of a better world."

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Joshua 24 : 15.

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Vergilius Ferm, An Encyclopedia of Religion, New York: Philosophical Library, 1945.

Any cosmic guarantees of human values, or of any supernatural, are not necessarily existent. Quoting from the Humanist Manifesto of 1933 (May), he says:

"Religion consists of those actions, purposes, and experiences which are humanly significant. Nothing human is alien to the religious. It includes labor, art, science, philosophy, friendship, recreations - all that is in its degree expressive of satisfying human living. The distinction between the sacred and the secular can no longer be maintained. ... The goal of humanism is a free and universal society in which people voluntarily and intelligently co-operate for the common good. Humanists demand a shared life in a shared world."

From the above definition we readily see that the cause of humanism, like the cause of so many philosophies and of so many religions is a very impressive one if we are to accept Mr. Ferm's definition. There is embodied in it, of course, a rejection of the supernatural. However, we may observe that humanism is not opposed to the development of a well balanced intellect, for it affords that as good as "all that is in its degree expressive of satisfying human living."¹² In fact, it appears from this definition that if society were to accept and maintain such an outlook, we would be on the verge of a miraculous era. We would co-operate for the common good and merely demand a "shared life in a shared world."

Let us now examine some other comments about the nature of humanism. Jacques Maritain, admittedly of the Roman Catholic faith, says that:

"Humanism essentially tends to render man more truly human, and to make his original greatness manifest by causing him to participate in all that can enrich him in nature and in history (by 'concentrating the world in man' as Schiller has almost said, and by 'dilating man to the world'). It at once demands that man make use of all the potentialities he holds within him, his

creative powers and the life of reason, and labor to make the powers of the physical world the instruments of his freedom."¹³

From this exposition we gather rather more emphatically that this manner of life, if it be alienated to theism and to the metaphysics of Christianity (in the traditional sense) has considerable possibilities. Surely this philosophy would encourage man to employ his wiles upon this universe and overcome that which impedes his progress! Does it not enable man to cling to that which presents itself to him as good? He has unbounded freedom in this curious world.

Another definition of humanism is one which is couched in general terms but depicts rather well what the majority of people regard as humanism:

"Humanism may be considered in general as the attitude of mind which seeks the key to the world in the life of man, or, at any rate, the key to man's life within himself."¹⁴

There is nothing here which contradicts the two previously stated definitions which we have examined. It is suggestive of all the possibilities incumbent in man. It reveals the utter dependence of man upon himself, that he may, through the powers conceived within himself, shape his own destiny in the world.

From the foregoing definitions it is evident that humanism is opposed to any supernaturalism. It is opposed to it as John Dewey is opposed to it. We must rid ourselves of

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Jacques Maritain, True Humanism, London: Geoffrey Bles, the Centenary Press, 1938. Introduction, p.xii.

¹⁴

J. S. Mackenzie, Lectures on Humanism, London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd., 1907, p. 14.

the shackles of creed, doctrine, and dogmatism, and muster all our power to accept nature and co-operate with her. The sooner we become aware of the fact that we are primarily dependent upon ourselves for our own destiny, the nearer will be the day when mankind may view the world in its true light. The humanist cries out against all the mental 'schemes', for they are definite forces impeding the progress of civilization. In ages past man subjected himself to the idea of God and embodied within Him the ideals necessary for a good life; but as Dewey says:

"Aims and ideals do not exist simply in "mind"; they exist in character, in personality and action. the aim and ideals that move us are generated through imagination. But they are not made out of imaginary stuff. They are made out of the hard stuff of the world of physical and social experience. The locomotive did not exist before Stevenson, nor the telegraph before the time of Morse."¹⁵

He wishes us to realize that these aims and ideals may be embodied in the 'idea of God', but these must not be confused with any supernatural concepts. Being thus relieved of any external restraints or inhibitions outside himself, man must strive for the unification of his character and personality. This is necessary, as John Dewey says:

"The whole self is an ideal, an imaginative projection. Hence the idea of a thoroughgoing and deep-seated harmonizing of the self with the universe, ... and it is pertinent to note that the unification of the self through the ceaseless flux of what it does, suffers and achieves, cannot be attained in terms of itself. The self is always directed towards something beyond itself and so its unification depends upon the idea of the integration of the shifting scenes of the world into that imaginative totality we call the universe."¹⁶

¹⁵ John Dewey, A Common Faith, found in Joseph Ratner, Intelligence in the Modern World, New York: Modern Library, 1939, p.1023.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 1016.

It is evident that the humanist may have little quarrel with the ethics of Christianity, but he is desperately opposed to the cumbersome load of dogma, creed, and ritual.

These are some of the general proposals of humanism. However, we must be prepared to observe divergencies in humanism too. Actually there are three main types, as also there are three main types of philosophy. These three approaches we will attempt to present in the light of E. A. Burt's chapter on humanism as found in Types of Religious Philosophy. Professor Burt is admittedly a humanist.

Mr. Burt says that there may be only a slight difference between the non-theistic humanist position and the more radical forms of modernism. The only difference might be that the modernist prefers to acknowledge and maintain his allegiance to the church, while the humanist prefers (usually) to paddle his own canoe. Modernism has been a means of overcoming the disadvantages of the historic and traditional dogmas and has allowed the individual not only to think rationally, but to think rationally about the Christian values and Christian principles. It has allowed a new vision of Christ, so that now he may not be a figure in history, but a symbol and example of a better and a fuller life. The more conscientious humanist then will probably also believe in the values of the life of Christ, but he will carry out his life either entirely outside any religious sect or merely maintain his membership without

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In the Journal of Religion, Vol. 21, 1941 (Jan.), David E. Roberts of Union Theological Seminary had an article called A Christian Appraisal of Humanism. Mr. Roberts took Professor Burt's chapter, as found in the book cited above, as a statement of the author's faith. Mr. Burt in the September issue reproved Mr. Roberts for 'jumping at conclusions', though he did confide that his name was on the list of names in the Humanist Manifesto.

adhering to the creed or doctrine.

In viewing the philosophical foundation of humanism, Burt says that humanists have been very much influenced by Kant, especially by his "destructive epistemology", and "they accept as essentially sound his disproof of the time-honoured argument for God and immortality." However, they find untenable Kant's "attempt to reconstruct religion upon moral postulates", for they have found through recent studies in anthropology the "relativity of moral ideas and customs to particular social needs which vary from one age and community to another."¹⁸

With reference to the naturalistic elements in humanism, E. A. Burt says:

"Man is a part of the universe... he must take no systematic account of his weal or woe: so far as he attains any enduring good he does so by intelligently controlling those natural processes which he learns how to master."¹⁹

In consequence, the humanist affords science a prominent place in his system. It is through practical inventions that he may exert mastery over the surrounding world. He is able, through mechanical advantage and power, to create a livable place in an indifferent universe.

Coupled with science then, humanism has the idea of non-teleology, for science is credited with viewing the universe as a non-purposive order. Darwinism has been an exposition of the same, and humanism accepts evolution though not only on the biological level. Still, this new biology

"makes man a part of a tree of life, genetically related to the lowest forms of the animal kingdom

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E. A. Burt, Types of Religious Philosophy, New York: Harper and Bros. Publishers, 1939, p. 366.

¹⁹

Ibid.

and capable of survival only as he continues to adjust himself successfully to environing conditions,"²⁰

but may we not be motivated to the higher form of life by the pure ability of man to adjust himself to nature and preserve the good? If we continually build on the good, never retaining the obsolete and burdensome schemes, may we not - even in the light of humanism - achieve some higher form of man? Even though there may be no final miraculous resurrection from the dead; though there may be no 'gilded mansions', if we live a 'good life' in accordance with the 'social good' we may through time attain the perfect life. There may be no 'gifts of celestial beauty', no 'golden crowns' or 'whirring wings' to act as an incentive in this life, but may we not be content to live this life in accordance with the most satisfactory order we may extract from the cosmic order?

With this preliminary view we may observe a little more closely E. A. Burt's analysis of humanism.

We must not forget that this philosophy, like any other philosophy or religion, has various expressions. These, however, need not contradict one another, but it is evident that at various phases one should be favored against another by different individuals. We know only too well how divergent are the views or sects of Christianity, and we would be committing a gross error if we lumped all such views into one and criticized them all as one. So we must analyse humanism into its main divisions so that we may not be accused of overlooking any particular view as expressed by any one division.

²⁰

Ibid., p. 369.

There are three major distinctions to be made in humanism, and these fall under the headings of the three major philosophies - idealism, realism, and pragmatism. In the first we have the great present day exponent, George Santayana. The second finds its expression in the vigorous communist movement. The third, pragmatic humanism, has been championed by none other than John Dewey.

Idealistic, or 'poetic' humanism as Burt calls it, is a type which is not too prevalent in society today. There are elements in it, however, which are maintained by people who have any special affinity for a poetic expression of themselves. It appeals more to the aesthetic than to any other feeling of the individual. In this way it remains as rather an exclusive philosophy of life; only those who find expression in drama, poetry, pageantry, and piety may be successful adherents. Religion for this humanist is essentially a poetic expression of the moral needs and aspirations of mankind. We must direct our devotions to the ideals and values in our institutions and we must ever strive to uphold these ideals. Although traditional religion of the Western world proves to be too much of a burden for the realistic humanist, the poetic humanist derives a sense or feeling of elevation and delight in the rituals and ceremonies of orthodoxy. They have, to a certain extent, inherited the spiritual awe and wonderment that was found in the Psalmist. However, the poetic humanist will not go so far as to admit the presence of a personal and protective God as did the Psalmist. Nevertheless, he will admit that in past ages, when the beliefs and ideals of men were associated with the supernatural, there were some good reasons for its being so. Now we may only retain the

idea of supernatural as it embodies our ideals, but this is no longer a necessity.

The poetic humanist wishes to preserve a sense of values. The best way to do this, for him, is to preserve the ideals of the social structure. If we may maintain the ideals in a reformed social structure, so much the better, but the ideals and values must not be allowed to fall into degradation or disrepute. Christianity, or at least orthodox religion, has maintained these principles, but neither is necessary for the further maintenance of these principles. It would be good if we could revise the symbols, but we merely say revise because these symbols are essential; they vivify and express the quest for the ideals which man pursues.

As for piety, it is the devotion of man to the ideals of our forefathers. We must bear a blameless character, and we ought not to allow ourselves to be overcome by the sins of sensuality and worldliness. These two sins are the prime enemies of piety. The latter sin especially, because it may distract us so much that we easily become lost in the whirl of materialism. On the other hand, however, we must ever avoid fanaticism or mysticism as influences in our lives, for they are both derogatory to the ultimate possibilities of humanity.

"The whole of religion for this humanist culminates in the vision of the supreme and ultimate spiritual end, which end may be conceived in one of two ways.²¹ The first is the all-pervading vision, the contemplative understanding of life, so that we are filled with a satisfying joy even in the face of

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E. A. Burt, Types of Religious Philosophy, p. 392.

personal tragedies. The second is the vision of universal charity. "Love is worthy of love, and everything and everybody must love something." ²² If we give ourselves expression in love for our brother, love for all beyond ourselves, we are aligning ourselves with the "synthesizing power" which we find expressed in nature. These are the essential concepts behind poetic humanism, of which the great exponent is George Santayana.

Realistic humanism throws a different light upon the problem of life. For him, we must so adjust our society, in maintenance of the ideals and values which are ours at present, as to allow more liberty for all men. Our world is one of progressiveness, and we must, in order to keep in harmony with it, adjust our social system in order to aid this progress. We - the animals of the highest orders - must not be guilty of impeding the natural process of the cosmos. The realistic humanist wishes to arrange society in order that more people will be favorably established. There will be no class distinction, for we are all brought into the world in like manner, we all leave the world in a similar fashion: Why may we not live that life which is given us on an equal basis?

This humanist looks at the world as an indifferent place in which we are wholly responsible for our own destiny. We may progress to a higher form of life only as we pass on our knowledge of the good to posterity. Formerly, the realistic humanist viewed the world as a machine whose constituents are blind energy, and matter; and as for a purpose in life, it was, only if man himself evolved it. Included in this conception was the idea that we are travellers through a long night, in whose

darkness lurk all the foes of man. However, these ideas have mellowed to include the view that the world is not full of enemies, but is a place for man to make his home. But build his home he must, and when he has built it, man must live in it.

Science, for this humanist, is one of the means whereby man may overcome nature. This will be achieved indirectly, for science first of all is a means of understanding the world. When we understand it we may then overcome the obstacles which impede our progress. As we have previously hinted, this progress is that of a social nature.

Religion for the realist is concerned with human ideals, and these ideals must be of a progressive nature, as alienated from a world of brute fact. We must not allow our ideals and conceptions of values to be incorporated in any theistic schemes. Theism may have been suitable at one time, but now it is not, for we are rationally capable of seeing the fallacies behind orthodox religions. As for salvation and sin in any religious sense, they must be completely rejected as detrimental to the natural development of man. They are but the residue of theism.

From the foregoing, it is quite evident that the position of the realistic humanist is much more forward and demanding than poetic humanism. It is from this humanism that communism stems.

The pragmatist has a little more comprehensive view of nature and the universe than the realistic humanist. For the realist, nature was almost alien, but for the pragmatist nature is that with which we must co-operate. "Our vision and pursuit of lofty ideals takes place in constructive interaction

with nature;"²³ the idea being that we alone are capable, but with the aids afforded us by nature we may work out a solution which is reasonably satisfactory.

Science, for the pragmatic humanist, is a study which discloses the structure of nature, and allows an understanding of the function of it. But this view of science is not complete. It does not reveal to us the entire picture, though it does increase our scope immensely. But as the pragmatist views the sunset, he sees in it not merely some particles of dust upon which the rays of the distant gaseous body descend and reflect. Rather he sees the sunset as a wealth of beauty. The amber hue cast by the lowering sun provides one with a sense of elevation, a feeling of the nearness and friendliness of nature. It is perhaps fancy, but does not this pragmatic humanism in general embody realistic and poetic humanism? We must at least admit elements of the first two are synthesized in the last.

In reference to religion for the pragmatist, we have viewed some of Dewey's comments. However, the significant thing for the pragmatist is to have ideals and a great sense of values. In fact, pragmatism has embodied some of the characteristics of idealism, which may account for the recent decline of the school idealism; the same school which, for a greater part of the nineteenth century, dominated the field of philosophy. At any rate, pragmatism does not, as some people think, overthrow all the principles and ideals which ought to be found in Christianity or any other theistic religion. The pragmatist maintains the ethics, though he does so in a more subtle manner than the traditional Christians. That is to say, the good life may be lived

in view of the ideals and values without the aid of symbolism and supernatural entities. Life has more freedom and meaning if we abandon doctrines and creeds of stagnation and accept the fact that things do change. If we wish to, we may call our aims and purposes God, but let there be no supernatural characteristics 'tagged' on. Too long have we labored under the metaphysical conceptions of God in addition to the embodiment of ideals; we realize the negative value of these metaphysics and concern ourselves with only the ideals. We must forget about the mysterious hereafter and live today, in co-operation with nature. Nature is our friend - let us learn to build our house with her.

The pragmatist evaluates ends and purposes as they are found in ideals and values of our own schemes and systems. We must not be susceptible to the conceptions of hell and heaven, as has been the Christian theist. We must not let ourselves be frightened into doing the will of the 'Great Almighty' who will burn us in eternal hell fire if we do wrong. All this is pure fancy, and what is more, it is harmful to the individual. How often have men committed suicide because they wished to die before they increased the temperature of the anticipated flames; how many criminals have become more murderous because they thought there was no help anyway? We can no longer tolerate such heinous symbolism and fancy. Only without such impediments may man achieve the unification of personality that is required if he is to be a success.

It is evident then that though the three views of the humanists differ, they have much in common. They all agree that man is here to shape his own ends. They all agree that we may

abandon the old symbols and concepts of religion (though the poetic humanist thinks there is still great value to be found in them). They do, however, differ on the purpose and veritability of science. They do differ slightly in their attitudes to nature.

We may also observe now that the trends that are at present tending towards modernism in theological circles are actually of a humanist nature. This new emergence might be called 'pragmatic Christianity'.

In view of the fact that Chapter Three will deal with criticisms of humanism, we have refrained from any serious attempt of that nature in this chapter. It was felt that we must have a clear presentation of the subject before calling forth the appraisals.

CHAPTER III

HARTSHORNE ON HUMANISM

One of the most complete rejections of humanism which could be offered is found in Charles Hartshorne's book, "Beyond Humanism". He attempts to show the inadequacies of humanism, as well as those of traditional theism, in relation to the social requirements of the present day. In addition he offers a most commendable solution to both in the form of a new theism. We shall attempt to examine, in this chapter, Mr. Hartshorne's treatment of the subject.

In opening up the subject, Mr. Hartshorne cites John Dewey as being of considerable significance. For him, Dewey is one who does not become so much an atheist as one who alters - rather radically, we would concede - the traditional view of God. However, in his Quest for Certainty, Dewey wished to alienate completely the idea of God from the supernatural. He wished - if we must consider it so necessary to hold to the term God - to make God the consummation of our ideals. He would, of course, prefer to forget about the term "God", because it has been a source of confusion in ancient, medieval, and modern times. Therefore, we would be forced to say that in opposition to traditional theism, Dewey is an atheist. But, as Hartshorne is considering the fallacies of both traditional theism and humanism in favor of a new theism, his comment on Dewey is explained.

Hartshorne says that not only has Dewey left behind the traditional God of religion, but he has not attempted to establish in his understanding any more fundamental conception of God. Man is then alone in the universe; he is the means of

his own ends. Of course, man has survived the ages rather well, but it is only now, says Dewey, that he has had the integrity and fortitude to realize that he is dependent on no being outside himself. To this Hartshorne replies that the humanist is being too rash. His objection to traditional theology is justifiable, but there is no purpose in completely extinguishing man's conception of God, and when he does do this, he tends to see in himself and his brethren more than actually is to be found there. Then, as Professor Hoton has put it, "the tragedy of humanism springs, not from its being humanism, but from its being man-centred."²⁴ But why does man not credit such a position in the cosmos? Hartshorne says man is not worthy of our final devotion. Man is too imperfect, too subject to the discrepancies within our society to merit such elevation. On the other hand, however, he points out that our former notions of supreme good have been located "in the most clearly known reality or the most ambiguous and empty unreality".²⁵ No wonder that man, in the height of frustration, turned to himself as a being of final worship.

Hartshorne says that through the ages there have been gross ambiguities in the ideas of God and Christianity; and, "whereas the heart of Christianity has been with Jesus, its intellect has been with Spinoza."²⁶ In the Middle Ages there was an attempt to unite heart and intellect in supernaturalism,

²⁴

W. S. Urquhart, Humanism and Christianity, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1945, p. 20, in quoting Professor Hoton in Contemporary Continental Theology, p. 5.

²⁵

Charles Hartshorne, Beyond Humanism, Chicago: Willet, Clark and Company, 1937, p. 4.

²⁶

Ibid., p. 7.

but this did not succeed. Today, however, we are fortunate in not having to choose between Spinoza and Jesus. With scientific discovery and deeper insight into the realm of nature, and with a clearer view of the words of Christ, we may form a complete and satisfying picture. The matter of choice is eliminated, for we may see the need of both the elements of Christ and Spinoza in a wholesome attitude toward the world. Christ was not opposed to nature - rather he was very much a friend of it. Therefore, when man has become dissatisfied with the schemes and dogmas of religion, he has tended to become a humanist. But as Hartshorne points out, the man who once has been a theist and then becomes a theist is still not inferior to the humanist. The humanist has rejected God but he cannot supply himself in God's place.

Were a man who had rejected God again to turn to theistic beliefs, Hartshorne says that he would not return to traditional theism. Rather he would advance to a new theism. This new theism, says Hartshorne, will find its essence in close communion with nature, for there is the spirit and body of God. The ancient theologians, in attempting to establish the supremacy and fatherhood of God, have only served to extricate God from nature. The new theism will return to nature in search of a fresh and comprehensive view of God.

This is indeed a great hope for that man who is already a theist. The humanist has accomplished one phase of the transition already. May he be shown that his position is yet incomplete, and that he must progress towards the better and fuller vision of the world, the Universe and God.

Speaking of fundamentalism, Hartshorne says that it

has within itself the essence of refutation. It believes that God dictated the Bible. Granted this were so, would we still not have to interpret the Bible into modern language to be able to have any degree of comprehension of it? We know that as time passes, one dialect becomes outmoded while another takes its place. To keep the Bible in terms capable of comprehension, we must ever be striving to write its truths in the most precise and modern dialect possible. The reason that the Roman Church has been so criticized is that it has failed to allow the Bible to be read in the vernacular. So also the fundamentalist friend, who refuses to alter one 'jot' or one 'tittle', fails to comprehend the truth. We would wish as does Hartshorne when he says:

"Christianity is not a code or a scientific metaphysics: it is, at its best, the sublimest inspirational source of true ideas and good acts that we have. To belittle this sublimity with literal-minded claims to finality is an old but tragic mistake. Call if you will the Christian story the centre or turning point in history, as Tillich does, but do not make providence a pedant."²⁷

One of the great pleas of the fundamentalist has been to oppose science whenever possible. Indeed, this has been one of the reasons for so exalting the idea of God and consequently extricating it from nature - so that it might be beyond the curious probings of the scientist. From his indifferent search into nature, the scientist uncovers the solutions to many problems. More often than not, however, this search discloses the presence of a multitude of greater problems. Because of the desire of the theologians to supply all the answers to any questions posed to them, they have closed out science. In defence of their positions they have moved away from the field of science

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Ibid., p. 9.

and have attempted to carry on in a faith which finds its objective in a supreme ruler of the universe. This being is to have many powers - among them the power to remove the shackles from the eyes of the misguided scientist, which he will some day do. Then how true were the words of Christ when he said "Why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but not the beam in thy own?"

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But it is not necessary that science oppose theism, at least the new theism, nor that this theism oppose science. In fact, it would seem at present as if it is necessary for them both to come together if man is to be saved from the quagmire of a listless society. Religion need not be based upon scientific fact, nor is it; but religion must see that in science there is the solution to the problem of understanding more about God. In nature there is to be found the order and power of a great will. The scientist himself does not see this, but what a thrilling universe it would be for him if he would! We cannot, however, conclude that because great and irrefutable natural laws exist, we must conceive of a great commander over all the world.

Hartshorne goes on to show how humanism is in the final analysis a disintegrating force in man. If man is to reject God and come to believe in himself as independent, what is the view which he will form of the universe? One of the problems that faces anyone - humanist or otherwise - is whether or not the life of this planet will be prolonged indefinitely. If in the face of scientific statements to the effect that the earth will

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Matt. 7 : 3.

some day disintegrate, the humanist believes that the earth will keep on forever, how can he credit the believer in divine providence with over-credulity? On the other hand, if the humanist believes in the ultimate destruction of man's habitation, how can he face the world with any degree of confidence in himself or in humanity as a whole?

The problem of - what of the future? has to be faced by man. The humanist may say that man has experienced many things in the past, and with the aid of such experience he may encounter the difficulties that lie ahead. But can we accumulate the past into a bulk of memory to which we return in each new specific situation? If man becomes extinct, what then? What of his experience? His memory? His accumulation of specific details? It all becomes nothing. Man's values will have passed into the world of nothing with man himself. With only this view to sustain him, well might the humanist say: Watchman, what of the night? The only utterance the humanist can make in answer to the question, what of the future? is that one "must be brave about it."²⁹

In one respect man may be considered as part of the infinite. He has the ability to scan the past and speculate on the future. He may talk in a world of the unconditioned, though he must work from the conditioned world. Truly man has powers which give him pre-eminence over the animals. If then man has this infinite element in him, may he not identify himself with the superhuman infinite? But, taking the view of the humanist:

"If the infinite in man is not in any respect a real superhuman being with which he can identify himself -

though vaguely and inadequately - through sympathy (which because of its inadequacy must also be humility), then he is mightily tempted to persuade himself either that there is no infinite in him at all, or that this infinite can be effectively possessed by him. The two come to much the same thing, since a finite which is not contrasted with any absolute standard is not clearly seen in its finitude, and whatever finite thing happens to be of supreme interest at the moment will be quasi-finite. Thus the alternative to religion in the true sense is megalomania in some form, the deifying of something human; or else it is the discouragement of man's vital impulses by the notion of an absolute so alien to man that he can derive no sympathetic satisfaction, no participating joy and fellowship from its existence, but must rather seek to annihilate himself as irrelevant to ultimate value."³⁰

People who have clung to the humanist beliefs have great difficulty in gaining a comprehensive view of life. They may think that they have the solution to all the problems of man, but they have not. How many men remove God from the picture, relegate nature to a subordinate position to themselves, and still have a well developed character and personality? It is preposterous for man to do such a thing, and if he does do it he is taking the first great step towards the ultimate disintegration of himself. Nature is necessarily lovable if man himself is lovable; for what is man but another organism of the cosmos? Therefore, if man loves other men, why not love that part of the cosmos which we distinguish from man by calling it nature? But this love we are unable to experience unless we have a knowledge of that which we love. Then, uniting love for nature and knowledge and making this part of a well integrated person: Is not this more than humanism? "Only humanity can be loved by a humanist, whereas the knowledge required for the realization of humanistic ends must embrace all nature."³¹ The

³⁰

Ibid., p. 18.

³¹

Ibid., p. 19.

view 'beyond humanism' then, is that we have the knowledge and love of nature. But man being so imperfect may never achieve the entire love of all nature. However, God - "simply nature as literally and profoundly lovable"³² - has the all encompassing picture.

In supporting this new theism, Hartshorne quotes from John Langdon Davies in his Man and His Universe, when he says:

"Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Newton, Leibniz, and the rest did not merely believe in God in an orthodox way, they believed that their woes told humanity more about God than had been known before. If man had not wanted to know about God it is highly doubtful if they would have worried to know about nature."³³

Also, in exemplifying this statement, we could turn to the Eastern philosophies of Buddhism and Hinduism, where God has been an unknowable, unseen being above and beyond the world. Consequently the cultures of India and China have lagged through the recent centuries. They have not experienced, as have the Western civilizations, the burning desire to know nature. Their incentive has been tragically inhibited by agnosticism.

We have above equated knowledge with love. This synthesis the humanist cannot make. But we need much more than pragmatic interest in the elements of cosmology. We must have sympathy and concern. To have an interest in nature merely insofar as it is in turn congenial to oneself is to limit ones scope to such a narrow degree that the world is only viewed through dark glasses. In this respect:

"Humanism condemns us to a lack of integration within knowledge itself. For just as God is nature as infinitely

³²

Ibid.

³³

Ibid., p. 20.

lovable, so he is nature as infinitely intelligible. To say nature is godless is to say that it is not basically intelligible."

and

"... to say God is not, is to say that the intelligible unity of the world is slight, not simply for our understanding, but in itself. This attitude discourages the attempt to enlarge our comprehension of nature, for it makes it always possible that our failures to do so are results of defects in nature as a whole, and not merely in ourselves as parts of nature."³⁴

The theist - the new theist, that is - can transcend the humanist not only in a better view towards life, which goes to make up a unified self, but he may take a more zealous curiosity to nature in order to learn more about God. Knowledge and love are the rudimentary and ever chastening terms for the theist. For the humanist the term is disinterested curiosity. Santayana depicts his last Puritan as one whose intellect is ever charged with a sense of guilt and of a fear for the after-life. He clothed his figure in the robes of ecclesiastical dogma and filled its soul with the qualms thereof. Had he but wished to change the picture it might have been that of a new theist - a man in tune with nature and so with God. It might have been a man with the peace of mind that coincides with a wholesome attitude to life. Jesus saw that we must live by impulses and thought, and not like Santayana's last puritan. Life is one of moral principles, but these principles have reason behind them. They are the inherent principles of nature, which, if followed, will allow us to sympathize with nature and so make us ethically strong. Then

"The real solution is to see the cosmic group, the universal community, as the body of God, the integrating

spirit of the world members. For nature is closer to us than the Chinese; and nature is palpably a unity, with its continuous forms of space, time, gravitation, and the like."³⁵

Refuse men the worship of God and you refuse them nature.

Without nature as a friend, men would not and could not survive.

"Refuse men the worship of God and they fall back upon egoism and state worship,"³⁶ and the results are only too apparent.

What evolves but totalitarianism and monopoly?

In order to make more clear his ideas on the new theism and organic sympathy, Mr. Hartshorne spends considerable time explaining the principles of the "cosmic variables". He has shown how the new theism may overcome humanism; now he shows us the essence of the new theism.

Man has ever been prone to think of himself in terms of being the highest form of development upon earth. Much of this attitude is derived from the belief in the early part of Genesis which states that man "shall have dominion over all things - the beasts of the field, the fowls of the air, the fish of the seas, and the creeping things upon the earth." The belief that man, the animals, and being of organic life are the only forms of life upon the earth, has been only too prevalent. "A mental capacity comparable to our own" is the criterion of judgment by which we consider the world about us. The conception that all things are subjected to man because of his exalted mental state and his ingenuity is wrong. We have fervently believed that what we call dead matter is dead. Stones

³⁵

Ibid., p. 34.

³⁶

Ibid.

are to us but dead matter in a crystallized form. This is all very naive, for "there are good reasons for thinking that inorganisms (e.g., stones) are simply aggregates of parts which are themselves organisms." ³⁷ This being the case, may not these smaller organisms be molecules, atoms, or electrons which show more analogy of behavior to animals than do sticks or stones, liquids or gases? Moreover, plants could be understood on the same basis; they do live when they are an aggregation of organisms. This being granted, what a remarkably well organized unit this world is; for all things are aggregations of particles which are in themselves organisms.

Now all things are constituted alike - to this the objector is agreed - but that still does not alleviate the fact that man is above the other creatures. Or does it? If we are going to agree upon cosmic sympathy or feeling for other creatures in the world, on what basis is this to be so? We cannot say that we love a dead thing - it must be alive. Granted, but insofar as these tiny unified organisms are alive - and a while back we stated that molecules, atoms, and electrons have behavior more analogous to that of animals than to sticks or stones - we are bound to share a love with them in obedience to the cosmic principles. To some this may appear absurd. Some objectors might say that these smaller organisms have no intellect or nervous system with which to experience sensation. In reply, the new theist would ask: Is it logical and universally right that we human beings, endowed with speech, a mental capacity, and a nervous system, should judge these smaller organisms on the same

basis as ourselves? We all agree that amoebas or other tiny organisms have digestive organs, but do they have similar digestive organs to ours? If not, then why insist that their abilities to experience sensation or to know be judged on the same basis as ours? Scientists cannot object as yet - and it is unlikely that they ever will on any factual basis - to the belief that the electrons have feeling. Electrons do conduct themselves in a regulated fashion.

At this point, with the introduction of the term 'regulated', the humanist might stop us. "There", he would say, "is the key to my theory," which proves to be the overthrow of theism itself. He is here referring to the mechanical nature of the universe. If all is mechanical, there is no free determination on the part of these lower forms of nature. But the humanist has forgotten that he too is a part of this nature of which he speaks. He too, then, is subject to the mechanical laws of which he also speaks. If he denies freedom for the smaller organisms, he must deny it for himself, and this latter he cannot do. Therefore, he cannot attribute pre-destination to the tiny organisms any more than to himself.

The humanist might also assail this theory on the grounds that the disintegration of the human body, once the will to live has gone from the being, is inevitable. The unifying factor has become extinct, therefore there is no life. But he has again overlooked the fact that prior to death there was an aggregate organism, while after death the complete unity is lost, and it is rather a multitude of entities, or organisms, or unities that are now living. The only God that is feasible for man is a God of love, and we can never conceive of him as a God of love

except "as the all sensitive mind of the world-body."³⁸ Man must then rid himself of the belief that he is the sole ruler of this world and attempt to see nature as the body of God - so beautiful, so infinite, and so orderly.

The new theism then proves superior to humanism. In addition it overcomes the stagnation of traditional theism. In the process it overcomes also the dualism of mind and matter - they are one.

CHAPTER IV

A SURVEY OF THEISM

From time immemorial man has affirmed his trust in something. That something has had a great range of existence. Men have trusted in that which has been very mundane or close at hand. They have worshipped the mysterious world beyond. That which was beyond their immediate comprehension was feared and respected. However, when the element of fear was obliterated, men came only to place their trust in the objects close at hand. These objects usually were represented as the ideals and values to which the people clung. Whether it was a golden image, an object of nature, or the distant source of light - the sun - it was something which ideally embodied the principles of the good life for which the people strove. Thus began the way of life called religion if we consider religion to mean what E. S. Brightman considers it to mean - "an allegiance to a source of value."³⁹

It has been customary for people who have held religion in the above sense to refer to this source of values or ideals as God. Nevertheless, it has been the peculiarity of men to imply in this term 'God' many strange and wonderful characteristics, besides embodying the values and ideals required in the society. The term 'God' has come to mean a supernatural being with powers of creation and destruction. It has come to mean a being who has omniscience and omnipotence. He has been referred to as a God of war, of peace, of reward, of

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E. S. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, New York: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1940, p. 241.

good, and of many other things. It might be summed up by saying that, in the main, God has been a major source of trust and hope for the variety of societies and civilizations through the ages.

The sense of God, however, must actually originate somewhere in the awareness of divinity. In this way God becomes quite personal. J. E. Boodin puts the problem rather well when he says:

"In the dawn of the mind the idea of the divine, like other ideas, is necessarily crude. Primitive man in his intellectual innocence felt the divine quality in his environment, but his imagination failed to grasp the whole. Man lived in the bosom of God, but his efforts to interpret the unseen were groping and pragmatic. Even before his fancy and his will to believe invested the things about him with life, he no doubt tried to get into rapport with the mysterious powers about him - not mechanically, because he had no idea of mechanism, nor impersonally, because he had no idea of personality. His efforts were for ages and pluralistic and opportunist, dictated by his immediate needs."⁴⁰

and so

"..... man starts with a sense of the divine. But the content in which he clothes the unseen must come through his experience. In the evolution of human experience, God is for man the great shepherd, the patriarchal father, the tribal chieftain, the judge, the lawgiver, the rational lord, the friend and comforter, in accordance with man's advance in social ideals."⁴¹

These have been the ways in which people have considered God.

Although, as we observed, the ideas of God vary from age to age, and though the God of one religion becomes inculcated in that of another, the God of the Hebrew nation has endured through the ages in relatively the same form. Hebrew theism has been the major form of theism in the history of the

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John Elof Boodin, God, New York: The MacMillan Co., 1934, p. 29.

⁴¹

Ibid.

Western civilization. True, it has undergone some changes with the embodiment of Christianity, but this has served to strengthen it. With the recognition of Christ as relative to God by his early followers there came the teachings of St. Paul. It was he who was responsible for having this religion spread into European countries. In his missionary zeal, however, he tended to express his belief in God in a manner which revealed the influence of Platonic and Aristotelian concepts. In like manner, Christianity spread across the continent - inculcating many things, including fanaticism and mysticism.

As for the theism of Plato and Aristotle, it was a mere convenience. In the one case, God was the all embracing 'idea' of goodness and light; in the other he was the unmoved mover. The God of these philosophers was one who could be thought of in a logical manner. He certainly embodied the idea of omniscience, but Aristotle's at least was not omnipotent - he could not move himself. All things were merely attracted to him. The Greek mind seemed to have a desire to think in an exacting manner, and it naturally thought of God in terms relative to their intellect. As Blewett says:

"The Greek mind in its scientific workmanship was thoroughly disinterested. Greek men of science and Greek men of thought were wont to look upon facts of life and the facts of the world with clear and direct eyes. They saw things just as they are, and described them exactly as they found them. The notion that truth - truth in the grave and deep sense of the word - could have ill consequences in the practical life, had no place with them. By the very nature of mind they were free from the vice of doing violence to the scientific conscience in order to conduct special pleadings for ethical and theological positions."⁴²

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G. J. Blewett, The Study of Nature and The Vision of God, Toronto: William Briggs, 1907, p. 56.

So much for Greek theology.

The Hebrew mind was not so given to disinterested curiosity as was the Greek mind. It was encumbered with a culture which encouraged concentration on laws, customs, and rites. The sacrifices to the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob demanded considerable attention. The fact that the Hebrews observed God as the all powerful creator of the world seemed to hamper their spirit of speculative thought. They were a pastoral people also, and the necessity to be always earning one's bread lessened the possibility of theoretical speculation. It is an economic theory that says that a poor nation is one in which the great majority of the people are farmers. If the country is rich there are more who are able to be at their leisure. Consequently, the Hebrews did little speculating because they were constantly at labor. But the Hebrew God was a practical one. He was the loving father who cared for his little flock with all patience. He was revered so greatly that his name was only used by the 'holy priest'. In common practice he was referred to as יהוה (Yahweh).

With the advent of Christian teaching upon the Continent, there commenced the most enduring and dynamic religion which the world has known. As we have previously observed, it was begun by Paul and his followers, but it was soon to be reckoned with in the form of Roman Catholicism. Under this form it was hoped that Christianity might become the religion of the whole world, hence the name Catholicism. However, the corruption of the church led to its disgrace and its division by the Reformation. This caused men to reconsider their faith in comparison with the fundamental teachings of Christ. The

result was that men became more independent of the clergy and began to think about God outside of the restricted areas which the Church had permitted.

Regardless of the fact that there has been an ever-changing idea of God, we have a number of people who still retain most of the Hebraic concepts of God - the supernatural, all powerful, all knowing being. These concepts were sufficiently valid in the days when they originated, but at present, when we have been privileged with the rapid advance of scientific discovery, we must reconsider our idea of God. We have observed the attitude of many men today in this regard, among them the humanists. We conclude, then, that something must be done to improve the logicity of the idea of God.

In the past three major systems have been employed in thinking of God. They are the cosmological, the teleological, and the ontological. In the cosmological argument we attempt to show that the world must have a first cause. This proof does not maintain itself logically. The argument follows the line that there must be a God of infinite qualities and potentialities. But this personage must find its cause from those of us who have the idea of him. But we are finite beings and God is infinite. Then how may something infinite be logically conceived from finite beings? "Beginning with an infinite or absolute cause, one might conclude with finite effects, but you cannot reverse the process."⁴³ It is an inductive leap which cannot be regarded as valid. The cosmological argument is not complete.

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John Caird, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, 1904, p. 129.

The teleological argument is elucidated in the fact that it conceives of a purpose or 'T E T I O S' for the world and for us finite beings of nature. Of the three proofs for God this one is the most acceptable, although it is not necessarily the most favored by most people. It permits the embodiment of the values and ideals which are most often held to by people. Under this proof God may be looked upon as the creator of the world according to his own free will. One difficulty arises, however: if God did create, he did so as a workman. Such being the case, he created according to the idea or purpose in his own mind. Now if he created according to a purpose, he excluded infinite power on the grounds that he set his mind on one finite thing - the universe. "Nonetheless this proof for God includes in its survey both principles of cause and principles of value."⁴⁴

The third proof is the one used by Aristotle, Aquinas, and by the founder of modern philosophy, Descartes. This argument is the most objectionable on logical grounds, but it is the one most adhered to by people. In it the very idea of God is presumed to be the proof of his existence. In this respect, however - taking in the totality of people - God would be the consummate of all the ideas of him. Consequently,

"If we conceive of God as Infinite Mind, or as that universal infinite self-consciousness on which the conscious life of all finite minds depend, and whose very nature it is to reveal himself in and to them; then we have before us a conception of the nature of man which makes religion necessary by making it in one sense the highest realization of both."⁴⁵

⁴⁴ E. S. Brightman, The Problem of God, New York: The Abingdon Press, 1930, p. 147.

⁴⁵ Caird, op.cit., p. 150.

From this we see that the idea of God has various proofs and there may be various ideals or values attached to God. We might pause here to view a few of these ideals.

Perhaps the idea of God most often expressed by people is that of 'goodness'. The implication of this is that if God is goodness there must be some other power in the world which must represent badness. This has to be so because we certainly cannot be blind to the fact that there is evil in the world as well as good. This being so, there must be a being who is evil by nature.

One other idea of God is that he is a cosmic personality or divine consciousness. This view is one that has come to considerable favor in recent times. It is in fact a rather intriguing view. One seems to gain a sense of comfort or solace in that there is an all-encompassing personality which has concern for each one of us. It is the patriarchal view of which Boodin spoke. However, there are some implications. These we will view presently as we consider some of the implications if God is infinite and if he is finite.

There are few modern theologians who consider God as Absolute or Infinite. However, it has been the view favored by the fundamentalists and by Roman Catholicism. Undoubtedly the latest notable exponent of Absolutism has been Karl Barth. Let us analyse briefly the position of God as an infinite being.

If God is infinite then he must be all good. He cannot, if he is absolutely perfect, be imperfect - that is only logical. Then, being infinite, God must be all powerful. But he is not all powerful, because he cannot do evil, for he is all good. Then there must be conceived another being in the world

who is all evil, and the heads of evil wage an endless war against the heads of good, and the battle-ground is man. But referring back to the omnipotence of God - if he has not the power to do evil he cannot have the power to do everything, and therefore he is not all powerful.

If God is conceived of as infinite, then the effect upon the mind of man is like a 'wet blanket.' There is a discouragement to further search about God. The reason is that because God is infinite he cannot reveal himself in the objects at our hand because these objects are finite - the finite cannot be the infinite. Consequently, the logical outcome of a belief in an infinite God is agnosticism. God is unempirical because he cannot be finite, and we experience only the finite. It is therefore evident that the idea of God as infinite or absolute is not suitable for man.

What then if God is finite? It is certain that if we consider him as such, we may have a coherent account of evil. God, being finite, could not create a Universe so extensive. Then he could not be responsible for the evil that we experience in this sphere. But we must always be aware that evil will overcome good in the final analysis. This we feel is true from our everyday life. Do we not find that although the way seems difficult, the load heavy, the obstacles almost impossible, there always seems to be a satisfactory solution of it all through time? For the common man, then, a finite God seems somewhat favorable.

However, there are objections to a finite God. Some object to it as being too inadequate a religious ideal. Some object to it as implying anthropomorphism. This ism may be

considered as the prominent defect in theistic finitism. It is not quite feasible that God should be considered a finite being in all respects. As such he would generally be conceived in the light of human characteristics; and man is generally supposed to be unworthy as an object of divine worship. Another absurdity that arises here is that we generally refer to the future as expansion. If we do this, how do we view the past - as regression? If God is considered to expand in the future, he must be considered to contract in the past until zero is reached. But this implies that God began from zero, which is absurd. Nothing will come of nothing in our logic, so the idea of a finite God is not complete.

The finite God then is an absurdity. But we found that the Absolute God was similarly illogical. How then are we to solve these difficulties? Could it be that we must deduce finite - infinite theism as a solution? We are told by Brightman that a "finite God makes a rational open-eyed faith possible,"⁴⁶ but we know there are occasions when an infinite God is preferable - especially when it comes to creation - in some cases. Perhaps Brightman's definition of God is suitable, however. He says that:

"God is a Person supremely conscious, supremely valuable, and supremely creative, yet limited both by the free choices of other persons and by restrictions within his own nature."⁴⁷

It seems that we must concede this, then - that God is a finite - infinite being if he is to be conceived in a satisfactory manner.

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Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, p. 334.

⁴⁷

Brightman, The Problem of God, p. 113.

by man. This is the conclusion at which Blewett arrives. In this respect he cites Wordsworth as one who was able to vision God in a finite - infinite fashion. We know that this poet certainly had a homely philosophy, but it was one which was suitable for this life. He saw God in the world and he wrote about him in the world, but he still thought of God as infinite in some respects. This is evident in his words:

"Wisdom and Spirit of the universe! 49
Thou Soul, that art the Eternity of thought!"

With this deduction, then, that we must conceive of God in an infinite, yet finite being, what may be said for the present day Christian theist? Is his position one which has a rational basis, or is his but an emotional position? Perhaps there are few who are Christian who attempt to formulate their position, but we would be of the opinion that most people will be found to favor a finite - infinite God. Few people, unless they are dogmatists, will tenaciously hold to the absolute theism in practice, although many wish they could believe in the idea of an absolute God. On the other hand, those who hold to a finite theism will find it easy to practice this belief. However, should their position be analysed for them, surely they would realize that they have not so much logic on their side as they had supposed. They would have to concede that they must accept the infinite characteristic of God in respect to the creation of the world. God, then, is finite in some respects, infinite in others.

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Blewett, op.cit.

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Wordsworth, from The Prelude.

CHAPTER V

HARTSHORNE ON THEISM

As we have several times noted through the foregoing discourse, traditional theism has been full of ambiguities. In view of this fact, Charles Hartshorne has attempted to extricate theism from these dogmatic beliefs and has come forth with a logical, simple, but forcible interpretation. We will attempt to elucidate some of Mr. Hartshorne's deductions here.

What we have long required is an exhaustive classification of theistic beliefs in order that we might discuss them logically and precisely. Hartshorne has provided us with such a classification. He has divided the theisms into three major classes and then subdivided these. The classification is as follows:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Symbol</u>	<u>Case</u>	<u>Interpretation</u>
I	A	1	Absolute perfection in all respects.
II	A R	2	Absolute perfection in some respects, relative perfection in all others.
	A R I	3	Absolute perfection, relative perfection, and "imperfection" (neither absolute nor relative perfection), each in some respects.
	A I	4	Absolute perfection in some respects, imperfection in all others.
III	R	5	Absolute perfection in no respects, relative in all.
	R I	6	Absolute perfection in no respects, relative in some, imperfection in the others.
	I	7	Absolute perfection in no respects, imperfection in all.

It is readily evident that this classification excludes no theisms. Upon examination we find that Group I has only one type, while the other two Groups have subordinate classifications. Group I includes the absolute qualities for God. Group II includes any beliefs which attribute to God some absolute qualities and some which are merely unsurpassable. Group III has only those beliefs which give to God no qualities of absolute perfection.

It is evident that first type theism implies a rational basis for thinking about God. God can only be conceived through intellect. He has no empirical qualities. In third type theism we have the antithesis. God is completely finite. This type of theism includes the pantheistic, hylozoistic, religions. God is for this group only experienced in an empirical fashion. Hartshorne feels that these two Groups (I and III) represent the positions of the extremes of traditional theologies: The infinite and the pantheistic. He then attempts to show that the only logical way that we could think about God is in some way to amalgamate these two theisms. The manner in which he attempts this feat is through considering the idea of perfection as used in his classifications. Apparently perfectibility means not "completeness" but merely "unsurpassability" by anything other than itself. Now we know if we implied this in first type theism that we would eradicate many of the difficulties of God as infinite. However, if we implied it in third type theism we find God is completely surpassable in only one case (No. 7). In his preface ⁵¹ Hartshorne speaks of power.

⁵¹

Ibid., p.xvi.

Now, when one speaks of perfection he usually implies some sort of power. But Hartshorne equates power with influence, so

" ... perfect power is perfect influence, over individuals which, as such, only a very imperfect power would even try to reduce to mere echoes or mechanical executors of its own decisions. There is a perfect way, as there are imperfect ones, of allotting to others the amount of good and evil they shall have within reach of their own decisions. There is neither an imperfect nor a perfect way of dealing with individuals as totally within power of their own over good and evil." 52

But Hartshorne also finds in power an element of love. Therefore God as a being - perfect in at least some respects - will have some power, some love, some influence. This is the essence of second type theism, and this, as Hartshorne sees it, is the solution to the difficulties arising in first and third type theisms.

In turning to his chapter on Theological Analogies, Hartshorne points out that man has ever had to think of God in terms of analogies and symbols and never in concrete terms. We have often thought of God as a father who sympathizes, reproves, and cares for his children. God has also been conceived as a tender shepherd watching lovingly over his sheep lest they stray from the green pastures. He has been thought of as no less than a monarch or world boss. These last analogies prove to be the least suitable to our universe of the ones cited. Along with these metaphorical conceptions of God, Hartshorne brings in another and more highly elaborate analogy. We have previously referred to this one as the new theism, but we will elucidate a little more fully here.

It is generally agreed that the only object over which

man has direct control is his own body. At least, this is so if by direct control is meant immediate. It is also agreed that this "organic body is both composite and simple, it is a complexity, but an integrated complexity."⁵³ If man receives an impression - be it tactile, olfactory, or otherwise - he has volition to respond to that impression. Now Hartshorne draws an analogy between the body of man and the world, and between the will of man and the will of God. If man has direct control over his body, God has direct control over his - the world.

And as

"God's volition is related to the world as though every object in it were to him a nerve muscle, and his omniscience is related to it as though every object were a muscle-nerve. A brain cell is for us as it were a nerve-muscle, and a muscle-nerve, in that its internal motions respond to our thoughts, and our thoughts to its motions. If there is a theological analogy, here is its locus. God has no separate sense organs or muscles, because all parts of the world body directly perform both functions for him. In this sense the world is God's body."⁵⁴

In addition to the individual body analogy to the world as God's body, Hartshorne goes on to create another analogy, which is this time social. We individuals, as the cells in our body, must work co-operatively for the maturity of the whole. We must practise the self-control necessary for our own well being in the influencing of others; and herein is love and "love makes all control of others also self-control, all denial self-denial, it does not abolish control or denial."⁵⁵

Obviously, there are objections to this analogy. But these objections will come from the ranks of traditional theism. These objections will arise because of the limitations placed

⁵³

Ibid., p. 181.

⁵⁴

Ibid., p. 185.

⁵⁵

Ibid., p. 187.

upon God's personage. Some might concede that if this analogy is valid, God is deprived of the ability to create the world, for man is unable to add 'one cubit' to his stature. However, we might interpret the meaning of creation as does Hartshorne - that is, to be a means of influence in the natural growth of the body. We may exercise our body if we wish to develop it more. Similarly, God may be conceived to create the world.

The analogy may be assailed on the problem of evil. If we are subject to sin - God must be subject to it. Hartshorne replies that God is not subject to such discord as we are.

Unquestionably this conclusion which Hartshorne reaches is very similar to pantheism. But in anticipation of such a criticism, Hartshorne shows that this analogy is more than empirical. This view involves second type theism, and as such overcomes the empirical in favor of some aspects of perfection. We have seen in previous deliberations how second type theism is quite suitable and adequate for man - more so than any other theism. This is the conclusion which Brightman has reached and it is the conclusion which we have reached. God cannot be conceived as absolute - he cannot be conceived as finite; he can be conceived as finite - infinite, however.

CONCLUSION

We have come now to the concluding phase of this work, and it is only now that we are able to give the final interpretation to it. It is difficult for one to carry through a discussion and then come to an ultimate interpretation of it; but this interpretation is necessary if any discussion is to be deemed worthy of the time which it requires to maintain it.

We have examined the fundamental assumptions and beliefs of the humanist. It has been observed that he has stressed the need to usurp our ancient 'trappings' of dogmatic theology for the wondrous realization of the potentialities of man himself. It has been noted too that the humanist is concerned for the welfare of man. He must have security, he must be realistic, he must face life squarely and on his own initiative. In all this the humanist is quite sincere, and he may be commended for his fortitude, but the sad part is that he has not gone far enough. The humanist lacks an entire comprehensive view. He is brave, yet, but he is unreasonable too; he must have more.

We have also concerned ourselves with a consideration of theism. We have observed that ancient theological beliefs have taken various forms. Theisms have been illogical and inadequate. Proofs for God's existence are so illogical that it would seem we must extricate ourselves from theistic beliefs entirely. Certain ideas about God conceive him as being finite, some as infinite, some as infinite and finite. Much discussion has been given to these things.

We have given some consideration to theological analogies in respect to Charles Hartshorne's books, "Beyond

Humanism" and "Man's Vision of God". It has been inspiring to learn of new ways in which we may think about God. However, there is one disturbing thing about it all; that is that neither the consideration of humanism nor that of theism has brought us to anything of much greater import. "What," we may ask, "is the purpose of thinking about God, what is there for us in proofs for his existence, how does theism really overcome humanism?"

Perhaps the most crying need which is apparent in our world today is that men should (in colloquial terms) 'see the light'. But the great problem which confronts us is: What is the light? This may be conceived as the deficiency in humanism. The humanist says we must seek truth but the problem which is for him and many others is, what is truth? This is the same problem which has befuddled men throughout the ages - the crowning example occurring when jesting Pilate before Christ asked "What is truth?"

It seems that there is no conclusive answer to the question, what is truth? But we do know this - that there is truth and that truth is right. But why is it right? The only answer is that if man does not live by the truth he must live by deception, and we know from experience that he who lives by this philosophy is doomed. Perhaps that is why the prophets through the ages have boldly proclaimed that men must mend their ways or suffer annihilation. It was inevitable that destruction should come. It was not because the prophet said so that they would be destroyed, it was not because of anyone's saying so that would make it so, but it was so because the very underlying principle of the world said it. We cannot overcome the fact that there are universal and immortal truths in the world, and

we must live by them or we will destroy ourselves.

It is today necessary, as ever it was, that men should live by truth. That men should be ready to stand up for truth against all opposition, persecution, or destruction is imperative, or we heap upon ourselves veritable coals of fire. If we do not produce men in our United Nations Organization who will stand up for what they know is true rather than for the economic diplomacy of their nation which they represent, we shall be doomed to further turbulence. War is inevitable if we cannot have leaders who will be willing to sacrifice prestige and honour for themselves and for their country in preference for truth.

As for the domestic uses of truth, they are only too apparent. What eruptions would occur in our church if men would demand truth - if the ministers would be prepared to sacrifice their reputations and prestige, even themselves, for truth! But why shouldn't they? Christ stood for truth, and if men are going to call themselves Christians they must stand for truth or be dubbed, as Christ himself dubbed the Scribes and Pharisees of his day, hypocrites. Christ died on the cross - not because he had not the means with which to help himself, not for the purpose of honour or prestige, but because he saw that that was the only way he could uphold truth. That was the only road he could take. He could not have allowed himself to be a king because he had to live by truth, and as a king he would demand truth. Such a king would have been overwhelmed in a society purged with deception.

We might observe another occasion when a man stood for truth. Abraham Lincoln, facing a terrible crisis, with the

issues at stake being slavery and economic rivalry, said:

"If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union."⁵⁶

These are the words of a man who endeavored to live by what he believed was true and because he so lived he has endeared himself to the hearts of many within and without his own country.

Truth, however, presupposes something else. We cannot live by truth merely because some supernatural figure says we ought or because someone says we ought. We must have an affection for truth - a love for it. We have seen how Hartshorne spoke of love - a cosmic sympathy. This is intriguing. We must adhere to love as the all-pervading, underlying, and necessary principle of the universe - God. We cannot escape this love and escape perdition. If we will to deceive we will to be destroyed. Deceit is the handmaiden of destruction.

It is therefore evident that we must live by truth; not because you or I say we ought, not because the clergy says we ought, not because the philosopher says we ought, not because Christ said we ought, but because it is the imperative principle of our universe.

We now conclude that we cannot escape God. God is love; God is truth. But he is so not for any rational proof, not because we will it, not because we think it, but because he is that and we cannot deny it. We know that the principles on which this universe turn demand that truth be upheld if we

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Nathaniel W. Stephenson, Abraham Lincoln and the Union,
Toronto: Glasgow, Brook and Co., 1918, p. 114.

are to survive, but truth must have love, and love is God. The humanist believed in the integration of the personality in order that we might produce a mind uninhibited, a character noble and strong; but he did not really know how to get this. He knew it was needed and he wanted it, but like the child in the crib wanting the toy beyond its reach the humanist does not know how to achieve his desire. The answer is through love for, and faith in, the truth against all odds. If we live in love and by truth we will be contributing to the higher principles of the Universe and we will be achieving the aims laid down by Plato when he said:

" the true order of going, or being led by another, to the things of love, is to begin from the beauties of earth and mount upward for the sake of that other beauty, using these as steps only, and from one going to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to all fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is."⁵⁷

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