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Special Issue

Our Diverse Cities: Challenges and Opportunities

CONTENTS

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Our Diverse Cities: Challenges and Opportunities

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Our Diverse Cities: Challenges and Opportunities

Contents

Ethnic Enclaves and Social Cohesion

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Abstract
Ethnic enclaves have a vibrant local commercial and services infrastructure. They are not altogether places of poverty and despair, at least not in the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA). Their social benefits outweigh the disadvantages of the predominance of one ethnic group. Social cohesion is largely promoted through the equality of economic opportunities, open society and public education. These are supra–neighbourhood processes, and institutionalizing them through the metropolitan, provincial and societal policies are ways to promote social cohesion. Neighbourhoods play an insignificant role in these processes.

Keywords: Ethnic enclave, social cohesion, multicultural Toronto

Perspectives on Ethnic Enclaves

Canadians often express concern about neighbourhoods dominated by persons of one ethnic background, particularly of visible minorities. While immigration has become necessary for population growth and labour supply, immigrants' concentration in a neighbourhood or city is viewed with apprehension.[1] This ambiguity is reflected in the celebration of the food, music and crafts of Chinese malls, India Bazaars and Italian markets, and the simultaneous characterization of corresponding neighbourhoods as places that breed segregation and social exclusion. Residential concentrations of ethnics are regarded as ethnic ghettos while their commercial clusters are lauded as an economic asset. This duality is the idiom of discourse about the ethnic geographies of cities.

Ethnic concentrations come in many forms. A cluster of households of one ethnicity in a building or street is a small and unobtrusive agglomeration of ethnics (in a neighbourhood). When a particular ethnic group forms a large proportion

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of a neighbourhood's population, it becomes a geographic concentration. Mere living side by side without any community bonds and shared sentiments does not make an ethnic neighbourhood. It is the emergence of formal and informal community institutions and symbols that converts a concentration into an ethnic neighbourhood and eventually an enclave. Formally, a residential enclave is an area where a particular ethnic group numerically dominates, and has spawned corresponding religious, cultural, commercial and linguistic services and institutions. An enclave is a culturally and economically distinct area (Marcuse 2005; Peach 2005; Qadeer 2005).[2] We will examine ethnic residential enclaves through the lens of the Toronto CMA.

Ghetto is another type of local community. It is an ethnically and/or racially segregated area of poor living conditions. Residential segregation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a ghetto. Poverty, deprivation and discrimination are the defining conditions of ghetto.

Cities are always organized in spatially differentiated neighbourhoods—rich here, poor there, young families in suburbs, seniors and singles in downtown. The point is that spatial and functional differentiations by class, income, ethnicity, life style or family type and activities are the organizing principles of cities. As long as these differentiations are neither imposed, nor are they a source of poverty and exclusion, they do not constitute ghettos. By this criteria, ethnic neighbourhoods and enclaves per se are not ghettos. It is not right to assume the spatial concentration of a group to be a symptom of ethnic discrimination and social pathology.

Apart from the media and public at large, academic literature also portrays ambiguity about ethnic enclaves. Academic researchers and commentators of varying theoretical orientation differ in their views about enclaves. Some regard them positively, others regard them poorly and a few are unconcerned. Those steeped in the Chicago sociological tradition and the 'melting pot' perspective tend to view enclaves as cultural ghettos, obstructing the assimilation of ethnics; whereas others inspired by European theoretical traditions and multicultural perspectives regard enclaves as expressions of cultural pluralism and sites of social capital formation.[3]

Poverty in cities is also woven into the narrative of ethnic neighbourhoods and immigrants' exclusion. The conjunction of poverty and immigrants' concentration has been interpreted as a fall out of racial and ethnic minorities' residential segregation. This narrative is inspired by the American experience of Black ghettos. Anecdotal accounts and popular beliefs maintain that ethnic enclaves of visible minorities, white enclaves are seldom mentioned, inhibit "immigrant off springs from succeeding as citizens" (Francis 2002,16). Yet Canadian cities present a complex picture that does not bear out these beliefs.

Kazemipur and Halli analyzed the causes of the rising poverty rates in Canada in 1990s, particularly in urban areas. Their comprehensive study led them to

the conclusion that,"spatial concentration of poverty in Canada has not followed the American Cities" (Kazemipur and Halli 2000, 136). They further conclude that,"race does not influence social trends drastically in Canada…..even ethnicity is far from creating rigid boundaries among people" (p. 157).

Another study of the 1971-91 period examined the existence of immigrants as an underclass in Canadian cities. The concept of underclass is more wide ranging than poverty of individuals and families. It refers to multiple deprivations and has a spatial dimension. Neighbourhoods with high rates of welfare, unemployment, mother led families, deficient work or education skills are the elements defining the term underclass (Ley and Smith 1997, 1). Measuring the incidence of these indicators at the census tract (CT) level in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver, Ley and Smith concludes that, "while immigration plays a role in membership of multiple-deprived tracts, deprivation displays far greater heterogeneity and indeed a majority of members in such tracts are native-born (Ley and Smith 1997, 35). They observe that "underclass concept has limited purchase in Canada's largest cities" (p. 41). Both of these studies point to the weak correlation between immigrants' concentration and neighbourhood poverty. It points out that broader economic conditions and societal institutions have determining influence on poverty and deprivation.

More recently the United Way of Greater Toronto examined the geography of neighbourhood poverty in the city of Toronto, not Census Metropolitan Area (CMA), for the period 1981-2001. From our perspective, the key findings are: i) poor neighbourhoods are concentrated in the city and they have increased over time, ii) visible minority and immigrant families make a large percentage of the total poor families in these neighbourhoods (United Way of the Greater Toronto 2004, 4). Cursorily read, this report may suggest that immigrant neighbourhoods and poverty are one and the same. But on reflection it is obvious that as immigrants start at the bottom and with continual immigration, a lot of the poor are bound to be immigrants. Yet it does not mean that most immigrants are poor. Furthermore ethnicity is a characteristic of both immigrants and born- Canadians. Therefore ethnic enclaves are not just places of immigrants' concentration and poverty.

Hou and Picot of Statistics Canada have attempted to construct a statistical profile of visible minorities' geographic concentrations at the CT level in Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver in 2001. Yet they have misinterpreted visible minorities' spatial concentrations as places of segregation and locales of ghettos. By mislabeling the measure of relative concentration as the Isolation Index, they observe that the residential concentrations promote "social isolation and reduce minorities' incentives to acquire host-country language or to gain work experience and educational qualifications" (Hou and Picot 2004, 13). Incidentally, Isolation Index is essentially a measure of the composition of a CT's popula-

tion. Relative proportion of a group's population in a CT is interpreted to be the probability of one of its members meeting others of the same group. This is conceptually a weak assumption.

When Siddiqui of The Toronto Star observed that Hou and Picot's study "resurrects, even if unintentionally, the very worst clichés about immigrants," the authors in reply to his queries conceded they had no direct evidence of immigrants behaviours but were only "recycling the assumptions found in academic literature" (Siddiqui 2004). Other commentators, such as Francis, are more direct about calling enclaves "impediments to social advancements" (2002, 102). All in all, one streak of the academic and journalistic thought regards enclaves as ghettos in the making and an obstacle to the assimilation of immigrants. Much of their argument is based on the notion that ethnic enclaves impede the social cohesion of Canadian society.

Yet those subscribing to the pluralistic models of Canadian society, or those steeped in the ideology of multiculturalism have a favourable view of ethnic enclaves and neighbourhoods (Harney 1985; Kymlicka 1998; Fong 1996; Peach 2005). In an assessment of Canadian experience of minority enclaves, Hiebert (2003) concludes that, "enclaves exist but definitive evidence of ghettoization does not." Preston and Murnachan in discussing the segregation of immigrants in Canadian cities observe that, "segregation is largely voluntary, an attempt to maintain cultural identities and heritage" (Preston and Murnaghan 2005, 68).

We can cite many other writers and commentators on both sides of the public debate about the social impacts of ethnic enclaves, but the critical point is that social cohesion and economic integration of minorities, including immigrants, are the criteria by which enclaves are assessed. A brief digression in defining social cohesion and economic integration is in order at this juncture.

Social cohesion

Simply put, social cohesion is an attribute of the quality of social bonds and institutions in a society or community. It is the basis of social order and nationhood. It is essentially a societal process and individuals or groups contribute to it but are not its primary agents. The Canadian Government's Policy Research Initiative (PRI) defines social cohesion as: "the ongoing process of developing a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunity within Canada based on a sense of trust, hope and reciprocity among all Canadians" (PRI 1999, 22). The key phrases here have been emphasized.

Apart from being a process, social cohesion is also a state in the sense that societies can be more or less cohesive. Maxwell takes a political approach towards social cohesion by describing it as a "society that accepts diversity and manages conflict before they become fights" (Maxwell 2003). Socially such a society is based on the inclusion of all its members. "People belong: they are not allowed to

be excluded" (Dahrendorf et.al.1995, vii).

A study commissioned by the European Commission concludes that the process of social cohesion promotes a "reduction of disparities, inequalities and social exclusion, and strengthens social relations, interactions and ties" (Berger-Schmit 2000, 4). It is not meant to counter diversity and homogenize identities but to build institutions that create a common ground of civil, economic and political rights enabling individuals and (ethnic) communities to fulfill their full potential.

Similarly, equality of economic opportunities for immigrants as well as long established citizens (i.e native-born Canadians) is a necessary condition for social cohesion. The removal of institutional barriers, such as ethnic discrimination in the job market or the undervaluing of foreign credentials, is thus a part of the process of building social cohesion. In all, social cohesion is a comprehensive concept including political, social and economic integration. The question is how space enters in the equation of social cohesion.

Spatial segregation affects social cohesion negatively. To the extent this proposition is valid, any assessment of enclaves boils down to determining whether they spatially and socially segregate their residents. Thus, the degree of segregation becomes the indicator of their contribution to social cohesion. Later we will point out some limitations of this proposition, but our immediate task is to assess the scope of segregation in the CMA's enclaves. We will let the data speak to this question.

Ethnicity in the Toronto Area

Toronto's Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) is the largest metropolitan area of Canada. It had a population of 4.6 million in 2001 which by now should be approaching 5 million, growing largely with immigration. Almost 46 % of immigrants landing in Canada settle in the Toronto area.

In 2001, foreign-born immigrants were about 44% of the CMA's population. The declining rate of natural growth has made immigration the primary force of population growth in Canada. Furthermore, a majority of immigrants have been coming from Asia, Latin America and Africa resulting in a larger proportion of visible minorities. They are destined to become a majority in the CMA, if present trends continue, particularly as immigrants' children born in Canada multiply.[4] Ethnicity is a defining condition of Canada now, and it will be in future all the more so in the Toronto area.

The City of Toronto has a long history of ethnic neighbourhoods, beginning with Irish Catholics' concentration in Victorian Cabbagetown, Blacks' settlement around Church Street and Queen's Street East and Eastern European Jews' enclave in St John's Ward at the time of the First World War. Harney calls these enclaves "little homelands" (1985, 11). This tradition has continued with successive waves

of immigrants up to the present times. One break with the history is that current ethnic neighbourhoods are not just in the old parts of the central city, but in the newly developing suburban municipalities and even farther out in exurbia. We have mapped the CMA's ethnic concentrations by the Census Tract (CT) based on the data of 2001 census of population using the following criteria.

Two types of concentrations, primary and secondary, have been identified using the following measures. 1)Primary concentration is a CT where the majority, more than 50%, of population, is of one ethnic background. 2) Secondary concentration is a CT where persons of a particular ethnicity are the single largest group without being in the majority, about 25-49% of a tract's population. Our criteria are more finely tuned than a gross ratio of 30% used by Hou and Picot. [5]

Applying these criteria, all CTs of the CMA were mapped for the respective proportions of six major ethnic groups of relatively new immigrants, namely Italians, Jews, Chinese, South Asians, Caribbeans and Portuguese.[6] These procedures yielded Map-1, which shows all areas of primary and/or secondary concentrations for each of these groups. It should be noted that the map is about the ethnic distribution of population, which includes both immigrants and Canadian-born of ethnic origins. They are based on the sum of single and multiple ethnicities self-reported by respondents in the long form of the Canadian census.

What is striking is that the ethnic concentrations, by and large, occur in clusters of CTs creating relatively large swaths of territories with high concentrations of one or the other ethnic group. These clusters of CTs have fostered corresponding places of worship, ethnic stores, professional services and other local institutions of distinct ethnic provenance. They have evolved into enclaves. For example there are now six Chinatowns—four of these are suburban Chinese malls located in the middle of Chinese ethnic enclaves. Though not so well organized, similar commercial and (professional) office clusters of South Asians, Jews, Italian and Greeks and other ethnic groups have emerged in the midst of their neighbourhoods. The metropolitan structure is evolving towards a polycentric spatial system of multicultural forms.

Structure of the Toronto Area's Ethnic Enclaves

Map-1 shows that ethnic enclaves are now essentially a suburban phenomenon. The only large enclave in the central city is the Jewish concentration in the North-central part of Toronto. Anchored to Bathurst Street, it is comprised of 14 CTs of the primary concentration and 23 of the secondary in 2001. Little Italy, the historic Chinatowns, Portuguese village and South Asian clusters are relatively small and secondary concentrations in Toronto city.

The Toronto Metropolitan Area has two distinct ethnic sectors. In the northeast has emerged a large cluster of Chinese dominated CTs, both primary and secondary, extending northward from Sheppard Avenue into municipalities of Markham

and Richmond Hill. This area has many Chinese shopping malls and business/office parks, including Pacific Mall purportedly the largest Chinese shopping mall in Canada.

Map 1



The northwestern sector of the metropolitan area has a second large ethnic concentration, namely the Woodbridge neighbourhood, which is essentially Italian in character. Bakeries, community centres, churches and cultural clubs complement Woodbridge's residential concentration. There are smaller Italian and Chinese concentrations in other parts of the metropolitan area, but these two stand out. The Chinese enclaves encompass about 203,395 persons out of the total Chinese population in the CMA of 435,700. Similarly 137,425 Italians lived in enclaves out of a total population of 429,560. Obviously only a minority of both groups lived in enclaves.

South Asians are the third group to form ethnic enclaves, though these enclaves are scattered across the metropolitan area. A number of CTs in Mississauga and Brampton, spilling into the northern Etobicoke, have secondary concentrations of South Asians. Similarly, Eastern Scarborough has another cluster of CTs with

a secondary concentration of South Asians. In both areas, there are churches, mosques, mandirs, halal butchers, Indian restaurants, immigration lawyers and consultants, travel agents and cultural associations, which turn these areas into enclaves. Apartment buildings in Flamingdon Park and Thorncliff Park in East York and St. James town in Toronto are small but well-known South Asian primary enclaves.

Portuguese are the other ethnic group from the six we have studied that has a noticeable territorial concentration. Arrayed along Dundas and College Streets in the center-west of the city of Toronto are about 20 CTs with secondary concentrations of Portuguese. Being the locus of Portuguese religious commercial and cultural life in the city, these areas qualify as enclaves.

What stands out is the absence of an enclave of Blacks in the CMA. Concentrations of Blacks are at the scale of an apartment building, a few hundred people in any one area, but they do not reach the CT level, except one.

GIS analysis points out the following characteristics of the Toronto's enclaves:

- National origins, language and religion are the binding elements of enclaves. Race is an ancillary factor.
- Out of the three large enclaves, Jewish, Italian and Chinese, two are of people of white and European ancestry. Chinese and South Asians are the only visible minority enclaves. There is no sizable enclave of Blacks.
- By and large, the CMA's enclaves are not comparable to Harlem or South Bronx in New York or Watts in Los Angeles in size. The most common forms of concentrations are secondary in character, where a particular ethnic group is not a majority. We will discuss the internal diversity of enclaves later in this article.
- Ethnic concentrations have spawned ethnic economies and a wide range of ethnic commercial and service establishments as well as religious and cultural institutions. Concentration of a sizable number of one particular ethnic group precipitates thresholds for the viability of ethnic businesses, professional services and religious/cultural organizations. These are advantages of enclaves for residents as well the larger communities.
- Enclaves have shifted the locus of ethnicity to suburbs. One finds upscale Chinese restaurants in Markham and Richmond Hill and South Asian strip plazas in Brampton and Mississauga, for example.

Having some idea of the structure and scope of ethnic enclaves in the Toronto area, we can now directly address the central question of this article. What contributions do enclaves as urban neighbourhoods make towards promoting social cohesion, if any? To answer this question, we will begin with an analysis of the degree of social segregation of these neighbourhoods.

Dynamics of Ethnic Concentration in Toronto's Enclaves

One of the indicators of social cohesion is the probability of social encounters among individuals and groups of varying backgrounds. Presumably, encounters lay the ground for better mutual understanding and sharing of values. One commonly used measure of this indicator is the degree of concentration of an ethnic group in enclaves of the CMA.

Table -1 shows the proportions of the six ethnic groups living in enclaves for 1996 and 2001.Two observations stand out: 1) only a minority of each ethnic group in the CMA live in enclaves; Jews had the highest proportion (49%) of their population living in enclave though still a minority of them lived in the enclave. Chinese followed closely (47%), while South Asians (34%) and Italian (32%) are a distant third in the degree of concentration. In 2001, Caribbean/ Blacks were almost completely de-concentrated, with less than 1% living in enclaves. 2) Comparing the proportions of 1996 and 2001, the decline in concentration ratios of long established ethnic groups, such as Jews, Italians and Portuguese, is observable. During the same period of time, the proportions of Chinese and South Asians living in enclaves increased, while Blacks almost disappeared from the map of enclaves. There may be a tendency towards leveling of concentration after initial settlement, as a new immigrant group establishes its roots in Canada.

Table 1: Population living in ethnic enclaves

	1996			2001		
% of Ethnic Group Living within an Enclave	**No. of Respondents Living in Enclaves**	**No. of Total Ethnic Respondents in CTs**	Percentage of Ethnic Respondents Living in Enclaves	No. of Respondents Living in Enclaves	No. of Total Ethnic Respondents in CTs	Percentage of Ethnic Respondents Living in Enclaves
Blacks	2455	87210	2.82%	0	0	0
Caribbean	5415	239675	2.26%	420	260745	0.16%
Chinese	146020	358765	40.70%	203395	435700	46.68%
Italian	137155	413745	33.15%	137425	429560	31.99%
Jews	88050	155915	56.47%	79255	161250	49.15%
Portuguese	41510	161450	25.71%	37175	171790	21.64%
South Asian	98600	374470	26.33%	164935	487110	33.86%
TOTAL CTs			813			932

Source: Statistics Canada's ethnicity data

Are Ethnic Enclaves Sites of Segregation?

Segregation is the antonym of integration. A simple measure of segregation is the spatial distribution of an ethnic group's population in a city. Ideally, a group's

population should be evenly distributed in all CTs or similar territorial units (i.e. 50% of a group's population should be living in 50% of CTs). This ideal is rarely realized because people settle where they can afford to live and where services they want are convenient and accessible; their choice is not determined by a pull or push towards their ethnic group only. Yet this measure is a first cut to indicate the degree of concentration of the group.

Table-2 shows the distribution of 50% of a group's population by CTs for the six ethnic groups and English (for comparison) in the Toronto CMA. Jews are the most concentrated followed by two pairs of ethnic groups with similar degrees of concentration, namely Portuguese and Chinese as one close pair and Italians and South Asians as another. Even persons of English ancestry are not evenly distributed, though they are relatively more dispersed than other groups.

Table 2: Ethnic Segregation in the Toronto Area

Ethnic Group	Percentage of CTs in which 50% of the group's population lives.
Jews	3.6
Chinese	10.1
Portuguese	10.6
Italians	13.4
South Asians	13.4
Caribbeans/Blacks	17.2
English	24.7

Source of Data: Statistics Canada.
Note: The lower the percentage of CTs, the higher is the level of concentration.

Table-3 suggests that enclaves are internally diverse because most CTs (215) have secondary concentrations. Chinese, Italians, Jews or South Asians may be the largest single group in these CTs, but 51-75% of the CT population had a different ethnic background. Only 60 out of the total of 931 CTs in the CMA had a majority of their population belonging to respective ethnic groups. There is no CT that is exclusively inhabited by one ethnic group. Everyday, an ethnic group will encounter people of different ethnic backgrounds at bus stops, in neighbourhood stores and on residential streets and parks.

If we compare the number of primary and secondary CTs for various groups, it can be observed that the number of both primary and secondary CTs of Italian, Jews, Portuguese and Caribbean concentrations decreased over the five year period. This observation affirms the earlier conclusions that ethnic concentration for older immigrant groups begin to decrease over time. There seems to be a flattening of the curve of concentration around 60-70% of a CT's population.

Table 3: Total Number of Census Tracts in Ethnic Enclaves

	No. of CTs in 1996		No. of CTs in 2001	
Ethnic Group	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary
Caribbean	0	2	-	1
Chinese	13	47	20	69
Italian	19	42	15	41
Jews	11	31	14	23
Portuguese	2	21	1	20
South Asian	-	41	10	62
Blacks	-	1	-	-
Total	45	185	60	216

Data Source: Statistics Canada

Finally, all these ethnic groups are comprised of persons of considerable (sub)cultural and linguistic differences. Jews include persons of German, Russian, Israeli and other national origins. Cantonese-speaking Chinese differ from Mandarin-speaking Chinese, and the socio-cultural backgrounds of these groups differ from Hong Kong Chinese and Taiwanese, despite sharing the same language. South Asians come from different religions, speak different languages and look similar only to strangers. The point is that an ethnic concentration has almost as many internal cultural differences as could be imagined among different groups. One conclusion to make from these findings is that ethnic segregation in the Toronto Area is tempered by a fair degree of internal diversity.

Are Enclaves Potential Ghettos?

The concentration of ethnic minorities raises apprehensions about Toronto's enclaves turning into ghettos. It is an apprehension that is not borne out by the internal conditions of enclaves.

To begin with, ghettos are largely the product of exclusion and externally imposed segregation of a minority. Toronto's enclaves are primarily the outcome of people's choices for homes and businesses, within the parameters of affordability and accessibility. There is no evidence of any systematic steering of ethnics towards certain neighbourhoods by public policy, social processes or real estate agents. What brings about the concentration of one group in an area is the prospective renters' or home owners' reliance on their friends and family for information about available accommodation or business opportunity. Obviously, friends and family primarily know about opportunities in their immediate surroundings. Proximity to people of one's own background comes about as a byproduct of choices made

on the basis of affordability and neighbourhood conditions one comes to know through one's contacts.[7]

Interestingly, Francis who has written a strong critique of the Canadian immigration policy and holds immigrants' clustering together to be the cause of their inability to assimilate,(p18, 58), herself on arriving as an immigrant lived "with other immigrants in Toronto who were from the US or Europe" (Francis 2002:10). The point of this example is that new immigrants are strangers in Canada who initially are drawn to their co-ethnics. They have little choice but to approach others from their homelands for support and introductions. Some degree of clustering is necessary for immigrants.

Another reason for the ethnic concentration is the draw of places of worship or congregations. For example, Orthodox Jews, Christians of Eastern orthodox denominations, and some Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus have established small territorial communities around their places of worship. In other cases, common language may be an attraction to move to enclaves, such as for Chinese new immigrants. Cumulatively, these reasons result in the spatial concentration of ethnic groups in some areas. Overall, enclaves are largely the product of market forces and personal choices.

Regarding the defining conditions of ghettos, namely poverty and deprivation, the Toronto's enclaves present a contradictory picture. They are not necessarily poor and blighted areas. There may be rental buildings here or housing co-ops there with high incidence of the poverty and other deprivation, but at the scale of a CT (which has an average population of 5,000) enclaves have almost a full range of metropolitan household incomes. They certainly are not the neighbourhoods of despair.

Overlaying Maps 2 and 3 on the map of ethnic enclaves (Map -1), we have gleaned the following observations:

- Using the CMA's percentage of families (19%) below $30, 000 annual income in 2001 as an area's base line of the incidence of poverty, we compared Map 2 to Map 1. We found a U-shaped band of high poverty CTs in the city of Toronto. The majority of CTs in Jewish, Italian and South Asian enclaves are below the CMA average of poverty, though South Asian areas have a sprinkling of CTs that are slightly above the CMA rate of poverty. Some CTs of the Chinese enclave located in Agincourt, South Asians living in Rexdale and parts of the Portuguese secondary enclave in downtown Toronto standout as CTs of high poverty. Generally, ethnic enclaves have CTs of both below average and above average levels of poverty, not unlike the rest of the metropolis. Ethnic enclaves are not largely poor areas.
- Map-3 shows the distribution of families earning more than $70,000 annual income by the percentage of CT families. The overall CMA average for families making more than $70,000 was 45%. Map-3 also shows that CTs of "much above average" family income, (identified by dark shading) are on the

metropolitan fringes and in the city center straddling Yonge Street. Enclaves largely fall in areas of above average incomes with a sprinkling of "below CMA average" CTs. Again, enclaves have their fair share of affluent families.

This cartographic analysis indicates that enclaves are not areas of high concentration of poverty or deprivation. There are small clusters of poverty in enclaves, reflecting the metropolitan pattern. Most enclaves are in the suburban areas that have a higher proportion of single-family homes and a corresponding high rates of ownership. These indicators, combined with the internal diversity of enclaves and the fact that enclaves are formed by choice, suggests that enclaves are not ghettos.

Do Enclaves Impede Social Cohesion?

Urban neighbourhoods by themselves have a limited direct role in fostering social cohesion. Residentially, they may segregate people or be poverty-stricken, which may then affect residents' economic and political opportunities. Yet on all these counts, their limited influence has little direct impact on building an overall community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunities.

Urban neighbourhoods have long lost the character of territorial communities of primary relations and strong neighbourly bonds. Modern social life is based on communities of interest, occupational associations, voluntary organizations and social networks that are spread all across a city. (Wellman and Leighton 1979; Keller 1968) A neighbourhood is at best a weak social organization of local interests. Its social relations are mediated through children's schools, play groups and local services. It also has some symbolic meaning. The point is that neighbourhoods do not have a primary role in fostering a strong sense of belonging to a society or nation, or in determining individuals' life chances. Having grounded our discussion in empirical facts, we are in a position to answer the question about the relationship between enclaves and social cohesion.

Social Cohesion and Enclaves : Advantages and Disadvantages

The choice of ethnic households to live in areas of high concentration of their own group has two implications. First, living in such neighbourhoods must be viewed as beneficial on balance. There are distinct advantages of the critical mass of ethnics in a neighbouhood. Elderly and homebound women find companionship among those who speak their language and have many common interests and values. It facilitates the socialization of children in their heritage culture. Politically and socially, minority communities feel strength in numbers. They can form voters blocks that politicians are compelled to pay heed to. Ethnic stores, services and places of worship become viable and emerge to enrich an area. Places of worship can be established closeby. Organizing religious and cultural activities is easy.

Map 2


Markham
Vaughan
Woodbridge
Agincourt
Rexdale
Malton
Brampton
Mississauga
Pearson Airport
Lake Ontario
N
Percentage of CT Families earning less than $30,000
0 - 19 (below CMA avg)
19.1 - 24.9 (above CMA avg)
25 - 71.1 (much above CMA avg)
Percentage of CT Families with Annual Income under $30,000 in 2001
5 0 5 10 Kilometers
Source of data: Census 2001
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Map 3


Markham
Vaughan
Woodbridge
Agincourt
Rexdale
Malton
Brampton
Mississauga
Pearson Airport
Lake Ontario
N
Percentage of CT Families with Annual Income above $70,000 in 2001
Percentage of CT families with annual income above $70,000 in 2001
2.6 - 45 (below CMA avg)
45.1 - 62.3 (above CMA avg)
62.3 - 92.2 (much above CMA avg)
5 0 5 10 Kilometers
Source of data: Census 2001
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Ethnic neighbourhoods enliven suburbs and introduce a variety of new forms and functions in a metropolitan area.

Against these advantages are the possibilities of children not being fully attuned to the mainstream values and being delayed in learning English. An ethnic neighbourhood is easy to identify and stereotype and in extreme circumstances may become the target of prejudice and violence, as has happened in France and Britain in recent years. Yet in an open society, the advantages of enclaves outweigh the disadvantages.

Second, the contemporary neighbourhood is a community of polite but limited social relations. People normally have largely nodding acquaintance with other residents of their street, not to speak of a whole neighbourhood.

Persons of one ethnicity may be a majority in a neighbourhood, but their work places, educational and health services, professional associations and social networks are spread all across a city. The activity system of a typical urbanite brings her/ him in contact with persons of diverse backgrounds in areas far and away. It is therefore not appropriate to assume that ethnic composition of one's residential area defines the scope of one's social life. Thus terms like Isolation index are not the true measures of the social segregation/ integration of a person or group.

Educational institutions, political/ economic organizations, professional groups and voluntary associations are the critical sites of social cohesion. Schools and universities, newspapers and mass media acculturate citizens in common values and national sentiments. Equality of job opportunities and the opening of the political processes to minorities and immigrants promote social integration. All in all, it may be that enclaves symbolically tie together residents more than a typical neighbourhood; but they neither inhibit their contacts with the larger community, nor do they provide full range of facilities and services necessary for modern living.

Enclaves are not a barrier to social inclusion, but even if they were there are no policy instruments in a democratic and market-oriented society to direct people away from living in neighbourhoods of their choice.

Strengthening public education, increasing employment equity, fostering open society and promoting political participation are the processes that promote social cohesion. Institutions where such activities are enacted, such as schools, places of work, governments, media and sports and arts, are the sites where social cohesion can be fostered. They need to be inclusive of all segments of society.

Notes

[1] The national newspapers usually brand ethnic enclaves as ghettos. Carey's (2001) report on Toronto's high-rise buildings full of immigrants sum them up as "High-rise ghettos." Among academic and other public commentators such views are not uncommon. For example see Francis 2002.

[2] Portes and Bach (1985) consider an economic ethnic enclave to be a set of activities

dominated by an ethnic group, Koreans in flower trade or Punjabi taxi services at the Toronto airport for example.

[3] For a summary of the two contrasting viewpoints see Introduction in Varady (2005).

[4] Statistics Canada projects that by 2017, visible minorities will be 50.6% of the CMA population.

[5] We have used single and multiple responses of the long census questionnaire as the estimated ethnic population and the sum of responses as the total population of a CT. According to Statistics Canada, ethnicity refers to a person's ancestral and/or cultural background. The concept of ethnicity is somewhat multidimensional as it includes aspects such as race, origin or ancestry, identity, language and religion. The term is applicable to both immigrants and Canadian-born.

[6] South Asians include East Indians, Punjabis, Pakistanis, Tamils/ Sri Lankans and Bengalis. Similarly, the group name "Caribbean" includes Jamaicans, Trinidadians, Guyanese and others. Jews have identified themselves both as an ethnic and religious group. Ethnicity is entirely based on the respondents' self-identification in response to the Canadian Census.

[7] Our small study of South Asian households in Mississauga's and Brampton shows that "being near one's own type" was not the primary reason when households to choose their homes (Kumar and Qadeer 2006). For a Chinese enclave, a similar observation was reported in Kumar and Leung (2005).

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Immigration, Social Disadvantage and Urban Youth Gangs: Results of a Toronto-Area Survey[1]

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Abstract
Both media coverage and public opinion suggest that immigrants are responsible for a high proportion of youth gang activity in Canada. Unfortunately, very little academic research has actually examined the extent and nature of youth gang activity in this country. Our paper attempts to address this gap in the literature through an analysis of data from a survey of Toronto high school students and street youth. Our results suggest that: 1) immigrant youth are less likely to report gang affiliation than their Canadian born counterparts; 2) although Black and Hispanic youth are more likely to report gang activity than youth from all other racial backgrounds, the majority of gang members in Toronto are Canadian-born whites; and 3) racial differences in gang involvement can be explained by racial differences in economic and social marginalization. The policy implications of these findings are discussed.

Keywords: Toronto, gangs, immigration, disadvantage

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Introduction

Over the past decade, youth gangs and gang-related violence have emerged as major social problems in many of Canada's urban centres. Much of the recent concern stems from an apparent increase in gun-related homicides in cities like Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. Many of these high-profile murders have been directly attributed to gang activity because they often take place in public settings and frequently involve young, minority males as both victims and offenders. The involvement of minority males has further contributed to the public perception that gangs are an immigration issue. Extensive media coverage of Jamaican posses, Chinese Triads, Tamil gangs, Vietnamese gangs, the Russian mafia and well known American gangs like the Bloods and Crips, has also likely strengthened the belief that the gang issue in Canada is an "imported" phenomena. Unfortunately, youth gangs in Canada have attracted much more media attention and public concern (see Shepard 1998) than academic research. Thus, to date, there is no empirical basis for the hypothesized link between patterns of immigration and gang activity in Canada.

Much of the Canadian gang research that has been undertaken is at least a decade old and based on extremely small samples. The problem of youth gangs in Toronto was, for instance, addressed in the early 1990s with information gained from interviews with a total of twelve youths (see Mathews 1993). Other research has been similarly modest in scope, often employing qualitative methods to investigate already identified and quite distinctive groups of young people residing in specific geographic locations: for example, Chinese immigrant gangs in British Columbia (Delbert and Norman 1980); Aboriginal gangs in the Prairies (Nafekh 2002); and skinhead gangs in both Calgary (Young and Curry 1997) and Edmonton (Baron 1997). To the best of our knowledge, there has been no previous large scale investigation of the extent of gang-related activity among more general populations of young people.

In the absence of an equivalent body of research in Canada, much of the way we think about youth gangs derives from the American experience. It is perhaps inevitable—given Canada's close physical and cultural proximity to the United States—that any investigation of youth gangs in Canada will invite comparisons with the U.S. However, significantly higher rates of violent crime in America, along with easier access to lethal weapons, makes it unlikely that gang activity in this country will take exactly the same form as gang activity in comparable American jurisdictions. Nonetheless, it is no longer plausible to argue that gangs are a uniquely American phenomenon. Indeed, regardless of how superficial its impact has been, large segments of Canadian youth have been exposed to American gang imagery and have adopted linguistic codes and dress styles associated with American gang culture (Klein 2002). How similar youth gangs in Canada are to their more frequently studied American counterparts remains to be seen.

One of the important lessons that we've already learned from American researchers is that there is little agreement about how we might go about recognizing or defining youth gangs. The following questions summarize some of the problems that those who study and work with gangs have to face: How do we distinguish youth gangs from other informal social groups? What are the defining characteristics of youth gangs? Are gang members always involved in crime? Do gangs always have specific names, clearly defined organizational structures (i.e., leaders and followers), initiation rituals and common colours? Do youth gangs claim control of particular urban territories?

These definitional issues are extremely important. American studies strongly suggest that how youth gangs are defined will have a major impact on how many gangs are identified in a particular community. For example, if gangs must have a name, display specific colours, practice initiation rituals, have clearly identified leaders and followers and engage in criminal activity, then fewer of them are going to be found than if one concludes that all groups of young people that hang out together are involved in gang activity. In other words, the larger the number of criteria that have to be met, the smaller the gang count is going to be. Thus, if you employ a restrictive definition of a gang, you stand a good chance of underestimating the true number of gangs in a community. By contrast, if you employ a broad definition, you run the risk of overestimating the magnitude of the gang problem. Overestimating the scope of youth gang activity may elevate people's fears of gang crime and could result in the inappropriate allocation of police and social service resources. On the other hand, underestimating youth gang activity could mean that a serious problem goes unchallenged. Quite clearly, policy-makers, non-government organizations (NGOs), educators and researchers need to know: "When is a group a gang?"

The purpose of this article is to update and broaden our general knowledge of youth gangs in Canada with information from a recent survey of Toronto high school students and street youth. Five specific research questions frame our analysis: 1) What proportion of Toronto youth claim gang membership? 2) What types of legal and illegal activities do gang members engage in? 3) Are self-identified gang members more involved in crime and victimization than non-gang youth? 4) Are immigrant youth more involved in gangs than youth born in Canada? and 5) What other social factors (gender, social class, ethnicity, etc.) are correlated with gang membership? We hope that the answers to these questions may help us construct a basic profile of youth gang activity in this country at the beginning of the new millennium. Furthermore, the information gathered may contribute to 'big picture' debates about the relationship between youth participation in gang activities and other dimensions of their lives.

Research Methods

We present findings from a large study of "in school" and "out of school" youth from Metro Toronto. In our opinion, Toronto is an ideal city for investigating the relationship between immigration and youth gang activity. First of all, Toronto has been described as one of the most diverse cities in the World and annually receives more immigrants and refugees than any other Canadian jurisdiction. Secondly, Toronto has recently experienced a sharp increase in gang-related crime—particularly gang-related homicides. However, we caution that the results of this survey may not be easily generalized to other regions of Canada. Indeed, different urban areas in Canada experience different patterns of immigration and different patterns of crime. Thus, in our opinion, future research should be pan-Canadian in scope and enable comparisons in gang activity between regions.

Our study was undertaken between June 1998 and June 2000. The first stage of the project involved intensive focus group discussions with both street youth and high school students. As well as an important source of qualitative information on the lived experiences of young people, these focus group sessions helped us identify important issues and develop survey items for the final questionnaire.

The second stage of the project involved an extensive survey of Toronto street youth. Street youth were contacted through three local shelters and four drop-in centers that cater to the needs of the homeless population. Most of these shelters were located in the downtown region of Toronto—where most street youth in the city congregate. Overall, the questionnaire was completed by 396 street youth.

The third stage of the project involved a survey of Toronto high school students. We randomly selected 30 schools (20 from the larger Public School Board and 10 from the Catholic School Board) to take part in the survey. The final school sample consisted of institutions from all areas of the city. Nine schools (30.0%) were randomly selected from the urban core and 21 schools (70.0%) were selected from the vast suburban region. The final sample consists of 10 schools (33%) from economically disadvantaged areas, 15 schools (50.0%) from "middle-class" areas and 5 schools (17%) from relatively affluent regions of the city.

Once a school was selected, we received a list of all home-room classes. From this list, we randomly selected a single class from each grade (Grades 9 through O.C.)[2]to take part in the study. In the end, the survey was administered to 3,393 students from 202 different home-room classes. The class lists indicated that there were 4,127 students enrolled in the 202 classes selected for the study. Thus, we were able to achieve a response rate of approximately 82 percent. The questionnaire was administered in a classroom setting during regular school hours. It took the typical student 50 to 70 minutes to complete.

Sample Description

The final high school sample ranges in age from 14 to 20 years (average age=16.6 years). Approximately 50% of the student respondents are male. Consistent with recent Census data, the high school sample is very ethnically and religiously diverse. For example, almost half (46%) of the high school students we surveyed were not born in Canada. In addition, most of our immigrant respondents (54%) have resided in Canada for less than five years. In addition, less than half (45%) of the high school sample self-reported a "white" or European racial identity. By contrast, 18% of the high school respondents reported that they were Asian, 13% reported that they were Black, 12% reported that they were South Asian, 4% reported that they were West Asian (i.e., Middle-Eastern), 3% reported that they were Hispanic and 5% reported that they belonged to some "other" racial group.[3] Finally, over a third of our high school sample reported a non-Christian religious affiliation (e.g., Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, etc.).

Compared to the high school respondents, the street youth sample tends to be older (average age=19.3 years) and are more likely to be male (69.9%). Compared to high school students, street youth are also more likely to be born in Canada (79%) and are more likely to report a "white" or European racial identity (67%). However, it should be noted that one out of every five street youth respondents (20%) are Black (compared to only 12% of our high school respondents) and 5% are Aboriginal (compared to less than 1% of our high school respondents).[4] It appears that both Asians (3%) and South Asians (3%) are significantly under-represented among street youth. Interestingly, most of our street youth respondents (93%) report no religious affiliation.

Findings

We began our analysis of the youth gang phenomena by asking our respondents whether they thought youth gangs were a major problem in the Toronto region. The results suggest that the vast majority of Toronto youth – much like other segments of the public—strongly believe that gang activity is a serious social issue. For example, three out of every four high school respondents (75%) report that they think gangs are either a very serious (52%) or serious social problem (23%) in the Greater Toronto Area. By contrast, only 4% think that gangs are "not a problem at all." As crime researchers, however, we recognize that public perception does not always mesh with reality. The next obvious question, therefore, is how much gang activity is there? To what extent are Toronto youth involved with the gang culture?

Rather than impose a particular academic definition of gang activity on our respondents, we simply let them decide for themselves whether they felt they belonged to a youth gang or not. We began by asking all respondents "Have you ever belonged to a gang?" Approximately one out of every ten high school

youth (11%) and one out of every four street youth (27%) claim that they have been a gang member at some point in their life (see Table 1). We then asked our respondents "Do you belong to a gang now?" Less than 6% of our high school students admitted current gang membership, compared to 16% of street youth. Thus, street youth are approximately three times more likely to report current gang membership than their high school counterparts. This finding is consistent with other research results which suggest that street youth are much more involved than other young people in a wide range of deviant activities (Hagan and McCarthy 1997). It is important to note that our estimate of current gang membership among high school students (5.7%) is only about half that estimated by an "unscientific" Toronto Star study released in 1998 (see Shephard 1998). Two explanations for this lower estimate are possible: gang membership among Toronto high school students has dramatically declined since 1998, or differences in gang estimates between the two studies are the result of major differences in the quality of research methodology (i.e, sampling strategies, questionnaire administration, etc.)

Table 1. Percent of Respondents who Report that They have Belonged to a "Gang" at Some Time in Their Life

	High School Students	Street Youth
Never Been a Gang Member	88.9	73.2
Former Gang Member	5.4	10.4
Current Gang Member	5.7	16.4
Sample Size	3393	396

The Nature of Youth Gang Activity in Toronto

What does it mean to be a "gang member" in Toronto? What do students and street youth mean when they say they are the member of a gang? Are they specifying that they are involved in organized criminal activity or are they simply communicating the fact that they frequently hang out with a familiar group of friends who provide them with both companionship and a sense of belonging? In order to address these issues we asked all those respondents who admitted a gang affiliation about the types of activities they have engaged in as the member of a youth gang. The results suggest that a great deal of gang activity involves "social" rather than "criminal" behaviour (see Table 2). For example, 83% of high school gang members claim that they just socialize or hang out with other gang members. Similarly, 73% report that they go to parties, 64% admit that they play sports and 56% claim that they use alcohol and/or drugs within the gang context. By contrast, only 39% of high school gang members admit that

they have ever sold drugs or engaged in property crime within the context of the gang.[5]

However, we can not discount the fact that gang membership is often associated with certain forms of violence. Indeed, over half of all high school gang members (57%) admit that they have participated in street fights in which their gang was pitted against another gang. It is also important to note that four out of five student gang members (78%) maintain that their gang serves a protective function: fellow gang members look out for or protect each other when they are at school or on the street. It could be that bullying and victimization experiences cause some youth to seek sanctuary in gang membership. Being known as a gang member—as someone who has associates who will stand up for you and seek revenge if you are attacked or challenged—may cause other predatory offenders to think twice about choosing you as a victim.

Table 2. Percent of Current and Former Gang Members who Report that They Engaged in Various Activities within the Gang Context

	Students	Street Youth
Sold Illegal Drugs	39.3	76.2
Used Alcohol and Illegal Drugs	56.2	76.2
Engaged in Property Crime	39.5	53.3
Fought Against Other Gangs	56.8	64.8
Used the Gang for Protection	77.5	81.0
Played Sports Together	64.2	50.5
Socialized or Hung Out	82.8	84.8
Went to Parties or Clubs	73.2	80.0
Sample Size	377	105

The fact that many of the routine "gang" activities described by our respondents do not involve criminal behaviour encouraged us to re-conceptualize gang membership. In our new classification, we distinguish between the members of "criminal" and the members of "social" gangs. Respondents were classified as the member of a "criminal" gang if they indicated that they had either sold drugs, stolen property or fought against other gangs as part of their regular gang activities (see Table 3). According to this new classification scheme, only 4% of our high school respondents are currently the member of what might be called a "criminal" gang.[6] It is also important to note that approximately one-third (31%) of all high school students who originally claimed gang membership were, in fact, only the member of a "social" gang. These types of social groupings are not, by definition, involved in any criminal activity. Thus, while journalistic calculations of the number of high school students claiming lifetime gang membership are

roughly accurate, the numbers alone do not tell the whole story. Indeed, students who claim gang membership are often not involved in any criminal activity. Current criminal gang membership, however, is much more common among street youth (15%) than high school students (4%). In fact, over ninety percent of all street youth who originally admitted gang membership were involved in a gang that engaged in some form of illegal activity.

Table 3. Percent of All Respondents Who Reported That They Belong to Either a "Criminal" or a "Social" Gang

	Students	Street Youth
Never Been a Gang Member	88.9	73.2
Former Member of a "Social" Gang	2.0	1.5
Former Member of a "Criminal" Gang	3.4	8.8
Current "Social" Gang Member	1.5	1.8
Current "Criminal" Gang Member	4.2	14.6
Sample Size	3393	396

Gang Membership and Crime

As a reliability check, we decided to compare our five basic gang categories with respect to independent measures of both criminal behaviour and illicit drug use. It is important to note that no matter what type of criminal activity we asked about—minor theft, major theft, vandalism, car theft, break and entering, drug dealing, carrying weapons or physical violence—current criminal gang members report much higher rates of criminal involvement than all other groups. Compared to social gang members and non-gang youth, former criminal gang members also report relatively high levels of criminal behaviour (see Table 4). For example, over half of all current criminal gang members (51%) report that they have sold drugs on ten or more occasions in the past year, followed by 21% of former criminal gang members. By contrast, not a single social gang member—and only 2% of non-gang members—report selling drugs at this level. Clearly, drug dealing is an activity that is highly associated with membership in a criminal gang. Furthermore, 35% of criminal gang members report that they broke into a home or business in the past year, compared to only 2% of social gang members and 2% of students who do not report a gang affiliation. These dramatic differences between gang members and non-gang youth also exist for all other forms of property crime (Table 4).

With respect to violence, nine out of every ten criminal gang members (91%) report that they were in a physical fight in the past year, compared to only 27% of social gang members and 26% of students who do not belong to a gang.

Similarly, 43% of criminal gang members report that they engaged in extortion or robbery in the past year (i.e., used physical force to take money from another person), compared to only 6% of social gang members and 5% of non-gang youth. The potential seriousness of gang-related violence can be demonstrated by the fact that almost 70% of current criminal gang members report that they carried a knife or gun with them during the past year. By contrast, only 11% of current social gang members and 12% of non-gang youth report that they carried a weapon.

Table 4. Percent of High School Students Who Have Engaged in Various Criminal Activities Over the Past Twelve Months, by Type of Gang Affiliation

	Never a Gang Member	Former Social Gang Member	Current Social Gang Member	Former Criminal Gang Member	Current Criminal Gang Member
Broke into a car to steal something	2.8	4.5	5.8	13.8	45.5
Stole a motor vehicle	0.9	6.0	1.9	11.2	37.3
Broke into a home or business	2.0	7.5	2.0	13.8	35.2
Sold drugs - ever in the past year	7.2	9.0	1.9	40.5	67.6
Sold drugs 10 or more times in past year	2.1	0.0	0.0	21.6	51.4
Vandalism	18.0	28.4	28.8	44.8	62.0
Minor theft (less than $50)	17.8	15.9	25.0	40.5	69.5
Major theft ($50 or more)	6.6	11.9	5.8	31.0	60.0
Carried a gun or knife	11.2	20.9	11.8	48.2	68.3
Extortion/Robbery	5.6	4.5	5.9	21.1	43.0
Attacked to seriously harm someone	7.4	6.0	5.9	45.6	57.7
Involved in a Fight	26.5	32.8	27.5	58.8	90.8
Involved in a Gang (Group) Fight	12.7	19.7	23.5	47.4	79.6
Sexual Assaulted Someone	0.3	3.0	0.0	3.5	11.3
Used Marijuana	26.3	31.8	19.6	65.5	84.6
Used Cocaine/Crack	1.6	4.5	2.0	11.2	17.5
Used Other Illicit Drugs	5.3	7.6	2.0	26.7	25.2
Sample Size	3,015	67	52	116	143

Both current and former criminal gang members also report much higher levels of illicit drug use than either social gang members or those with no gang affiliation (see Table 4). For example, among high school students, 85% of current criminal gang members report that they used marijuana in the past year, 17% report that they used cocaine or crack and 25% report that they used other illicit drugs. By comparison, only 20% of current social gang members and 26%

of non-gang youth report that they used marijuana in the past twelve months. Similarly, only 2% of current social gang members and 1.6% of non-gang youth report that they used cocaine or crack in the past year.

In sum, our results strongly suggest that membership in a "criminal" gang is strongly related to high levels of criminal offending and illicit drug consumption. However, it is important to stress that high school students who claim "social" gang membership report only slightly higher levels of deviance and criminal offending than those who have never been the member of a gang. Indeed, differences in offending behaviour between social gang and non-gang youth rarely reach statistical significance. Clearly, many youth who identify themselves as "gang members" are not overly involved in deviant or criminal activities. It should also be noted that differences in offending behaviour between non-gang members and "criminal" gang members are much greater among high school students than street youth. For example, among high school students, "criminal" gang members score 6.5 times higher on our "total criminality" scale than non-gang members. By contrast, among street youth, "criminal" gang members only score 1.7 times higher than those who are not the member of a gang (see discussion in Tanner and Wortley 2002). Thus, while street youth who are "criminal" gang members have the highest overall levels of offending, they are not that different from street youth who are not members of a gang. We suggest that this pattern of results is a further illustration of what has been consistently reported in the research literature: life on the streets is sufficiently harsh that it makes little difference whether an individual is involved in a gang or not. Among street youth, encounters with crime are sufficiently routine that gang membership has only a small additive effect.

With cross-sectional data it is somewhat difficult to explain the exact nature of the relationship between gang membership and criminal offending. One possibility is that young people who already demonstrate high levels of criminal activity are attracted to—or recruited by—criminal gangs (i.e., birds of a feather flock together).[7] On the other hand, some young people may be introduced to crime, or become more criminal, once they join a gang—perhaps as the result of peer pressure or socialization into the gang culture. In our opinion, both selection and socialization processes are likely at work. Indeed, the fact that former gang members report significantly less involvement with crime than current gang members suggests that the nature of gang context does have at least some crime-promoting effects.

Gang Membership and Victimization

Both popular and academic discussions about youth gangs have tended to focus exclusively on criminal offending. Very little is known about differences in the victimization experiences of gang members and non-gang youth. In order to

address this gap in the literature, we asked all of our respondents whether or not they had been the victim of nine different types of crime in the past year. The results of our survey suggest that criminal gang members are much more likely to experience various forms of criminal victimization—including major and minor theft, vandalism, physical threats, threats with a weapon, physical assault, assault with a weapon and sexual assault—than all other youth. By contrast, youth who have never been the member of a gang are the least likely to be victimized (see Table 5). For example, among high school students, eight out of every ten criminal gang members (79%) report that they were physically assaulted in the past year, compared to 50% of social gang members and only 35% of non-gang youth. Similarly, almost half of current criminal gang members (45%) claim that they were assaulted with a weapon over the past twelve months, compared to 10% of current social gang members and only 5% of students who have never belonged to a gang. The results also suggest that gang membership puts one at risk of sexual assault. This is particularly true for female youth. For example, one out of every four female respondents (25%) who claims current membership in a criminal gang also report that they were sexually assaulted in the past year. By contrast, only 8% of females in social gangs and 2% of female students who claim no gang affiliation report being the recent victim of a sexual assault. This finding is somewhat consistent with other ethnographic research which suggests that female gang members are sometimes forced to have sex as part of gang initiation rituals.

Table 5. Percent of High School Students Who Have Experienced Various Forms of Criminal Victimization Over the Past Twelve Months, by Type of Gang Affiliation

	Never a Gang Member	Former Social Gang Member	Current Social Gang Member	Former Criminal Gang Member	Current Criminal Gang Member
Victim of Minor Theft (<$50)	35.9	44.8	36.5	45.7	54.0
Victim of Major Theft (>$50)	14.5	19.4	12.5	20.7	34.0
Victim of Vandalism	25.2	28.4	23.5	41.4	45.4
Threatened (no weapon involved)	36.7	44.8	52.9	56.9	73.8
Threatened with a Weapon	13.8	17.9	19.2	31.0	56.7
Received Death Threats	6.0	7.5	13.5	18.1	44.7
Assaulted (no weapon used)	35.2	43.3	50.0	63.8	79.4
Assaulted with a Weapon	5.2	4.5	9.6	20.7	44.7
Sexually Assaulted	5.9	11.9	1.9	13.8	12.1
Sample Size	3,015	67	52	116	143

How can we account for the positive relationship between gang membership and criminal victimization? One possibility is that frequent victims of crime actually seek out gang membership as a means of protection. In other words, fear of further victimization causes some youth to join gangs. An alternative explanation is that the very nature of gang activity itself dramatically increases the risk of victimization for those involved. In other words, gang membership causes victimization. For example, gang members may be required to vigorously protect specific gang territories—a task that may often bring them into violent conflict with other youth. As discussed above, a high proportion of criminal gangs are also involved in the illicit drug trade and other forms of illegal economic activity.

Previous research suggests that drug dealers are particularly vulnerable to violent victimization because they often possess large quantities of both money and drugs and they cannot report victimization experiences to the police because of the illegal nature of their economic activities. Combined, these two factors may render gang members attractive targets for other predatory offenders—including the members of rival gangs—and dramatically increase their overall risk of violent victimization.

Immigration Status and Gang Activity

In the next stage of our analysis, we employed a variety of statistical techniques in order to identify the social correlates—or predictors—of current membership in a criminal gang.[8] We were particularly interested in determining whether or not immigrant youth are more involved in criminal gangs than youth born in Canada —controlling for other relevant factors including gender, age, social class and feelings of social alienation. The identification of these correlates is important because it provides insight into the causes of gang formation and could ultimately lead to the development of effective social policies that can target harmful gang activity. It should be stressed that—in general—the predictors of gang activity identified by our research (and discussed below) are highly consistent with the results of other youth gang studies conducted in both the United States and Europe (see bibliography).

As discussed above, a great deal of public concern has been recently expressed over the concept of the "immigrant youth gang." The idea is that youth gang activity in Canada may be increasing because of recent immigration from certain "gang-prone" nations. In other words, serious youth gang activity is being imported from other countries into Canada. Interestingly, the results of our study simply do not in any way support this hypothesis. In fact, Canadian-born high school students are slightly more likely to report current membership in a criminal gang (5%) than students born in other countries (4%). Further analysis reveals that immigrant gang members are not more involved in crime—as either

offenders or victims—than their Canadian-born counterparts. In other words, Canadian-born gang members are just as likely to sell drugs, carry weapons and engage in violent assaults as gang members born in other countries. Furthermore, the data indicate that, among immigrants, gang activity actually increases with time spent in Canada. Recent immigrants are the least likely to report gang membership, while immigrants who have been in Canada for more than 10 years (i.e., youth who for all intensive purposes have been raised in this country) are most likely to report a current gang affiliation. These findings suggest that youth gangs are not being imported to Canada from other nations. Rather, youth gangs are a domestic phenomena with roots in the Canadian experience.

With respect to the immigration-gang connection, the results of our survey are completely consistent with the views of many Toronto-area police officials.[9] For example, when asked if immigrant youth are more involved in gangs than youth born in Canada, one Toronto-area police officer, with extensive gang experience, stated that: "This is just another myth routed in those marginalization theories. I can tell you that all of the Greater Toronto Area's biggest gang problems are from Canadian born gangsters. I have personally only come across two major non-Canadian gang leaders in my 6 years of work on this issue. To put this into context, I have interviewed or had contact with in excess of 500 major gang members." Another gang-unit officer, with more than 10 years of gang-related experience, stated that: "I don't think there is a connection to immigrant youth. In Toronto, a large number of gang members are born here. Ten to fifteen years ago there may have been more immigrant youth involved—but those persons now are having children born here. These are the same persons who were in the housing projects then and their children are growing up in the projects now. The only connection to immigrants would be that they would appear an easy mark for a gang recruiter as they would be less educated and easy to intimidate." Another officer involved in gang-related investigations acknowledges that gang membership has much more to do with social status than immigration: "Immigration really has nothing to do with gangs. It has more to do with poverty and disadvantage. Some immigrant groups are pretty well-off. You don't see gangs coming from those people. But if you are poor—well it doesn't really matter if you are an immigrant or not. You are gonna be tempted to take up the gangster lifestyle." This opinion clearly reflects some of our other results, discussed below.

The Social Correlates of Gang Activity

In addition to immigration status, we were very interested in identifying other social correlates of youth gang activity. The results of our analyses are outlined below.

RACE/ETHNICITY: Although our findings reveal that gang activity is not

related to immigration status, additional analysis reveals that gang membership is quite strongly related to racial background. Interestingly, the historical record reveals that early North American gangs were largely composed of youths from various disadvantaged European ethnic groups (i.e., Irish, Italian and Jewish immigrants). More recent studies, however, suggest that gang activity in the United States has become increasingly concentrated among certain racial minority groups—particularly African and Hispanic Americans (see Howell 2004; Short 2002). The results of our Canadian survey also suggest that Black, Hispanic and Aboriginal youth are more likely to report gang activity than youth from other racial backgrounds. For example, 8% of Black youth report that they are currently the member of a criminal gang, followed by 7% of Hispanic youth and 6% of Aboriginal youth. By contrast, only 4% of white youth report being the current member of a criminal gang. Importantly, relatively high levels of gang activity are not characteristic of all racial minority groups. Both South Asian (3%) and Asian students (2%), for example, report significantly lower levels of gang involvement than white students. Finally, although Black, Hispanic and Aboriginal youth may be somewhat over-represented among current gang members, whites are still the most prevalent racial group within Toronto's gang community. Overall, 36% of all criminal gang members self-identified as white, 26% are Black, 11% are Aboriginal, 10% are South Asian, 10% are Asian and 7% are Hispanic.

The fact that Black, Aboriginal and Hispanic students are more likely to report gang membership can largely be explained by the fact that they are also more likely to report lower class backgrounds and current residence in a housing project. Black, Aboriginal and Hispanic students also report significantly higher levels of alienation from mainstream Canadian institutions. Indeed, once the impact of social class and social alienation have been taken into statistical account the impact of race on gang membership disappears. The implications of these findings are clear. Social policies that are designed to reduce gang activity among these ethnic groups will also have to significantly reduce racial discrimination and existing racial inequalities. Without improving the relative social position of these minority groups, social programs and other gang suppression efforts are likely doomed to failure.

GENDER: As with crime and delinquency in general, males report much higher levels of gang activity than females (see Table 6). For example, 16% of male high school students report that they have belonged to a youth gang at some point in their life, compared to only 6% of female students. Similarly, approximately 7% of male students report that they are currently the member of a criminal gang, compared to less than 2% of female students. According to our data, males represent over 80% of all criminal gang members within the high school population. Gender differences in gang membership, how-

ever, are less pronounced among street youth. Indeed, 22% of female street youth report that they have been a gang member at some point in their life, compared to 29% of their male counterparts. Furthermore, 11% of female street youth report current membership in a criminal gang, compared to 16% of male street youth. Interestingly, current membership in a criminal gang is actually more prevalent among female street youth (11%) than male high school students (7%).

AGE: Previous research suggests that gang activity is highly concentrated among adolescents and young adults. Curry and Decker (1998), for example, estimate that the average age of an American gang member is 17 or 18 years. We found that, among our high school respondents, the average age of a criminal gang member is only 16—slightly lower than American estimates. Furthermore, we found that criminal gang membership is somewhat more prevalent among younger than older students. For example, 6% of 14-15 year-olds report current criminal gang involvement, followed by 5% of 16 year-olds. By contrast, only 3% of 17 year-olds and 2% of students over 18 report that they are the current member of a criminal gang. This "aging out" effect strongly suggests that much of the gang activity among high school students is "adolescent limited." Thus, even without government intervention, most youth will likely exit gangs by the time they reach their late teens. However, it is important to note that, among street youth, gang membership seems to be more persistent. Indeed, the average age of street youth involved in criminal gangs is 18.4 (over two years older than their high school counterparts). It is quite possible that gang membership is much more enduring among severely disadvantaged youth who have become totally disengaged from mainstream society and the legitimate opportunity structure.

Table 6. Percent of Respondents Who Report that They Have Belonged to a "Gang" at Some Time in Their Life, by Gang Type and Gender

	Students		Street Youth	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
Never Been a Gang Member	94.0	83.7	78.2	71.1
Former Social Gang Member	1.9	2.0	0.8	1.8
Current Social Gang Member	0.7	2.4	0.8	2.2
Former Criminal Gang Member	1.7	5.2	9.2	8.7
Current Criminal Gang Member	1.7	6.8	10.9	16.2
Sample Size	1696	1697	119	277

SOCIAL CLASS: Previous American research suggests that gang activity is most prevalent among lower class populations. Studies indicate that, in general, youth gangs are most likely to flourish in poor, inner-city neighbourhoods where financial resources and legitimate economic opportunities are scarce (Howell 2004; Spergel 1995). The results of our study are completely consistent with this research. Our analysis, for example, suggests that current criminal gang membership is strongly related to low levels of parental education, high levels of parental unemployment, residence in public housing projects and subjective assessments of lower class position. Indeed, 18% of students who described their family as "poor" report current membership in a criminal gang, compared to only 3% of students who report that their family income is "above average."

Living in a public housing project also seems to be a very strong predictor of gang activity. Indeed, 14% of all youth who live in public housing report current membership in a criminal gang, compared to only 4% of youth who live in other rental accommodation and 3% of those who report that their home is "owned." The particular combination of extreme poverty with specific geographical location may render housing projects ideal breeding grounds for youth gangs. Young people who reside in housing projects may feel particularly stigmatized, isolated and excluded from the outside world and come to believe that they are being systematically denied access to legitimate opportunities. As a result, they may identify more with other housing project residents than role models from mainstream society. Subsequently, young people in housing projects may be more likely to organize into criminal gangs in order to achieve social status or respect, acquire a sense of belonging or gain access to financial resources through the illicit economy.

FAMILY STRUCTURE: Consistent with previous American research, our survey also found that family structure is an important predictor of gang activity. In general, students who come from single parent households are more than twice as likely to report current membership in a criminal gang (8%) than youth who live with both parents (3%). Of course, family structure is highly related to social class. In other words, the relationship between single parent households and gang membership might be partially explained by the fact that single parent family units are more likely to be poor. However, it should be stressed that gang membership is also much less common among lower class youth who live with both parents than youth who live with their mother only. Therefore, it is possible that low levels of overall parental supervision—and perhaps a lack of a male role model within the household—may further contribute to the relationship between family structure and gang activity.

EDUCATIONAL PERFORMANCE AND CAREER ASPIRATIONS: Consistent with previous research, we also found that current and former crimin-

al gang members tend to receive much lower grades in school than non-gang youth. Furthermore, compared to non-gang youth, gang members are less likely to report that they want to pursue a university or college degree and are much more uncertain about their career goals. The nature of relationship between educational performance and gang activity, however, is difficult to interpret. On the one hand, it has been argued that under-achieving students are more likely to drift into youth gangs in an effort to obtain the social respect and sense of belonging that they do not receive within the formal educational system. On the other hand, it has also been argued that school performance further deteriorates once youth become involved in the gang subculture.

SOCIAL ALIENATION: It has been argued that individuals who feel alienated or excluded from mainstream society are much more likely to seek solace in gang membership. Evidence from our study tends to support this hypothesis. For example, young people who feel that members of their own racial group suffer from severe discrimination—in housing, employment, education and at the hands of the criminal justice system—are much more likely to report current gang membership than youth who feel that Canadian society is fundamentally fair. Thus, perceptions of social injustice may be an important factor in explaining why some youth reject conventional social activities and decide to join criminal gangs. It is also important to note that perceptions of social injustice seem to develop as a result of actual experiences with discrimination (i.e., racial profiling, hate crime victimization, etc.). Thus, racism in Canadian society should also be seen as a possible cause of gang activity in this country.

CONCLUSION: Our results indicate that gang activity is much more prevalent—and more serious—among street youth than high school students. However, contrary to public opinion, our research suggests that criminal gang membership is not associated with immigration status. Nonetheless, serious gang activity is quite prevalent among poor people and among certain disadvantaged racial minority groups. The implication is that social policies designed to reduce serious gang activity should target those disenfranchised segments of the population that suffer from the greatest levels of inequality and social disadvantage—regardless of immigration status. This does not mean that our immigration policies should ignore the gang issue. Indeed, our findings suggest that all efforts should be dedicated to ensuring that new immigrants are quickly integrated into the economic and social fabric of the nation. The more immigrants suffer from economic and social marginalization, the greater the risk that some immigrant youth will be tempted into gang activity. Furthermore, the greater the suffering of new immigrants, the greater the risk that their Canadian-born children will turn to gangs as a means to attain power, money and respect.

In conclusion, we feel that our study is an important "first attempt" at docu-

menting the nature and extent of youth gang activity in Toronto. However, while our study may have told us many things that we did not previously know about youth gangs, there are important issues that we have been unable to address. For example, the results of our survey cannot help us determine whether youth gang activity is becoming more prevalent in Canada or if the members of youth gangs are engaging in more serious behaviours than they did in previous decades. We simply have no comparable information from 40, 30, 20 or even 10 years ago. There is also a need for pan-Canadian research on this issue. Such studies are needed to determine the extent and nature of youth gang activity in different regions of the country. These gaps in our knowledge should underscore the importance of future research on the gang issue. If we do not conduct periodic studies of youth gangs across Canada—using standardized research procedures—how will we ever know if the "gang problem" is getting better or worse? How will we be able to determine if the anti-gang policies and programs that we develop are effective or not? In sum, we feel that good research must be considered part of the solution to the problem of youth gangs in Canada.

Notes

[1] We would like to thank Sara Thompson, Carla Cesaroni and Andrea McCalla for their help in preparing this article. The research described in this report was funded by a general research grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

[2] O.C. was previously known as grade 13. O.C. or grade 13 has since been eliminated from the Toronto high school curriculum.

[3] Including those who reported multiple racial identities.

[4] For more detailed information on the research methodology and sample characteristics see Tanner and Wortley 2002.

[5] Criminal gang activity is much more common among street youth. For example, although less than 40% of high school gang members have sold drugs as the member of gang, this figure rises to over 70% when we examine those street youth with a gang affiliation.

[6] It should be noted that our current definition of a "criminal" gang is quite liberal. Indeed, if we define "criminal" gangs as those which must involve either drug selling or property crime (i.e., we take fighting out of the definition), the proportion of current criminal gang members drops to only 3% among our high school respondents.

[7] With respect to street youth, one might argue that they naturally "flock together" due to their homelessness. Thus, street youth may in fact represent "ready-made" gangs because of their common adverse living circumstances.

[8] A series of logistic regression analyses were conducted in order to determine what demographic and social characteristics—including immigration status—are associated with gang membership and gang-related criminal activity. Please contact the authors for the details of these analyses.

[9] The following quotes were collected as part of an ongoing qualitative study of youth gang activity in Toronto that includes in-depth interviews with police officers, community workers and gang members. To date we have interviewed over 30 police officers involved in anti-gang initiatives.

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Diversity in Sports and Recreation: A Challenge or an Asset for the Municipalities of Greater Montréal?

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Abstract
Today, ethnocultural diversity is a fact of life in big cities, and indeed in smaller ones, where it sometimes serves as a means of promotion. How are cities responding to the issues raised by the growing numbers of people who have different needs and different tastes? This article offers some answers based on the findings of two surveys of practices followed in managing diversity, conducted in Greater Montréal. Municipalities are developing a variety of responses to diversity: some are adopting policies that advocate accommodation, others favour a universal approach. In the field of recreation, various issues arise: infrastructures (redesign of recreational spaces) and interethnic cohabitation (changes in preferences, group issues). Generally, Montréal's municipalities are responding ad hoc, case by case, in a pragmatic spirit, as seen in the case of pool management. The management of diversity may thus seem to be improvised, but this approach has the advantage of allowing gradual adaptation to the differences among residents, with a view to fostering reciprocal learning.

Keywords: Municipal management of diversity, Montréal, recreation, pools

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Introduction[1]

The cosmopolitan face of Metropolitan Montréal has changed a great deal in the last 20 years, particularly as a result of increased and diversified immigration. While Montréal has fewer immigrants in absolute terms (about 30,000 a year) and as a proportion of its total population (28%) than Toronto (49%) or Vancouver (37%), it is distinguished from the other two metropolises by the variety (albeit already substantial in the case of Toronto) of countries that immigrants come from and by their concentration within the metropolitan area (9 out of 10 immigrants admitted to Quebec). This has led to the growing significance in the urban fabric of strongly multiethnic neighbourhoods, both at the centre and in the outlying areas of the Island. Thus, the presence of people who are "different" is a part of the daily urban experience of most Montréalers, and has been for many years. Yet ethnocultural diversity has not necessarily been incorporated into the municipal agenda, apart from any formal "intercultural policies" that may have been adopted (Pare, Frohn and Laurin 2001).

In this sense, the case of the municipalities of the Montréal conurbation illustrates the recent awareness in cities of certain issues raised by the diversity of their populations. Cities are responding by positioning themselves as cosmopolitan, multicultural, diverse cities, but they are also setting up management mechanisms designed to address this diversity (Poirier 2005).

In 2000, as part of a research program into municipal practices in the management of diversity entitled *Appropriation de l'espace et pratiques municipales de gestion de la diversité ethnoculturelle*,[2] we attempted to look beyond formal policies and examine the reality of municipal practices in the management of diversity in Greater Montréal, at least in those municipalities with significant numbers of immigrants[3] (Germain, Dansereau et al. 2003). How did municipalities deal with the growing presence of immigrants and cultural communities? How did they accept, at a practical level, the expression of ethnocultural differences? How were they responding to the special requests that might emerge from these minorities?

As a rule, sports and recreation, along with culture, and apart from basic services related to infrastructure maintenance, is one of the most important municipal services at the local level in terms of the financial and human resources it employs. It was therefore interesting to see how municipalities were developing their range of services and adjusting to the increasing ethnocultural diversity of their clientele.

However, these management practices do not have unanimous support, and are regularly the target of virulent criticism. One reader, for example, asked "Où cela s'arrêtera-t-il ?" [where will it end?] (La Presse, Forum, September 13, 2004, A21) after reading a series of articles on the introduction of separate swimming schedules in some pools in Montréal. Yet sports and recreation generally appears to be an ideal means of integrating immigrants, which makes the issue all the

more sensitive (Frisken and Wallace 2002).

Here, we would like to cite the findings of our research into municipal sports and recreation services, and complement them with those of a more recent survey of the way special requests are dealt with at public pools (Germain, Dansereau et al. 2003; Billette 2005).

As we will see, municipalities are adapting to diversity in a pragmatic, ad hoc fashion, particularly in the area of recreation, where municipalities are no longer the only stakeholders. For our purposes, we will first examine Montréal municipalities' awareness of diversity in sports and recreation. We will then look more closely at adaptation mechanisms, using the example of swimming pools. Lastly, we will note that immigration raises new questions about ethnicity, religion, and gender relations and that these aspects, which have acquired an especially pronounced urban resonance in recent years, correspond to what, in the view of some commentators, unites or divides contemporary societies—cultural differences (Wieviorka 1997; Touraine 2005).

1 - Sports and recreation activities in Montréal municipalities: partnership and recognition of diversity

For the purposes of our inquiry, we selected municipalities in Greater Montréal with different characteristics, including different recognition policies, but which all have significant concentrations of immigrants.[4]

In 1989, Montréal adopted a declaration against racism and discrimination to underpin the introduction of an equal access program, the object of which was to promote the hiring of people from cultural communities (Valcin 2001). Moreover, through the creation of an intercultural affairs division, Montréal acquired a support unit with the expertise to develop and assist the implementation of municipality policy.[5] This horizontal unit offered support to municipal departments through training and management tools.[6] We chose to look at the Montréal situation by targeting two very different multiethnic neighbourhoods: Park Extension, with a 61% immigrant population from a wide variety of countries, and Saint-Michel, with a 40% immigrant population that breaks down into a few groups, with Italians and Haitians in the majority.

Saint-Laurent, with nearly 80,000 residents, was the largest municipality on the Island after Montréal itself, with a 46% immigrant population. It had also won an award of excellence from the Canadian Race Relations Foundation for its intercultural policy, adopted in 2000.

LaSalle, a small middle-class suburb, also on the Island, had fewer immigrants (23%) and no intercultural policy. Laval, with a population of over 330,000, the largest suburban municipality off the Island, had only a 15% immigrant population, but they were mostly concentrated in one neighbourhood—Cho-

medey—where they constituted almost a third of the population (29%). Laval had adopted at quite an early date a relatively clear policy on the management of diversity. Thus, while most of Montréal's municipalities recognize diversity as an asset, they have developed different management strategies.[7]

How is this reflected in recreation service availability? It must be noted at the outset that the meshing of sports and recreation policies with the management of diversity was not systematic. There are two main reasons for this lack of linkage. First, diversity management policies are sometimes limited to the impact of an announcement that conceals a lack of political will, if not a lack of resources.[8] Second, while municipalities define orientations in relation to sports and recreation, they are free to leave execution to recreation associations (management in partnership) or retain the responsibility for implementation (stewardship).[9] Thus, while in the smaller municipalities, services were still managed directly by the municipal administration, in the larger ones and more particularly in Montréal, municipal activities had become a game with many players, based on partnerships with local and mostly non-profit organizations. Thus, in 1995, the City of Montréal initiated a reorganization of its services, with special focus on sports and recreation, outsourcing program implementation and service delivery through agreements with community agencies, while retaining responsibility for developing an overall framework. For the City of Montréal, this partnership approach in recreation emphasized the dimension of proximity, a characteristic of this sector of activity, where roots in the community are vital.

How, therefore, did the municipalities and their partners address management of the diversity of their sports and recreation clientele?

In fact, the evolution of municipal recreation services followed a course parallel to that of the welfare state (Harvey 2002), moving from a paternalistic model (recreation as charity) to an interventionist model (recreation as a right) (Frisken and Wallace 2002). The present day is marked by a corporatist or neo-corporatist model in which municipal programs are subject to consumer choice. The manner in which recreation is managed—partnership or stewardship—is thus characterized by a client-centred approach, which seeks to match the supply of recreational services to users' preferences. This approach affects how diversity is reflected in the management of recreation.

2 – The various models and levels of municipal involvement

Given both the context in which diversity (the recognition of diversity, whether or not a policy exists) and recreation (the development of the client-centred approach, with or without partnership) are managed, what about the actual practices followed by municipalities?

The municipalities actually have to cope with two main issues.[10] The first concerns the changes in sports activities that result from immigration. The range

of sports enjoyed in the neighbourhoods has greatly diversified: from soccer to cricket and from basketball to bocce, these new and increasingly popular activities required the redesign of playing fields, sometimes at the expense of activities held in less regard by minorities, such as baseball. Yet these changes had to be reckoned with in order to guarantee a certain level of use of the facilities. How were these sometimes delicate judgments made?

Second, what was to be the attitude toward activities practised by a single ethnic group? Would a field be set aside for an exclusively Greek soccer association? Would support be offered for the organization of Tamil Olympic games? How would ethnic groups be treated, given that getting together with others from the same ethnic group is often a way of escaping discrimination (Richardson 2004)? For some, this distinction is justified not as a way of encouraging communities to turn inward, but as a way of avoiding the de facto or systematic exclusion of specific groups, within reasonable constraints (Dyck 2001). Thus, Saint-Laurent advocates closer intercultural relations, and reasonable adjustments.

For others, municipalities have to ensure that public spaces retain a measure of neutrality and have to position themselves as the guarantors of equality. For example, Laval takes a firmly universalist approach designed to promote participation and prevent identity-based withdrawal.

In some cases, the responses of the municipalities are dictated not by pre-established principles, but by various considerations, such as the availability of space and the political clout of the community. In LaSalle, a case-by-case approach is followed, with an awareness that communities are also voter pools.

Note also that in many cases, recreational organizations like the YMCA—which, by the way, do not always share the attitudes of the municipalities whose partners they are—often serve as buffers, either by circumventing municipal rules to provide services, or by allowing the municipality to avoid making difficult choices. Such situations were observed in almost all the municipalities studied.

Although in the case of the City of Montréal, partnerships are more closely supervised, and although municipal practices do after all vary widely from neighbourhood to neighbourhood, many municipal agencies in Greater Montréal appear to share two characteristics. First, municipal actions often resemble ad hoc responses to special needs or requests expressed by ethnocultural groups, organized or not so organized, and are notable usually for their pragmatism. Second, the attitudes of municipal officials are closely tied to the local dynamics of the contexts in which they are working and to their own individual experience in the area of intercultural relations.

3 - Ad hoc management: the case of the swimming pools

The case of pool management illustrates particularly well the pragmatism and ad hoc nature of the municipal practices we encountered throughout our research

in the various sectors of municipal administration. We saw how municipalities respond when ethnoreligious groups make special requests concerning the use of community recreational facilities. We therefore conducted an exploratory study of this type of request in relation to municipal pools.

We inventoried all the public pools within the metropolitan boundaries, and chose 12 for a preliminary field survey (Billette 2005). We should say at the outset that in Montréal, few pools seem to have received special requests from ethnoreligious groups. However, while the number of pools concerned remains marginal, the types of response and argument elicited are characteristic of the situations encountered both in sports and recreation and in other areas, particularly the design and construction of places of worship. We did not attempt a quantitative study of these requests; we preferred to explore the types of response made by municipalities and their partners to requests that in general concerned scheduling separate swims for men and women, with supervision by lifeguards of the same sex; the wearing of clothing that covers more of the body than the usual swimsuits, or the wearing of certain symbols, such as a kirpan or a turban; the installation of curtains to protect bathers' privacy; and to a lesser extent, restrictions concerning nudity in change rooms. Requests relating to the celebration of special events, such as baptisms, are much less common.

Our survey covered nine public pools, and three private pools that had no agreement with the City of Montréal; the latter were chosen because they had received special requests of the kind described above. They are located in 10 boroughs in Montréal and in Longueuil. Because some immigrant neighbourhoods in Montréal are strongly multiethnic, requests can concern a number of ethnoreligious groups: indeed, there are Muslim women and Hasidic Jewish women who share women-only swims together. Interviews were conducted with spokespersons for ethnoreligious groups[k] that had made requests, and with those responsible for aquatic or sports centres and borough development officers to establish the ins and outs of these requests, and the responses they received. We also observed public swims in order to complete our exploratory survey.

In Montréal, the requests in question usually come from groups linked to the Muslim, Hasidic and Sikh communities, the most organized groups in this respect being the Hasidim. The Jewish community is the only one to own its own sports centre. Thus, the Hasidim can always swim in compliance with their religious code, although registration fees are payable. In the case of requests from Muslim groups, the requestors included "converted natives": these were women who held clothed swims reserved for Muslim women and their children. These swims are also opportunities for getting together, socializing and enjoying religious fellowship, and there is a strong demand for them in Muslim communities.

The responses to such requests on the part of the pool authorities—administrators, lifeguards, monitors and so on—vary widely, sometimes even at the same

pool. Without attempting an exact count of requests accepted and requests refused, we will merely say that acceptances seem to exceed refusals. Again, however, what most interested us were the reasons cited in accepting or refusing. What were they? What types of argument were offered to justify refusing or accepting a special request?

The refusals basically fall into five categories according to the nature of the reasons cited. The reasons most often mentioned to justify refusal of a request to wear special clothing have to do with health and safety. The reason most often given for refusing to schedule separate swims for men and women have to do with logistics and pool attendance (which, for example, might make it impossible to make such special arrangements), or with the difficulty of coordinating the lifeguards' schedules (for example, to have females monitoring the women's swims, and males monitoring the men's). Also in the area of logistics, there is reference to the risks to the equipment (for example, the water filtration system) associated with the wearing of bulky clothing. Less common were respondents who said that they did not want to offend their other clients. Even less common were those who referred to an organizational philosophy, or "house rules," although without always specifying what this philosophy entailed. In essence, this was how they expressed the feeling of a mismatch between the values of the clientele, and those of the organization.

The reasons for acceptance were of three kinds: those accommodations that expressed a wish to respond to users' needs, those that were presented as a concession to a group complaint, and those that resulted from political pressure.

Therefore, with respect to the reasons for refusal or acceptance of special requests, our respondents are clearly wedded to pragmatic accommodation (meaning that negotiation is always a part of the equation) and hardly ever stray into the area of principles or values. In general, pool staff and employees merely respond ad hoc to the requests they receive. Even in strongly multiethnic neighbourhoods, they do not plan ahead for such requests; they wait until they are asked to make the exceptions required.

The types of response seem to vary with the personal conceptions of our respondents. In many cases, they seemed to keep their own counsel, or to know little about their clientele. They are not familiar with the concept of reasonable accommodation, although many of them do in fact put it into practice. Some supervisors count on their staff, who are multicultural, to respond appropriately.

In the pools, therefore, as in our other research into municipal practices in the management of diversity, there seems to be some measure of improvisation in the response to special requests from ethnoreligious groups. And these groups do not always seem to be very practised in the formulation of such requests. Both sides therefore attempt to play things by ear. Moreover, ethnoreligious groups often prefer to rent swimming time in private establishments, rather than to have

to negotiate a change in the rules governing the use of public facilities—as long as the total number of dilemmas faced by the managers of public pools across Greater Montréal remains relatively small. It seems, therefore, that we are still far away from the excesses that some people decry in the media. The facts is that these accommodations, whether numerous or not, continue to be discussed.

4 - Conclusion

What are we to deduce from the pragmatism we observed in how the recreation sector adapts to diversity in the Montréal conurbation? Do we credit this result to the flexibility of the social fabric, imbued with a pragmatic spirit that readily adjusts to manifold accommodations? Are the demographics of international immigration in Montréal still of too recent origin for the occurrence of real problems in living together?

It is admittedly surprising that in such a multiethnic metropolis as Montréal, despite some efforts by the City of Montréal to give its people guidance on reasonable accommodation, they seem often to proceed on an ad hoc basis in their management of diversity, particularly religious diversity, unlike Toronto and Vancouver (Tate and Quesnel 1995; Sandercock 2003). However, this apparent improvisation is perhaps not without some merit, since the complexity of situations emerges only gradually, particularly as those involved are often dealing with situations with relatively few precedents.

A good many requests by ethnoreligious groups for special arrangements at public pools are in a sense on the borderline between religious issues and cultural issues. The question of where to draw the line is doubtless debatable, but we shall most humbly leave that debate to other experts on religious issues in the strict sense. It is obvious in any case that the protagonists negotiating an accommodation do not always share the same concept either of the line between religion and culture, or even of the very possibility of drawing such a line. A number of researchers have in fact shown the importance of the concept of "cultural comfort" (McNicoll 1993) in the mutual process of adjustment among people of diverse origins, for example in the establishment of neighbourhoods with concentrations of immigrants. The question, then, is whether these practices are exclusive or inclusive in their effect. In this connection, note that some women who could be described as Quebeckers born and bred (or not of immigrant origin) also enjoy swim schedules that separate the sexes. The cultural comfort of some can coincide with that of others, even where they do not share the same definition of the concept.

The line between issues of religion and those of gender is also very fine. Many special requests by ethnoreligious groups in fact concern relations between men and women. In Quebec, where the women's movement is especially strong and has served to expand access to many sectors of social life, transforming them into

mixed environments, gender relations are an extremely sensitive area, but one that is still in the grip of change. Are we not restarting the debate over the wisdom of separate schools for boys and girls?

Requests by ethnoreligious groups are thus made in a context in which the host society is examining the values by which its members live together, reaffirming some and changing others. The immigrants placed in the midst of this society are also contributing to its transformation from within. Thus, ethnocultural diversity is going to bring fairly significant change to municipal management practices, particularly management of the supply of recreational services. Success in this process will depend strongly on the intercultural skills of the various participants. In this sense, diversity is a major challenge for municipalities.

At the same time, the growing multiethnicity of Montréal's population may be seen above all as an opportunity to expand and diversify recreational activities, to the greater benefit of the host society. Moreover, a number of immigrant communities are especially enthusiastic in their dedication to sports.

Furthermore, studies of the process of ethnic concentration in sports activities suggest that such concentrations do not result not so much from the attraction exerted by an ethnic group as from negative experiences in multiethnic organizations (Germain and Poirier 2005). This means that we sometimes tend to perceive a retreat within a community solely as a failure to integrate or even as a rejection of the values and ways of the host society.

The fact remains that at the practical level, those involved have to make judgments, impose limits that reflect the collective will, and try both to enable users to assert their identity and to allow for possible discrimination that people may suffer, based on their origin or their ethnic or racial background. Thus, the approach in matters of recreation has to vary constantly between two goals that may seem contradictory: respect for differences and individual development, and the promotion of social integration through participation (Arnaud 1999; Dyck 2001).

Those involved will still have to take a position on these issues, since the benchmarks remain inadequate, despite the existence of policies and management tools. The many areas of activity involve different visions and attitudes towards pluralism. There is cause to wonder how these differences will be expressed and what effects they will have in the context of decentralization of authority to Montréal's boroughs.

Notes

[1] We want to thank the evaluators for their valuable suggestions.

[2] Program funded by the SSHRC.

[3] We chose three sectors of municipal activity that seemed to us likely to reflect these practices, given both their importance to immigrants and their families, and the various aspects of municipal involvement. In our case it was how immigrants are received in social housing (Bernèche 2005), management of the supply of sports and recreation services, and urban planning issues as they relate to the construction or expansion of places of worship (Gagnon and Germain 2002, Germain and Gagnon 2003).

[4] Some are now part of the City of Montréal as a result of the mergers of 2002.

[5] This unit survived municipal amalgamation.

[6] Note in particular a guide detailing the various steps towards a reasonable accommodation, which, in addition to being based on the legal principle enshrined in the Canadian and Quebec charters of rights and freedoms, could be used by officials in dealing with potentially discriminatory management issues.

[7] In one of the municipalities studied, moreover, the intercultural policy was a response at least as much to a need to reassure the majority population, beset by an identity crisis, as to a need to guide municipal actions in dealing with minorities.

[8] Note that Quebec municipalities have limited authority and jurisdiction in various areas, resulting from the centralist thinking of the Government of Quebec, regardless of which party is in power.

[9] In most Western countries, in fact, the institutionalization of recreation peaked in what is known in France as the Trente Glorieuses, the expansive years from 1945 to 1975 when governments invested massively in the development of sports and recreation. Beginning in the 1980s, with the disengagement of governments, particularly in Canada and Quebec, the management of mass-participation sports was left to municipalities and recreational organizations. In Quebec, the policy of the Ministère des Affaires Municipales, dating from 1997, is entitled Un partenariat à renouveler, or "a partnership to be renewed," and stresses decentralization to the municipalities and their partners.

[10] A series of interviews was conducted with local elected representatives, officials and partner community organizations in order to understand how they planned their range of recreational services, and how they responded to any special requests they received.

[11] We were hesitant about using the term 'groupes ethnoreligieux', or ethnoreligious groups, in our analysis, as some religious groups are associated with more than one ethnic origin. These requests, which may at first seem to be dictated by religious considerations, cannot really be dissociated from the broader phenomenon of ethnocultural differentiation of the make-up of Montréal referred to at the beginning of this article. Because we were interested in the effects of recent and earlier immigration on the urban fabric and on municipal practices, we addressed those issues with strong religious connotations. Moreover, it is not always easy or even possible to draw a clear line between what is a religious matter and what is a cultural matter. We therefore chose the expression "ethnocultural groups" as a broad, all-encompassing category to describe the requestors in our surveys.

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The Challenges of Religious Pluralism in Kingston, Ontario

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Abstract
Increased ethnic and religious diversity resulting from immigration, together with other changes in a "post-Christian" society, have altered the face of religion within Kingston, Ontario, necessitating responses from the municipal government. Prayer at city council, Christmas observances and nomenclature, multifaith services and events, religious displays in city parks together with other religious use of public space, and death rituals and memorials are among the new challenges. The city's response has more often been ad hoc adjustment or accommodation than deliberate policy initiatives.

Keywords: Religious pluralism; Canadian multiculturalism; Public policy; Kingston, Ontario

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The Challenges of Religious Pluralism in Kingston, Ontario

During its centennial year of 1967 Canada was being transformed from a Christian country to a religiously pluralistic one (Miedema 2005). Almost four decades later, Peter Beyer predicts that immigration from non-English and largely non-Christian parts of the world will mean, assuming persistence of the trends evident from 1981 to 2001, that "the religious landscape of Canada will continue to become more pluralistic, especially in favour of the three largest non-Christian worldwide religions, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism" (Beyer 2005). Yet, despite aging congregations and plummeting church attendance, the lineaments of something like a Christian culture linger in many Canadian towns and cities, reinforced by such measures as the observance of Good Friday and Christmas as statutory holidays, or Ontario's support of a separate (i.e., Roman Catholic) school system (and comparable measures in some other provinces), or the continuing vaguely theistic affirmations of God in the National Anthem, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and prayers in Parliament (Biles and Ibrahim 2004).

The prophecy of inevitable and complete secularization has failed. David Lyon cogently points out that instead of "no religion" we have "deregulated, reshaped, relocated, and restructured religion" (Lyon and Van Die 2000). Religion has not disappeared from the public into the private sphere. The resulting situation has become far more complex than a simple bifurcation between those wanting more Christianity in the public realm and those who wish society to be free of all religion, or what in the United States has become a polarization of the religious right against the secular left.[1] Religious pluralism, largely the result of immigration, has meant that the alternatives of Christian hegemony versus secularism have been enriched and complicated by immigrants to Canada who are Jews and Muslims, Buddhists and Sikhs and Hindus, Zoroastrians and Confucians. [2] Their doctrines and worship and behavioural codes and rituals necessitate adjustments and accommodations that towns and cities could not have imagined a generation ago. Kingston, Ontario exhibits many of the tensions and adjustments exhibited in municipalities across Canada, as the presence of diverse religious traditions affects the way in which school boards, city government, and municipal agencies conduct their business early in the 21st century, often challenging the customary ways of doing things inherited from an earlier era.

Only nine cities in Canada have a population of more than a half-million people. But the next twenty cities range from 500,000 down to 100,000 people. When Kingston (pop. 146,838) is compared with Canada at large, we find that it mirrors the national distribution of population by age, but with fewer immigrants, a larger proportion of highly educated people, and more employment in health and social services and in education. Kingston has been characterized as "an institutional town" (one thinks of its schools and prisons and hospitals) that has changed little over the past 300 years. In the popular

view Kingston epitomizes Upper Canada's Anglo-Celtic customs and values (Osborne and Swainson 1988).

Hugh MacLennan was undertaking to depict this Upper Canadian ethos in his novel *The Precipice*, set in the fictional town of Grenville on Lake Ontario during the 1930s. MacLennan portrayed Grenville, in company with almost every other Ontario town rooted in the Victorian era, as having "streets sweetened by names redolent of British colonial history: Wellington Street, Simcoe Street, Sydenham Avenue, Duke Street, Elgin Lane." As MacLennan so perceptively observed, "there was hardly a British general, admiral, or cabinet minister who had functioned between the French Revolution and the accession of Queen Victoria who was not commemorated in the name of a street, town, or county somewhere in Ontario" (MacLennan 1948). Grenville's traditions, even in the period between the wars, bore many of the characteristics of the nineteenth-century Protestant culture of the old Ontario that William Westfall has so ably described (Westfall 1989).

It was another renowned Canadian novelist, Robertson Davies, who in his first trilogy set in the 1950s fictionalized (and satirized) Kingston under the name of Salterton, a small eastern Ontario city whose centres of civic power were the Anglican cathedral, the newspaper, the university, and to a lesser extent, the military college. A few years earlier, under the guise of the slyly ironic newspaper columnist Samuel Marchbanks, Davies had given a comparative description of Kingston in the 1940s:

> As they are approached over water Quebec is noble, Montreal mighty, and Toronto strenuously aspiring, but Kingston has an air of venerable civilization which warms the heart; domes and spires, and the moral yet kindly outlines of its houses of refuge and correction give it a distinction of which any city might be proud. (Qtd. in Grant 1994)

Those "domes" would of course include Kingston's City Hall and the architecturally similar St. George's Cathedral, as well as Kingston Penitentiary, while the "spires" might refer to both the Gothic architecture of Sydenham Street United Church or of St. Mary's Roman Cathedral, and of Queen's University's Grant Hall. Moral, yes; but can the limestone features of a psychiatric hospital, homes for the aged, or prisons—"its houses of refuge and correction"—truly be said to be "kindly"? Kingston has not had the reputation of adapting rapidly to change, nor of being a city hospitable to outsiders or recent arrivals, though its size and location have more to do with a relatively small proportion of immigrants than overt unfriendliness. Ironically enough, much of the city's religious and ethnic diversity comes from its hospitalized and incarcerated and student populations, rather than from its permanent residents. [3]

How has the increased ethnic and religious diversity of the past generation, together with other changing practices, altered the face of religion within this

mostly unilingual city? And, how has the municipality responded to these changes? Geographer Brian Osborne shows how in the nineteenth century the fortunes of Kingston's major Presbyterian congregation, St. Andrew's, were intricately bound up with the origins of Queen's University and the city of Kingston itself, in addition revealing much about the battles and vicissitudes within the Christianity of that era (Osborne 2004). At least some of those sectarian struggles stemmed from different immigrant groups having religions not identical with those of earlier arrivals.[4]

In 1824 a Presbyterian funeral procession bearing a child's body (the son of one of the elders of St. Andrew's) made its way towards the burial ground only to find its entrance blocked by Anglicans asserting their sole rites to inter the corpse. For the burial to proceed the Presbyterian minister had to defer to the Anglican priest. In 1843, and continuing for several more decades, a series of violent skirmishes erupted between Irish Protestants, who were supporters of the Orange Lodge, and Roman Catholics, culminating in a shooting death at the building site of the new Catholic cathedral. One outcome was a local split between Scottish and Irish Presbyterians. Today a cannon commemorating such antecedent animosities within the United Kingdom more than three centuries ago still sits on the lawn of St. Andrew's Presbyterian Church, its barrel more or less pointed in the direction of St. Mary's Roman Catholic Cathedral. In 1891, with temperance issues in the fore, the Presbyterians were objecting to the establishment of a new tavern across the intersection from their church—the same intersection where more than one hundred years later Presbyterians have had to cope with street people using the church lawn or objectionable advertising in the window of a clothing store. Internally, there were also debates among Presbyterians about the celebration of the "'popish' festival" of Christmas, not that far removed from today's controversies around the meanings and observances attached to Christmas. Many of these battles of nineteenth-century Christianity parallel and foreshadow contemporary problems (Osborne 2004).

Even in the early twenty-first century some of these issues—religious-secular conflict, interreligious conflict, tensions among groups of immigrants or between more recent immigrants and long-time residents, the assumption of religious privilege on the part of an entrenched tradition—continue, though Presbyterians are less likely to be in the thick of them. Presbyterians have waned in relative size, importance, and influence, in Kingston and in Canada, over the past two centuries. Though Christians continue to have some of their most vehement quarrels with their co-religionists of other denominations and differing theologies, or even internally within their own churches, the growth of religions other than Christianity has created a new urban reality. Christian hegemonic assumptions are challenged by matters as diverse as providing separate times for Muslim women at a municipal swimming pool, accommodating the presence of a gay or

lesbian couple at the graduation dance of a separate school, or deciding about the distribution of explicitly Christian materials (e.g., the shoeboxes prepared for Operation Christmas Child) at public schools.

Though Jews have been present in Kingston since the nineteenth century, only in 2003 did the city elect its first Jewish mayor, Harvey Rosen. Rosen, at the time also the president of Beth Israel Congregation, announced as one of his first acts that there would be no religious dimension to the installation ceremony for the new council: "The simplest thing would be to eliminate it." The alternative—to have one or a number of clergy administer an invocation, prayer, or blessing at this multifaith council—was reportedly rejected as too "complicated" or "difficult" (Phillips 2003). The mayor's decision, while far from a unique response, was not the only option for altering existing practices, often persisting for a century or more, that assumed a uniformly Christian society.

In 1999 the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled in a case arising in another jurisdiction that the Lord's Prayer, whose use tended to "impose a Christian moral tone on the deliberations of Council," violated religious freedom (Csillag 1999). The decision resulted from the efforts of one of the few Jewish residents of Penetanguishene, an Ontario town of eight thousand people, who felt pressured to stand and recite the Lord's Prayer with others when he attended council meetings. Reportedly, he had even discarded the idea of running for council because of this practice. The court suggested as an alternative that the town "follow the lead of the House of Commons, where, since 1994, proceedings have opened with a moment of silence and a non-denominational prayer." Penetanguishene's mayor seemed not to comprehend the principles involved and issued a statement reporting that townspeople were having difficulty "understanding how one person can dictate what they can say or not say" (Csillag 1999). Diana Eck, who since the early 1990s has headed up the Pluralism Project at Harvard University, says that Americans must discover a form of "positive pluralism" beyond mere tolerance or recognition of the diversity of religions. She argues that Christians need to discover ways of maintaining the truths they find within their own religion without denying the validity of other faith traditions for those practicing them (Eck 2001).

But even if the wishes of a majority cannot settle what mode of religious invocation might be used to open a city council meeting, neither can the objections of every possible minority be anticipated or satisfactorily accommodated. In 2001 the Ottawa City Council voted to retain its opening prayer, "Almighty God, let us work together to serve all our people," despite its invocation of a "singular supreme being" that excluded atheists, non-theists, or people having no religious faith (Wheeler 2001). When a secular humanist objected that the council in Renfrew, near Ottawa, violated his religious freedom with recitation of a prayer that named God, the court ruled against the objection. (It is worth noting, as an aside, that such objections seem more often to come from atheists or secularists than

from non-theists or non-monothesist such as Hindus or Buddhists or Confucians.) Justice Hackland, citing parallel phrasing in the Charter, observed that the reference to God in a prayer as a source of values was not "a coercive effort to compel religious observance":

> The current prayer is broadly inclusive and is nondenominational, even though the reference to God is not consistent with the beliefs of some minority groups. In a pluralistic society, religious, moral or cultural values put forward in a public governmental context cannot always be expected to meet with universal acceptance. (White 2005)

The question of how to "commit the act of religion in public," as someone has phrased the issue, remains a challenge within a religiously diverse Canada. Members of a Roman Catholic order, the Sisters of Providence, have themselves demonstrated ways in which public multifaith ventures might be conducted. More than a decade ago they initiated a weekly silent vigil against poverty outside City Hall. On key occasions representatives from other faith groups have joined them. On the tenth anniversary of their Silent Vigil, for example, there was an interfaith service with participation from Orthodox and Reform Judaism and various Christian denominations, as well as Quaker, Unitarian, Hindu, and Muslim representatives. While broadly inclusive representation might be unwieldy on every single occasion, other alternatives exist, such as rotating through a roster of participants, or drawing on a selection of prayers from various faith groups, or using an inclusive, more generic prayer.

In many parts of Canada old customs die hard, especially at particular seasons of the year. In Toronto a few years ago the city came under fire when in an attempt at inclusivity, the civic Christmas tree began to be referred to as a "holiday tree." A spokesperson for B'nai Brith Canada opined that "to take a generic term, slap it on a symbol that really only has significance to one religion ... and then say we're being multicultural does not really fit." Common sense would seem to support the view that "whatever you call it, it's still a Christmas tree" (Reuters 2002). Bernie Farber of the Canadian Jewish Congress thought this renaming was an excess of political correctness: "It's time to sort of get on with life, accept everybody for who they are and revel in their holidays as opposed to look for ways to deny people's holidays. It's just plain silly" (Reuters 2002).

In Kingston in 2004 some objections were raised about a city employee who sent Christmas greeting cards to co-workers in City Hall. After the story appeared in the local newspaper, The *Kingston Whig-Standard*, letters to the editor took up both sides of the issue, some seeing the gesture as a well-meaning expression of goodwill while others thought it was insensitive. Local religious leaders, including Jewish and Muslim representatives, in general have agreed that people should be free to extend whatever form of greeting they wish—though of course they cannot

expect a religiously identical reciprocal greeting. In concert with contemporary practice, the City of Kingston recently made the decision to refer to December as the holiday season rather than the Christmas season, and to holiday hours rather than Christmas hours (Popplewell 2005). Nonetheless, a "Christmas tree" remains, perhaps anomalously, in the office of Kingston's Jewish mayor, decorated by the H'Art Studio, a local organization for adults with intellectual and developmental disabilities (City of Kingston 2005). This "holiday" versus "Christmas" debate was greatly reinvigorated in 2005 when Boston seemed about to rename a Nova Scotian gift of a Christmas tree a "holiday tree," and a similar fate threatened the tree at Rideau Hall. In both cases the threat was averted when Boston's mayor and Canada's Governor General both opted for the more traditional nomenclature they themselves had grown up with (Ottawa Citizen 2005).

While a municipal Christmas tree, especially if interpreted as a secular seasonal symbol, or Christmas cards distributed by one city employee might be acceptable or at least excusable, a more explicitly religious representation such as a public manger scene may well cause offense. In the United States displays featuring the symbol of one religion have been prohibited in public places, because church-state separation forbids favouring one religion above another (Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance 2005). A religious symbol might be acceptable if paid for privately rather than by public funds, or if one religious exhibit is "offset" by the symbol of a second religion (e.g., placing a menorah alongside a crèche). In one Florida town, however, the town removed both displays when it was objected that placing a menorah beside a Christmas tree amounted to foisting the Jewish religion upon residents (Lithwick 2001).

In Kingston a nativity scene, owned, maintained, and stored by the City, is erected annually in Confederation Park across the street from City Hall. In 2002, Isabel Turner, then Kingston's mayor, contradicted a news report that its installation was going to be discontinued after some complaints had been voiced. The Mayor announced that council members had agreed to continue the practice. She also reported that "the majority of councillors want all creeds to be offered an equal opportunity to erect and display symbols of their faith that recognize important dates or events" (City of Kingston 2002). But would such an "equal opportunity" not mean that another faith group could ask the city to purchase a religious object appropriate to their tradition, and then have it erected, dismantled, and stored by the Parks Operations department at the taxpayers' expense? Because such a request for equal treatment is unlikely to emerge from a minority religious group that has appeared only comparatively recently in the city, this civic presentation of Christianity continues.

Close to the nativity scene an outdoor stage provides the venue for the performance of music by various groups. Salvation Army members, who have used the area adjacent to City Hall since the nineteenth century, have sung hymns and gospel

songs. In other ways too religious groups have made use of public civic space. One church distributed flyers throughout their neighbourhood inviting people to join them in a nearby city park for food, refreshments, and entertainment. Whether this occasion served a missionizing or evangelistic purpose for the group, rather than general service to the community or an opportunity to get acquainted, one can imagine that aggressive preaching or giving testimonials in parks or on street corners might today arouse objections, despite a general understanding that there exists the freedom in Canada to promulgate one's religion. Regulations governing the barricading of streets for parades or other events might affect religious organizations differentially. A group of Christians still gets approval to march down the city's main street with a cross on Good Friday, but could the city similarly accommodate other religious organizations on their sacred days—especially if those are not statutory holidays? Whether or not it is accounted an explicitly religious practice, people can be seen in public spaces in Kingston practicing tai chi, as they can in most other Canadian cities. Perhaps more notably, the Queen's University Muslim Students Association has held their welcoming picnic in September near the Time sculpture on Kingston's waterfront, accompanied with the offering of prayers in the usual position of prostration (sajda).

A city park is a public park, and therefore "the public" (including religious groups) may use it in any way, at any time, for any reason, without permission. So long as a group does not violate any municipal, provincial, or federal laws, cause damage to the park, or infringe on others' enjoyment of the space, they are free to use the City's public space. However, while it is not necessary for individuals and groups to seek permission from City Parks before meeting in Kingston's public parks, booking a park is highly recommended if a group wants to ensure use of park facilities in an uninterrupted manner (City of Kingston Parks Operations 2005). As with many procedures that lie in abeyance or remain unenforced, such booking "recommendations" can presumably be invoked as a means of control should the need arise.

To gain the City's approval a form must be completed with the name and purpose of the event—whether social (e.g., church picnics, reunions, etc), legal (e.g., weddings), or religious (e.g., prayer services, memorials, etc). Applicants must provide proof of at least two million dollars of liability insurance coverage. As the Use Permits for city parks specify, no one using a park may "stereotype or discriminate on grounds prohibited under the Ontario Human Rights Code" nor may they "promote or preach hatred or derision of any groups covered by section ii of this declaration." If any group is found to be discriminatory or inciting hatred the City has the right to deny the booking of a City Park, or to cancel an event in progress, even if approval was not previously sought, and may deny any future requests from the respective group.

Monuments and memorials in public spaces play an essential role in foster-

ing a sense of Canadian collective identity and a shared national history. They become the site of memorial ceremonies, as can be easily demonstrated at war memorials every Remembrance Day in towns and cities across Canada, when people come together to reflect upon the past, its meaning, and our collective loss. Such commemorations create a sacred space for this activity of shared religious and ritual observance. Kingston's Islamic Centre on its website publicly endorses participation by its members in Remembrance Day observances, together with an exposition of the Muslim view of war and peace. The only restriction on Muslim involvement is a caution against taking part in rituals that are specific to another religion. In general, though, such public gatherings have aimed at being inclusive and multifaith in nature. Even the aforementioned Sisters of Providence vigil held in front of City Hall on Good Friday a few years ago—on that occasion oriented toward world peace—included reflections by the rabbi of Beth Israel Congregation, the president of the Islamic Centre, and the monsignor from St. Mary's Cathedral. Perhaps ironically, particular religious groups, often supposed to be at odds with one another, have often promoted interfaith cooperation far beyond anything that municipal governments have endeavoured to facilitate.

But what can be said about impromptu memorials erected following a tragic event and/or death? Spontaneous shrines, more popular after the death of Princess Diana or 9/11, are frequently set up at the scene of a road accident or of a murder, consisting variously of bouquets of flowers, or written messages of condolences, or, if a child's death, toys or stuffed animals. Whether a personal act of remembrance, public display of grief and loss, acknowledgement of human mortality, or warning of societal dangers, or defiant political statement (e.g., with deaths due to drunk driving and gang-related shootings), these shrines represent positive and life-affirming responses, inherently religious because they seek to transcend the limits imposed by death. They stand as "ways of imagining a human community that includes both the living and the dead" (Chidester 2002). Such public expressions of the grief of private citizens, individually or en masse, when established in public places, are often constructed without the express permission or consent of the respective authority.

Sometimes families want a continuing memorial at the site, perhaps a lasting commemoration of their loved one, or to make a statement about unsafe streets or drunken drivers. Of course, a proliferation of crosses at a dangerous bend in a highway has for decades served as a more effective reminder to slow down than any warning sign could provide. But an unauthorized wayside memorial might itself become a traffic hazard if drivers reduce speed unexpectedly to gawk. One wonders about responsibility for the maintenance of such sites as years pass, or when people move elsewhere. While some memorials are maintained, or are renewed annually—often on the anniversary of the fatal incident—often these roadside shrines are left to their fates as crosses break down with age, and flowers wilt or

fade over time. In such cases compromises have to be sought, perhaps through the city offering the family an alternative way to remember a departed loved one.

Obviously, the practice of erecting roadside shrines represents deeply meaningful human behaviour. What is a city to do when public space becomes sacralized due to the acts of a few citizens? Normally the City of Kingston requires citizens and businesses to apply for an eighty-five dollar encroachment permit before the erection of any sign or physical object on public property. In the case of roadside shrines, bylaw enforcement officers have an unspoken policy of leaving them alone so long as they are not obstructing pedestrian or vehicular traffic. Additionally, City Parks may ask for their removal if snow-clearance or grass-cutting is affected. Despite the unauthorized nature of their presence, bylaw enforcement personnel tend to leave these shrines intact as a gesture of respect to both the living and the dead. Trees bearing memorial plaques in parks are a possible alternative, and have become a popular commemoration that also renews the urban canopy of foliage. In general, municipal officials informally recognize roadside memorials as private sacred spaces on publicly owned lands (City of Kingston Engineering Department 2005). Roadside shrines are an example of a policy grey area—neither legal nor illegal, neither written nor spoken. Likewise, when it comes to the private religious use of public spaces, the City of Kingston prefers a "live and let live" approach.

Regarding the scattering of cremated remains (strictly speaking not "ashes," but compressed bone fragments, a much denser and more particulate substance), the City seems to have no clear answer. For all intents and purposes, the scattering of remains on Kingston's public parks and waterways is sensitively overlooked by the City. Bylaw officers, City Parks' employees, and funeral directors seem equally unaware of the laws and regulations governing this practice. One memorial society even refers to cemeteries, private space, and crown land as possible areas for the scattering of cremated remains. And while public parks are not mentioned, this Society does state that it is "best not to scatter them on the ground where people will frequent" (Funeral Advisory and Memorial Society of Peterborough and District 2005).

Presently the Ontario Ministry of Government Services is replacing the *Funeral Directors and Establishments Act and the Cemeteries Act* with one statute, the *Funeral, Burial and Cremation Services Act*. According to Chapter 33, Part 3, Section 4, "no person shall scatter cremated human remains at a place other than at a scattering ground operated by a person licensed under subsection (1) unless the person is permitted by regulation to scatter cremated human remains in such circumstances, at such a place or in such a manner as may be prescribed" (Province of Ontario 2002).

As with the case of the erection of roadside or sidewalk shrines, presumably the permission to scatter the remains of a loved one has not been sought before-

hand. Families may opt to spread such remains discreetly on their own terms while the City remains unaware of the time and place of such practices. So long as the scattering of remains goes undetected, the City is tolerant of a custom that proceeds unhindered. The City of Kingston does have a memorial bench or memorial tree program in place, though it is currently under revision with regard to placement, payment, and perpetuity. Citizens may purchase a bench or request the planting of a tree in remembrance of their dearly departed (City of Kingston Parks Operations 2005). People sitting on a park bench, or whose dog visits a park tree, might well wonder if anything else was surreptitiously placed at this private sacred site.

Concerns by city residents about the impact of religious practices on their city or neighbourhood might be aimed directly towards faiths that are new or unfamiliar, or simply representative of a minority tradition. In some cities the establishment of a mosque, a meditation centre, or a Hindu temple has led to protests. In Kingston in the early 1950s the Roman Catholic Church reportedly declined to sell a piece of its property to a Jewish congregation wanting to relocate. A few years earlier, in 1945, Ontario Justice Keiller McKay had ruled against a restrictive covenant aimed at preventing the sale of property to Jews on the grounds that it contravened public policy. McKay stated: "If sale of a piece of land can be prohibited to Jews, it can equally be prohibited to Protestants, Catholics or other groups or denominations." He felt that "nothing could be more calculated to create or deepen divisions between existing religious and ethnic groups in this Province, or in this country" (Qtd in McLachlin 2004). But, one suspects, the citizens of a more secular society might be worried about the practices of Christianity as readily as those of any other religion. What of a Christian church situated in a mostly residential area providing a mission to the homeless, to street people, to psychiatric outpatients, or to ex-offenders? A church with a large bell or carillon, whatever the denomination, might not be readily tolerated by neighbours whose sleep is disturbed on a Sunday morning. And, indeed, an anti-noise bylaw in Kingston has restricted the use of some ecclesial chimes and bells.

The confident assumptions and predictions of a generation ago that increasing secularization would drive religion out of the public sphere have far from materialized. Despite an undeniable increase in an inner and private spirituality focused on the individual, the public manifestation of religion in a pluralistic society remains, demanding to be accommodated. Sometimes those who are unaffiliated seek to establish their shrines, scatter remains, or hold services in public spaces. As a result, the distinction between religious and secular has become difficult to uphold in contemporary Canada. Nineteenth-century Christians were concerned about the use of canals on the Lord's Day. Today stores remain open on Sundays, as do sports arenas, theatres, and other centres of entertainment and commerce. Within the stretch of a kilometre or so along

Kingston's main street, one restaurant trades on the decline of the sacred with a sign that gleefully announces, "We confess! Our deserts are sinful," while a similarly designed sign outside a United Church dispenses maxims of secular advice such as "Never let failure go to your heart."

In the centre of Kingston's downtown a contemporary clothing store aroused the ire of neighbours across the street at St. Andrew's Presbyterian Church with banners in the window proclaiming "Gsus sucks." The defense that "Gsus," the brand name of the Dutch clothing company, was a reference to a descending guitar chord, and not a homonym of the name of Christianity's central figure, did little to settle the storm. Gsus Sindustries, known for its self-mockery and provocative advertising, has recently inaugurated its "od," or "'original denim" line, with the logo "gsusod" whose first and last two letters are in contrasting colours with the central "sus." Is "Jesus God" a curse or an ironic proclamation of the divinity of Christ or a typographical "coincidence"? The Presbyterians, whose late nineteenth-century coreligionists were concerned about the appearance of new tavern at the same intersection, complained, without success, to Kingston's Dutch consul and to the police about the possibility of this being an instance of a hate crime. According to an article in the Toronto Star, 29 July 2004, theirs was the only complaint brought against the company during its three years in Canada. A compromise was reached when the store agreed to remove the sign on Sundays, and to seek a replacement banner from the company. The new banner read "Lost in Gsus."

In many respects the changing fortunes of religion within a Canadian municipality can be gauged by the history of this same St. Andrew's Presbyterian Church. The nineteenth century was marked by confrontations with the Anglican Church over Presbyterian rights of burial in a churchyard, and by violent conflicts between Catholics and Orange Protestants at the site of the building of the new Roman Catholic cathedral. Today Catholics and Protestants, as well as Jews and Muslims, live more or less amicably together. The proportion of Presbyterians has declined in the past century and a half, while the number of Muslims in Kingston today exactly equals the number of Jews. Nationally the number of Muslims exceeds the number of Presbyterians by more than 40% (580,000 to 410,000). In Kingston a single Islamic Centre accommodates Muslims of many nationalities and theologies, whereas by comparison there may be as many of as a half-dozen Muslim groups on the Queen's University campus. As members of Kingston's Hindu community have reported, when the numbers are small, sectarian divisions must be avoided, and members have to get along.[5]

The changing demographics of religious pluralism have sometimes led to new alliances. On such contemporary issues as same-sex marriage evangelical Protestants may find that they have more in common with Roman Catholics, or even Orthodox Jews or Muslims, than with liberal Protestants. And Orthodox

Jews seeking to establish a Hebrew Day School might also find more commonality with other faith groups wanting government funding for their religious schools than with Reform Jews. As Diana Eck says, "stories of interreligious encounter also remind us that our religious traditions are multivocal, that no one speaks for the whole, that we argue within our traditions about some of our deepest values, and that newfound alliances may be made across the political and religious spectrum" (Eck 2002).

Kingston, like many other Canadian cities, tends to deal with the challenges posed by immigration and the resulting religious diversity, as well as changing contemporary practices, through trial-and-error modifications, informal accommodations, ad hoc adjustments, or alterations necessitated by formal legal tests more often than by undertaking deliberate and considered policy changes. But in the absence of any coherent policy age-old practices are allowed to continue as if the city were still uniformly Christian (which, of course, never was the case). Opportunities are available to Christians that are not extended to other groups. When occasions do arise in which religious privilege or preference becomes too blatantly obvious or offensive, the expedient is often simply to banish religion from the public realm altogether rather than trying to accommodate religious diversity.[6] When interfaith ventures are undertaken, they almost always occur at the initiative of the various faith groups themselves, not because the municipality has sought to provide a space for such cooperation or invited their participation.

And yet, surely, providing a public forum in which the full range of voices existing in the community can be heard is one of the imperatives of civic government. Moral issues will arise in any community needing discussion in a public forum where religious diversity will be present, and in which, it is hoped, religious pluralism can be forged. As Diana Eck maintains:

> Pluralism is much more than the simple fact of diversity. Pluralism is not a given, but an achievement. It is engaging that diversity in the creation of a common society. Now, as then, the task is to engage in the common tasks of civil society people who do not share a single history or a single religious tradition (McGraw and Formicola 2005).

In almost any Canadian municipality immigrant groups of differing religions and ethnicities are to be found, eager to share their traditions and to participate in this common task of creating a civil society. In many respects the need is for something like what Paul Bramadat urges, namely, "cultivating a pluralistic, multicultural, open society" of the kind most Canadians cherish in their best moments by making "much better use of the constructive and creative social capital generated by certain forms of religion" (Bramadat 2005).

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Notes

[1]Most of the contributors to a recent collection of essays argue from the assumptions of the three major western religions and from such precedents as the mention of God in the Charter, for an enhanced role for (presumably monotheistic) religion in Canadian public life. No mention is made in the book of Sikhs, Buddhists, Confucians, or Hindus, let alone (except slightingly) Wiccans (see Farrow 2004). Similarly, other scholarly considerations of "religion in Canada" have confined themselves to the statistical majority, i.e., Christianity (see Hewitt 1993 and Bibby 1987). Peter Emberley argues that maintaining references to God in the Constitution is a matter not simply of heritage nor recognition of historical roots, but of metaphysics-"there needs to be a foundation of an incorruptible nature" (Emberley 2002).

[2] There have been various scholarly estimates of the effects of immigration throughout the history of Canada on the prevailing patterns of religion. Keith Clifford has written of how, between 1880 and World War II, the Protestant vision of Canada as "His Dominion" was thrown into crisis by the massive immigration to Canada of "the Orientals and the Slavs" and of "Mormons, Jews, Mennonites, Hutterites, and Doukobors" (Slater 1977). Sociologist Hans Mol examined the major immigrant groups of the twentieth century-Germans, Italians, Ukrainians, Dutch, Scandinavians, Polish, and Jews-maintaining that "old-country religion reinforced enthnicity all the more when the immigrant group and its members were marginal to Canadian culture" (Mol 1985). In 1993, Reginald Biddy rather dismissively and prematurely wrote that immigration had not much changed the religious makeup of Canada: "An examination of religious identification in Canada since the first census in 1871 through 1991 reveals that, for all the immigration that has taken place, the proportion of Canadians lining up with religions other than Christianity has changed very little" (Bibby 1993). While Bibby and others did not anticipate the impact of immigrants whose religion was other than Christianity, nonetheless earlier successive waves of immigration have each had their effect on religion in Canada.

[3] Though the study Religious Diversity in Kingston has not been able to identify a single Parsi resident in the city of Kingston, a multifaith service at the Royal Military College of Canada in 2002 included a Zoroastrian prayer offered by a second-year cadet (Royal Military College of Canada 2002).

[4] The range of ethnic diversity represented in Christian congregations in Kingston and resulting from various waves of immigration is worth noting: Greek Orthodox, Ukrainian Catholic, Portuguese Roman Catholic, Polish Roman Catholic,

French Roman Catholic, Reformed (Dutch), Coptic Christian (Egyptian), Korean Christian (Free Methodist), Chinese Christian (Missionary Alliance), Lutheran (German), and a predominantly Afro-Canadian church (Faith Alive). The list reveals far greater diversity within Christianity than perhaps one might expect from thinking of a time when perhaps the greatest division imaginable was between Scottish Presbyterians and Irish Catholics.

[5] Kingston's Hindus do not have their own building, choosing instead to meet in their homes, stressing their commonality with all immigrants from India in the Kingston area. It was been said that if there were a Hindu temple, there would be an inevitable exclusion or alienation felt by some Hindus of other sects and by other Indians.

[6] For an interesting example of "the contested nature of minority religion in the public realm," when that public realm is assumed to have a secular status, see Siemiatycki 2005.

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The Residential Mobility of Newcomers to Canada: The First Months

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Abstract
This paper looks at a key aspect of new immigrants' settlement experience—finding a home. Specifically, we examine the factors determining the propensity, over the first six months of settlement, to remain in or move on from the first residence occupied since arrival in Canada. We consider in turn the effects of various household and individual characteristics, and examine how these effects vary by urban region. Our data source is the first wave of observations from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC), which covers a sample of 12,040 people who arrived in Canada as landed immigrants between October 2000 and September 2001. Semi-parametric survival models are used for the analysis. We find that while the residential mobility of this cohort in the initial months after arrival is associated with certain individual- and household-level characteristics, the strongest association is with the type of housing occupied. The city of residence of these newcomers, however, has little bearing on their housing transitions.

Keywords: housing, residential mobility; immigration; immigrant settlement process; Canadian cities; longitudinal analysis

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While shelter is a basic need for all, it takes on a particular material and symbolic significance when people settle in a new country in that it represents the fulcrum for a new start (Ray 1999; Ryan and Woodill 2000). Finding a home is one of the first settlement actions, if not the first, that a newcomer takes when making the initial contact in terms of day-to-day living with the receiving society. In this situation, an understanding of the first settlement activities is vital. Newcomers to Canada are highly diversified in terms of economic resources, links to the labour market, social networks and knowledge of residential markets in the cities where they first settle (Statistics Canada 2005). It can be assumed, therefore, that while some succeed at once, or almost at once, in obtaining housing that will satisfy their needs and aspirations for some time, others tend to move more than once in order to gradually improve their residential quality of life, to be closer to those with whom they have social ties, or to improve their job prospects. However, immigrants whose economic status remains precarious face a more limited range of residential options; this can entail frequent and more or less forced moves resulting from, say, rent increases, which may impair their personal stability and their social integration. For those immigrants, residential stability may mean that they have succeeded in finding affordable housing, likely with help from their social network (Bernèche and Martin 1986; Miraftab 2000; Ray 1998); this may or may not satisfy their other needs. Residential mobility or stability among newcomers, and their residential trajectories or "careers" resulting from these dynamics, may thus have a variety of meanings, and the residential adjustments they make in the initial months and years of settlement do not occur in a vacuum and must be interpreted in light of the settlement actions taken by immigrants in other areas of their lives (Murdie et al. 1999; Özüerkren and van Kempen 2002), taking into account the filters and barriers they face in the residential market (Bolt and van Kempen 2002; Murdie 2002).

The residential transitions of recent immigrants should thus be examined longitudinally, which was not possible on a Canada-wide basis until quite recently, with the completion of the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC), and with the availability to researchers of the microdata from that survey. The target population for the LSIC consisted of immigrants aged 15 or older arriving in Canada between October 2000 and September 2001 who submitted an immigration application to a Canadian mission abroad. Some 12,040 immigrants were selected to participate in the first wave of interviews after about six months' residence (Statistics Canada 2003 and 2005).[1] The same immigrants were also asked to take part in a second and a third wave of interviews after two and four years, respectively, of settlement. The survey gathered data on various aspects of immigrant settlement. Subjects such as the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondent, language proficiency, social networks, household composition and income were addressed. Questions were also asked about the respondent's

housing, employment and education. Data were also gathered on moving-in and moving-out dates, and on selected features of the housing occupied in each place the respondents lived in. Since much of the data included dates, dynamic study is possible of the residential settlement of the immigrants, although the structure of the survey does not enable us to consider the reason for each successive move as an explanatory factor in the analysis.

We therefore took the opportunity presented by the LSIC to explore the survey's potential to shed light on the residential transitions that newcomers experience. We restricted our study to the residential adjustments occurring in the first months of settlement, as only the data from the first wave of interviews were available at the time. The objective of this paper will be, first, to describe immigrants' residential mobility, and second, to answer two specific questions about their initial residences: What factors affect how soon they leave their first home? Are there factors peculiar to the urban settings in which immigrants are placed?

In addressing these two questions, we will first identify the factors—whether individual or household-related—that hasten or delay the transition. This will help us determine what characteristics affect the stability or mobility of newcomers. Analysis of the second question will show whether cities offer different urban contexts, and thus whether new immigrants face different situations, depending on whether they settle in Montréal, Toronto, Vancouver or elsewhere in Canada.

Methods and variables

In our study of residential transitions, we used survival model analysis (Allison 1991; Cleves et al., 2002). This involves studying the speeds of transition from one status to another and identifying the factors that affect them. It shows for each unit of time the probability that a given event will occur. Survival curves and semi-parametric regressions (or Cox regressions) were plotted.[2] In this case, residential mobility is considered from four different angles related to the analysis of the transitions. First, we looked at interurban and interprovincial mobility. Two survival curves were estimated, showing the rates at which immigrants change their metropolitan region of residence (MRR) or census agglomeration of residence (CAR) and province. However, the main purpose of the analyses was to explain mobility from one residence to another, while continuing to pay special attention to the dynamics related to the urban settings of residence. Survival curves were prepared for the promptness of leaving a residence depending on the rank of the residence occupied (first, second or third residence since arrival), and the promptness of leaving the first residence depending on the city of residence.

The first variables introduced to explain how soon people leave a dwelling relate to socio-demographic characteristics: the respondent's age, sex, immigration category (economic, family or refugee) and membership in various kinds of visible minorities. Added to these were variables related to human capital. Two variables

relate to knowledge of English and French. These are the indicators of knowledge of the official languages based on three questions that ask respondents to assess their ability to speak, read and write each of them. Another variable considered was the highest level of schooling attained outside Canada, whether primary or below, secondary, post-secondary or university. Another variable was whether the respondent had lived in Canada before immigrating.

As the promptness of departure from a dwelling is a phenomenon that involves the household,[3] its characteristics must be considered among the causal factors. Such factors include savings and average monthly family income,[4] as indicators of financial independence in the first months in Canada. Two variables related to household composition are also included: the number of members of the immigrating unit[5] the respondent belongs to, and its composition (single adult, two or more adults with children, two or more adults without children, one adult with children, or children alone).

Furthermore, the social networks already developed by the immigrant and in place when they arrive are likely to provide assistance in finding a home, in particular by supplying temporary lodging, or more or less complete information on the market availability of affordable accommodation (Moriah et al. 2004; Ray 1998; Rose and Ray 2001). To take these effects into account, the presence of family or friends in Canada at the time of the respondent's arrival is also included.

Two questions relating to housing were identified and included in the analysis.[6] The first relates to any arrangements made prior to migration to occupy the initial dwelling. The second relates to the various types of accommodation occupied by the respondent: their own home, or that of immediate family or in-laws; the home of a friend; the home of a relative outside the immediate family; a hotel or motel; the home of an employer; temporary lodgings; an immigrant or refugee centre; or, lastly, some other type of accommodation.

The next variable contributes information on the immigrant's region of residence: Montréal, Toronto, Vancouver or some other urban region, and indicates whether the processes relating to the promptness of leaving a dwelling differ according to its urban context. To that end, terms of interaction designed mainly to show whether the effect of the previously introduced variables differs with the city of residence were added to the regression. In the process of defining the final analysis model, interactions between the immigration category and the social network variables, and between cities of residence and immigration category, knowledge of the official languages and membership in a visible minority were carried out at the same time. Of these interactions, only those that appeared significant in the first test were retained for the purposes of our analysis.

Analyses of residential mobility

The descriptive analyses of residential mobility will focus on the respondents' first

30 weeks of settlement.[7] After 30 weeks, although respondents will have begun to move out of the picture, enough remain to produce reliable estimates.

Interurban and interprovincial mobility

Moving to another city or province of residence during the first months entails a major residential adjustment that might result from getting a new job or from the desire to be closer to relatives or to concentrations of members of the same ethnocultural group (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2000 and 2001). The results obtained indicate that when this type of mobility occurs, it takes some time to set in motion—usually after 20 weeks of residence—and affects a very small proportion of newcomers. After 30 weeks, only 4% of immigrants will have moved to another city, and the proportion drops to 1.5% for those changing province.

Promptness of moving out by rank of dwelling

Residential mobility, however, is certainly not a matter only of changing the city or province of residence. It may be thought that the first type of mobility experienced by the new arrival is mobility between dwellings.[8] Our focus will be the rate at which newcomers move, particularly with respect to the first dwelling occupied upon arrival in Canada (ranked first).

We prepared a survival curve and table for moves out of the first three dwellings occupied by newcomers since their arrival. They indicate more specifically the proportion of individuals who are still in their first, second, third or subsequent dwelling (ranked 1, 2 and 3) over time. Immigrants leave their initial dwelling soon and at a relatively constant rate in the first months of settlement. After 30 weeks in Canada, nearly 50% of respondents will have left their initial dwelling. They are slower to leave the second dwelling than they were to leave the first, and even slower to leave the third than they were to leave the first two, which is consistent with the idea that overall, the residential situation improves with each move. Of immigrants at risk of leaving their second dwelling, just over 15% will have done so after 30 weeks' residence there, and this proportion will be only slightly smaller with respect to leaving the third dwelling. In other words, the residential trajectories of a substantial proportion of new immigrants show no sign of residential stabilization in the first weeks of settlement. The regression analyses of departure from the first dwelling presented below provides a profile of the most mobile individuals at the very beginning of settlement.

Promptness of departure from the initial dwelling

In order to determine whether the promptness with which immigrants leave their first dwelling differs with the place of residence, an additional survival curve and table were prepared. They indicate that in the first 20 weeks, respondents seem

to leave their first dwelling at the same pace, regardless of whether they live in Montréal, Toronto, Vancouver or another MRR or CAR, which suggests that generally, the first residential adjustments reflect the same types of experience in the early stages of settlement, regardless of variations from city to city in the residential market or the profile of the newcomers. Thereafter, a slight gap opens up between Montréal and other cities, with immigrants in Montréal tending to leave their dwelling less promptly than immigrants elsewhere in Canada. However, this initial trend should be explored further, using regression analysis.

We move now to the results of the Cox regressions, which yielded better documentation of the processes surrounding the move out of the initial dwelling. Seven models were constructed, in a hierarchical arrangement. The first includes one set of variables, and in each subsequent model a new set of variables was added. In Table 1, for each model, we present the coefficients for each variable, their significance and a set of data on the regression, particularly the $\chi 2$ or likelihood ratio (LR), which indicates whether the model is significant, and the $\chi 2$ that determines the contribution of each significant variable to the model. The last column of the table is associated with the seventh model. It presents the $\chi 2$ for each variable, showing the impact of each of them on the promptness of leaving the first dwelling.

The results indicate that the introduction of each set of variables in the regression models in turn adds further explanatory force to assist our understanding of residential transitions. The various models show some measure of stability as the additions are made: a majority of variables and categories of variables retain their significance and effect. The seventh and last model best explains the promptness of leaving the first dwelling (LR $\chi 2$=15785.51, sig=0.001). The introduction of the terms of interaction further improves the explanation ($\chi 2$=21.44, sig=0.001), but to a lesser extent than the addition of the other variables.

Table 1 also shows which variables explain in significant terms the moves out of the first dwelling: the age of the respondent, the category of immigration, membership in a visible minority, knowledge of French, level of education, previous residence in Canada, average monthly family income, composition of the immigrating unit, presence of family in Canada, and type of initial dwelling in Canada. The other variables have no significant effect on how soon the respondent moves out of the first dwelling.

The $\chi 2$ of the variables indicates the extent to which each variable explains the transition. The type of dwelling seems to be the variable that helps most to explain it ($\chi 2$=2638.07, sig=0.001). Next in order of importance are the variables relating to composition of the immigrating unit, membership in a visible minority, category of immigration, previous residence in Canada, and level of education. The contribution of the other variables is less important.

In the latter model, the addition of the terms of interaction prevents indi-

Table 1: Risk ratios for the Cox regression on the move from the initial dwelling

	Model							
Variables	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	$\chi 2$
Socio-demographic characteristics								
Age	0.996**	0.997*	0.994***	0.994***	0.995**	0.995**	0.995**	9.07**
Sex (female)[1]	1.027	1.020	1.024	1.018	0.995	0.998	0.998	0.00
Category of immigration (economic)								28.52***
Family	0.339***	0.358***	0.443***	0.478***	0.743***	0.743***	0.701***	27.40***
Refugee	0.985	1.027	1.099	1.130*	1.104	1.081	1.031	0.15
Visible minority (White)								40.23***
Chinese	1.020	1.015	0.960	0.946	0.979	0.996	1.004	0.01
South Asian	1.171***	1.099*	1.031	1.063	0.924	0.946	0.956	0.78
Black	1.087	1.093	1.043	1.067	0.875	0.872	0.881	2.80
Filipino	1.132	1.013	0.972	1.027	0.883	0.895	0.906	1.75
Latin American	1.150	1.198	1.206	1.212*	1.045	1.060	1.171	2.10
Southeast Asian	1.065	1.076	0.911	0.929	0.730	0.736	0.741	2.94
Arab	1.190**	1.178*	1.133	1.163*	1.109	1.139	1.128	2.96
West Asian	1.486***	1.483***	1.390***	1.428***	1.113	1.138	1.255**	7.42**
Korean	1.292***	1.344***	1.155	1.160	1.227**	1.265**	1.277**	8.84**
Japanese	0.402*	0.558	0.494	0.477	0.605	0.617	0.622	1.58
Visible minority n.i.e.	1.333	1.254	1.254	1.313	1.272	1.307	1.329	1.62
Multiple visible minorities	1.131	1.067	0.940	1.005	0.893	0.821	0.832	0.51
Whites and visible minorities	1.564	1.417	1.397	1.427	1.170	1.199	1.199	0.37
Human capital								
French		1.005	1.072	0.997	1.031	1.043**	1.039*	4.71*
English		1.059***	1.001***	1.072***	1.028	1.027	1.026	2.47
Educational attainment (none or primary)								14.75**
Secondary		1.072	1.074	1.071	1.172	1.166	1.150	2.27
Postsecondary		1.167*	1.188	1.177	1.360***	1.367***	1.347**	9.38**
University		1.151**	1.199*	1.178	1.308**	1.311**	1.291**	7.36**
Previous residence in Canada (none)		0.519***	0.563***	0.554***	0.738***	0.726***	0.731***	20.79***
Household characteristics								
Monthly family income			0.999***	0.999***	0.999**	0.999**	0.999**	8.08**
Size of the immigrating unit			1.004	1.007	1.020	1.014	1.016	0.73
Composition of the immigrating unit (adult only)								51.70***
2 or more adults with children			1.261***	1.246***	1.478***	1.507***	1.507***	35.47***
2 or more adults without children			1.262***	1.256***	1.378***	1.377***	1.379***	37.51***
One adult with children			0.890	0.895	1.146	1.152	1.150	2.52
Children only			0.399**	0.408**	0.518	0.536	0.532	4.13*
Amount brought in savings			1.000*	1.000*	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.30

Table 1 Continued

	Model							
Variables	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	$\chi 2$
Social network								
Relatives in Canada (none)				0.868***	1.130**	1.127**	1.111**	6.42*
Friends in Canada (none)				1.059	0.971	0.979	0.980	0.33
Housing characteristics								
Arrangements for initial dwelling (none)					0.943	0.941	0.940	2.27
Type of accommodation (own home or a relative's)								2638.07***
Home of a friend					5.313***	5.300***	5.303***	1570.95***
Home of a distant relative					3.127***	3.149***	3.178***	456.51***
Hotel or motel					10.790***	10.884***	10.869***	1229.24***
Residence of an employer					2.745**	2.769**	2.787**	8.71**
Centre or temporary residence					8.954***	8.887***	8.942***	1118.51***
Other					2.997***	3.023***	3.022***	125.33***
MRR or CAR of residence								
City of residence (Toronto)								3.20
Montréal						0.931	0.967	0.25
Vancouver						1.035	1.019	0.15
Other MRR or CAR						1.084*	1.068	2.31
Terms of interaction								
Vancouver / French							1.080	2.18
Other MRR or CAR / Family							1.258*	6.28*
Relative / Refugee							1.159	3.04
West Asian / Montréal							0.922**	9.78**
Latin American / Other							0.954	3.07
West Asian / Other MRR or CAR							0.981	2.34
* p<0.05 n	11956	11956	10959	10959	10875	10720	10720	
** p<0.01 Event	5608	5608	5240	5240	5163	5029	5029	
*** p<0.001 Cases covered	6348	6348	5719	5719	5712	5691	5691	
-2LL	99747.844	99572.608	91946.124	91920.512	87383.318	85166.026	85144.584	
dl	17	23	30	32	39	42	48	
LR X^2	1182.25***	1357.49***	8983.97***	9009.58***	13546.07***	15764.07***	15785.51***	
Contribution of each set of variables $(X^2)^t$		175.23***	7626.48***	25.61***	4537.19***	2217.29***	21.44 ***	

vidual consideration of the variables or categories of variables. They have to be considered in relation to the terms of interaction associated with them, since the coefficients of the variables lack the effect associated with the terms of interaction. Thus, the categories "family" and "West Asian" cannot be interpreted in isolation. To obtain the overall effect of these categories, they must be related to the coefficients of the terms of interaction: "other MRR or CAR / family" and "West Asian / Montréal."

Detailed examination of the seventh model shows the effect of the significant variables and categories of variable. Socio-demographic characteristics help explain the phenomenon in terms of age variables, a few groups within the cohort belonging to visible minorities, and particularly the family immigration category. With regard to age, the older the respondent, the slower the pace of leaving the first dwelling, which is consistent with the results of earlier studies in Quebec (Renaud et al. 1993; Renaud and Gingras 1998) and which suggests that residential stability is more important when a newcomer has already achieved a certain age level upon arrival in the new country. However, membership in a visible minority accelerates departure from the first dwelling, by comparison with the "White" reference group: this is the case with West Asians living outside the Montréal MRR, and with Koreans.

Respondents coming to Canada for reasons of family reunification generally experience a significant reduction in the likelihood of moving out of their initial dwelling during our observation period, by comparison with economic immigrants. The slower departure rate could be associated with the very definition of this immigration category. These respondents seem more likely than economic immigrants to have accommodation arranged before arrival, since they are joining a family member already settled in Canada, who in most cases will have been able to make suitable arrangements to receive them. Living in accommodation more appropriate to their family situation, these respondents seem less likely to move from their initial residence. Also, in some cases, the initial dwelling may not be satisfactory, but the transition is slowed by the difficulty of finding affordable accommodation that is sufficiently large, particularly in the major urban areas. The fact that respondents living outside the Montréal, Toronto and Vancouver MRRs leave their initial dwelling sooner could also relate to market conditions that are more favourable to family households.

The set of variables relating to human capital shows that knowledge of French and a level of educational attainment above secondary contribute to an early move out of an immigrant's initial dwelling. These moves could be prompted by occupational factors. These attributes also favour the ability to access information on the residential market and on the housing system without reliance on informal networks, which means that people are better informed about the possibilities of improving their residential situation (Moriah et al. 2004; Rose and Ray 2001).

On the other hand, previous residence in Canada reduces the likelihood of a transition. Having lived in Canada before immigrating could give immigrants more familiarity with the housing market and with Canadian institutions and how they work, and the possibility of having developed a network within the city that enables them to find suitable housing from the outset.

Monthly family income and the composition of the immigrating unit are the only significant variables in considering the characteristics of the household. Both may relate to different groups of individuals, since the first relates to the family, whereas the second relates to the immigrating unit—the respondent and all those individuals who arrived in Canada with him or her. In terms of income, the results indicate that the higher it is, the lower the chances that the transition will take place; families that are better-off are more likely to find satisfactory accommodation upon arrival. In terms of the composition of the immigrating unit, the categories that appear significant are households of two adults with or without children. Both of those types of immigrating units are more likely to move than those made up of a single adult. The desire to acquire a more private and stable residential situation both for children and for couples beginning their lives in a new country could help make the first residential adjustment occur sooner, particularly in cases where the first dwelling does not belong to them.

Among the variables relating to the social network, having family in Canada at the time of arrival is the only significant one, and it increases the likelihood of leaving the initial dwelling. It may be that family in Canada is a help in quickly finding housing that appeals, if there are relatives already settled in the city where the respondent arrives, but such an interpretation must be made with caution, because in the LSIC, this variable includes both family members living in the same MRR or CAR, and those living in another province.

With respect to housing characteristics, only the type of housing has a significant effect. Thus, immigrants who live in housing that is not their own tend to change residences more quickly than those living in their own home or in the home of a close relative. These results were more or less what we might have expected. Beginning life in Canada in housing that is not one's own, with the sharing and crowding that this can imply, may increase immigrants' desire to find a place of their own or to live with a close relative, thereby enjoying a residential quality of life that offers more privacy, comfort and stability.

Lastly, with regard to the urban area variable, none of the categories is significant. The model shows that a respondent living in Vancouver, Montréal or another MRR or CAR does not move out significantly sooner or later than one living in Toronto. This result accordingly led us to reconsider our initial observations concerning the slight gap between Montréal and other urban areas. Only certain special cases of interaction between the place of residence of the respondents and another individual attribute made it possible to identify a few specific

effects associated with the geographical location of newcomers. Immigrants in the family reunification class living outside the three main MRRs are quicker to leave their initial dwelling, whereas West Asians living in Montréal show more residential stability; this could be attributable to the difficulties in economic integration experienced by the latter (Godin 2004) and the supposedly negative effect on their ability to find and move into more satisfactory housing.

Conclusion

The objective of this study was to explore the potential of a new source of longitudinal data in documenting the residential mobility of new immigrants in the first months of settlement in Canada, whether the mobility takes the form of a move out of their metropolitan area or province of residence or, less drastically, a change of housing. Detailed examination of the promptness of moving out of the initial dwelling made it possible not only to identify the factors associated with greater residential mobility, or on the contrary greater residential stability, but also to see whether the associated processes differ with the immigrant's place of residence. We hoped thus to make up for the lack of studies comparing the major cities of immigration in Canada and to gain a better understanding, through the enhancement of longitudinal data, of the dynamics of residential settlement. The results are somewhat surprising.

While immigrants are unlikely to move to another city or province in the first months of settlement, we cannot say that they are not very mobile in the early days. Many of them—about 50%, in fact—moved at least once, either within the same city, or otherwise. However, contrary to what one might have expected, the rate at which newcomers leave their initial dwelling does not generally seem to be affected by variations in residential markets from one large city to another, or between the three large metropolises and the other urban areas. The promptness of moving out of the initial dwelling is affected rather by the characteristics of the housing and the household, by newcomers' individual characteristics and attributes in terms of human capital, and by social networks. In particular, the type of housing occupied, household composition, membership in a visible minority and educational attainment are the determinant variables in accelerating transitions, whereas the category of immigration, previous residence in Canada, age and income have a significant effect on delaying the move from the initial dwelling.

While the dynamics of the move from the first dwelling vary little from city to city over the brief period of settlement considered, that is, with respect to the first wave of observations from the LSIC, things could be different in the medium term, when immigrants may be more exposed to the dynamics of residential markets, which differ considerably from city to city. In conducting this study, we sought to use the newly available data from the first wave of the LSIC to shed light on the residential aspects of the first steps in settling in a new country. The

period covered by the analysis does not, however, correspond for all respondents to the time spent in the same accommodation. Data from subsequent waves of the LSIC will support analyses of this type covering a longer period of observation, particularly as it corresponds to a period of inflation in the housing market in certain large cities (Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation 2004). It will be possible to see whether the mechanisms observed are maintained, whether some are peculiar to the beginning of settlement, or whether other dynamics emerge after a certain time has passed.

Lastly, with regard to method, the study showed the added value of the longitudinal approach in gaining a better understanding of the housing dynamics that newcomers experience, even though we did encounter some limitations of the LSIC, particularly the impossibility of determining possible associations between the timing of residential transitions and certain variables with a major explanatory potential, such as rental costs, the degree of effort and the mode of occupancy. That said, the other Canada-wide longitudinal surveys of the immigrant cohort (such as the Longitudinal Immigration Database and the National Population Health Survey) contain much less information on housing and residential mobility, and in this sense the LSIC represents substantial progress, particularly as housing is a crucial fulcrum for making a fresh start in a new country.

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Notes

[1] For the first wave of observations, designed to describe the situation of respondents after 6 months' residence in Canada, longitudinal respondents were interviewed over a period varying from 5 to 10 months or so in the host society. Thus, length of residence is not the same for all respondents.

[2] The regression results presented were resampled using "bootstrap" weights. This method of resampling is used to test data reliability and consists of extracting random subsamples (with replacement) from within the original sample to obtain an approximation of the actual variance. For the LSIC, Statistics Canada supplied a series of 1,000 bootstrap weights for recalculating the variance for each estimate produced, and for determining its quality. Using these weights, we can determine whether the differences observed in the regression are statistically significant for the cohort studied.

[3] With regard to the unit of analysis and the phenomenon being studied, the residential

dynamics and the resulting choices involve the entire household. However, the unit of analysis for the LSIC was the longitudinal respondent. While it would have been appropriate to use immigrant-dependent households as our unit of analysis, this was not possible given the design of the survey, which was intended to assess the individual experiences of immigrants. For more information, refer to the user's guide.

[4] Since total income received in Canada and from outside Canada by the economic unit supported by the longitudinal respondents was not available until the interviews were held, it was divided by the number of months the respondent had spent in Canada in order to obtain an approximation of average monthly income. Thus, income is assumed to have been stable through the first months of settlement, which is likely not the case. It would have been helpful to have more accurate data on family income levels: start of gainful employment, and increases or decreases in the income of both spouses.

[5] In the LSIC, household characteristics are available only as at the time of arrival. In order to ensure recognition of the time factor in the sequence of events, data on the respondent's immigrating unit were given priority for the period considered, that is, between the time of arrival and the first interview. "'Immigrating unit' means the 'group of people who applied to come to Canada under the same visa form and, for the purpose of the survey, who arrived either with the longitudinal respondent or three months before or after the longitudinal respondent'" (Statistics Canada 2003). However, it is not necessarily all the individuals belonging to the immigrating unit, or only those individuals, who will be living with the respondent and forming the respondent's household. In some cases, the number of individuals in an immigrant household may be underestimated, and in other cases overestimated. Nevertheless, this is the best estimate available in the survey for the relevant period of settlement.

[6] With no detailed information on all the initial dwellings occupied by the respondents, given the structure of the survey, the analysis could not include rental costs, the rate of effort or the mode of occupancy (owner or tenant). These factors could have proved to be key determinants of residential stability.

[7] Note, however, that regression analyses are done for the entire period during which respondents were observed. In the first wave, observation ended after 10 months' residence.

[8] In the various analyses conducted, all the immigrants in the survey are likely to undergo a mobility experience in the initial months of settlement, whether mobility is expressed in its more general form (a straightforward move) or the more specific form (such as a change of city or province). With regard to inter-city or -province mobility, transitions may or may not take place at the time of the move from the initial dwelling. In some cases, the change of MRR or province of residence occurs upon leaving the first dwelling; in others, it occurs when they leave subsequent dwellings (second, third or more). Thus, in the analyses of the move from the initial dwelling, some immigrants who went through this first change of residence may have moved beyond the boundaries of their MRR of initial residence. However, the percentage of respondents in this situation is very small.

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Landing at Home: Insights on Immigration and Metropolitan Housing Markets from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada

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Abstract
This paper examines the housing conditions, needs and trajectories of recent newcomers to Canada, by focusing on the first few months of their adjustment process. Until now, most research in this field has been unable to provide a comprehensive description of this early stage of settlement. Employing individual survey data from the first wave of Statistics Canada's Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC), we draw a portrait of immigrant and refugee residential outcomes as observed six months after arrival. In particular, we highlight five novel insights, centered around the rapidity with which newcomers in general enter the housing market, but also around the appreciable variability of outcomes in tenure status, class of entry, metropolitan area of settlement, and assessment by newcomers of their situation in the housing market. We conclude with a discussion of the significance of these variegated findings for the settlement experience of recently arrived immigrants and refugees and, more broadly, for social policy in the areas of housing and newcomer integration.

Keywords: Immigration, housing, early settlement, LSIC

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Introduction

The extraordinary diversity among newcomers to Canada has transformed the study of urban and metropolitan housing markets, and there is now considerable interest in understanding the residential outcomes and trajectories of recent immigrants. Most of this literature emphasizes broad demographic differences, as well as distinctions based on temporal and locational characteristics such as region of origin, city of settlement, stage of life cycle, and period of arrival. Despite this sensitivity to difference, however, key dimensions of heterogeneity remain poorly understood. Little is known of the varied housing experiences of immigrants entering Canada through different categories of admission. A few studies have examined homeownership attainment and market impacts of business class immigrants (Ley 1999; Ley and Tutchener 2001) and the precarious circumstances of refugees at risk of homelessness (Hiebert, D'Addario, and Sherrell 2005). Yet these and other studies rely on quite different methodologies, precluding any systematic, comparative analysis of the relations between housing conditions and admission class. Moreover, the literature provides little information on the housing experiences of economic and family reunification migrants.

The literature certainly does provide a wealth of information on the role of housing in the situation of immigrants several years after their arrival. But this evidence—an artifact of the categories available in the Census every five years—obscures the view of immigrants' experiences in the first months after arrival. These early housing experiences are crucial, because the array of choices made and barriers encountered are likely to reverberate through other, non-housing facets of daily life. The localized nature of many job-search networks, for example, suggests that the location of early residence—and the tradeoffs between housing and commuting costs—may play important roles for immigrants without pre-arranged employment when they take their first steps on job-market ladders in Canada. Unfortunately, the literature provides few insights on important questions. How do households first look for permanent accommodation, and how long does it take to find it? What factors determine the varied outcomes of newcomers? And how do newcomers perceive their housing experience at this early stage of their settlement trajectory?

In this paper, we address some of these gaps in the literature through a descriptive analysis of the first wave of data from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada. We begin by describing the design and content of LSIC, focusing specifically on the pace of initial access to housing, the diverse spectrum of early housing outcomes, the importance of admissions class, the role of metropolitan context, and the perceptions of individual immigrants evaluating their housing experiences. Finally, we conclude with an evaluation of the significance of these five insights, underscoring the complex and evolving interplay between national immigration processes and contingent housing market outcomes.

The Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada

Two of the most commonly cited shortcomings of studies on housing and immigration in Canada relate to issues of data availability. In the first place, the limited availability of individual survey data has contributed to the predominance of studies based on the use of aggregate Census tabulations. Consequently, most of the findings and conclusions in this body of work are tied to a variety of risky ecological assumptions. For example, census-based studies that document *neighborhood*-level correlations between percent recent immigrants and various measures of social problems (e.g., poverty, reliance on social assistance, low educational attainment, etc.) mistakenly infer *individual*-level relations from aggregate data—and thus ignore the experience of, for instance, highly-educated immigrant professionals who may start out in a poor, low-cost neighborhood before quickly working their way into a better, more expensive neighborhood. In the second place, the lack of comprehensive longitudinal data pertaining to this topic has meant that most studies are of a cross-sectional nature. As a result, scholars have for years faced a series of methodological obstacles, affecting in particular the investigation of housing trajectories of immigrants over time. Fortunately, however, researchers are now able to address numerous questions that until now had proved difficult to approach with existing data, thanks to the introduction of a new Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC) by Statistics Canada and Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC).

There actually has been a longitudinal survey of immigrants to Canada, which took place 30 years ago, at a time when annual levels of immigration were comparatively low and the vast majority of foreign-born residents were European. Results from that survey are too dated to be of much relevance today (Justus and MacDonald, 2003). It is worth noting, though, that the 1970s study was instrumental in supporting the concept of "income assimilation," whereby immigrants gradually gain (and then surpass) the same level of income as the Canadian-born (Ornstein and Sharma 1983). The new LSIC is therefore the first survey of its kind for a generation. It is also interesting to note that, although we will not explore this point here, LSIC will foster international comparative studies of immigrant settlement. In fact, it was designed with the multi-panel Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia (LSIA) in mind. Unlike its Australian counterpart, though, LSIC was initially planned as a single-panel survey (although there is a possibility of subsequent panels if funds become available). The first LSIC panel is based on a target population of approximately 164,200 people who: a) are aged 15 and over, b) were officially landed in Canada from abroad between October 2000 and September 2001, and c) who had lived in Canada for at least six months at the time of the survey.[1] The 12,040 respondents included in the weighted sample have been interviewed six months and 24 months after their arrival, will be interviewed again on the fourth anniversary of entry, and possibly at a later time as well.

For our purposes, LSIC is a source of detailed information on the housing conditions, needs, and trajectories of new immigrants that is simply unavailable elsewhere. On the one hand, LSIC provides a systematic window on the initial experience of immigrants, very soon after their formal arrival in Canada. This type of information is not available in the census or other sources, including administrative data. Secondly, the range of variables included in LSIC is unique. Several variables in the survey, such as tenure and place of residence, as well as type, size, and cost of dwelling, replicate information available in the census. But other variables add entirely new information: the housing search experience of immigrants, including rankings of difficulties encountered, as well as sources and availability of help. LSIC also provides information on housing mobility, reasons for changing residence, and respondents' plans to purchase housing in the future. Besides housing, however, LSIC includes other types of information, such as newcomers' socio-economic situation, motivations for immigrating to Canada, labour market participation, integration barriers, access to health care and education, and also settlement support sought and received from institutions and social networks. Furthermore, LSIC provides in some cases appreciably more detail than the census. For example, information is available on family wealth, measured by self-reported savings at the times of arrival and of interview. Additionally, LSIC provides a breakdown of immigrants and refugees according to admission categories, and also in terms of principal applicants and spouses or dependents.

LSIC has a few additional limitations that need to be taken into account. So far, only the results of the first and second waves (six months and two years after arrival, respectively) have been released; second-wave data are expected shortly. We therefore could not include these new data in this study. It is clear that LSIC will be an ideal resource for research on integration, but the base of results from just the first wave is insufficient for a thorough study at this time. Our study should therefore be seen as a first step in the analysis of this important resource. Also, only those immigrants who were legally admitted and had arrived in Canada from another country during the survey period are included in the sample. Asylum claimants and refugees accepted through an asylum claim were excluded from the sampling frame of the survey, as they had been in Canada for some time before their official landing date. It should also be noted that respondents to this survey arrived in Canada prior to the shift in admissions policies associated with the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), passed in 2001 and implemented in 2002. In addition, LSIC has a small sample size (compared to the census), which limits statistical study at fine levels of disaggregation and geographic scale. LSIC's sampling design also raises some analytical difficulties when conducting housing-related research, because the weights used to produce estimates and to adjust for oversampling and sampling error yield the individual immigrant—not the immigrant household or family—as the unit of analysis. Yet the unit of housing consumption is of course the household or family. Furthermore, due to the

confidentiality regulations of Statistics Canada, and also with the issue of statistical reliability in mind, data must be suppressed when unweighted frequency counts are small. As a result, it is not always possible to report highly disaggregated findings, particularly at spatial scales below the provincial level. Finally, readers should be aware of potential under-reporting in the income and earnings questions in the survey, and that Statistics Canada engaged in statistical imputation on the variables that were created in this module of the survey (Statistics Canada, 2005). Imputation, widely used by government statistical agencies but rarely discussed among casual data users, involves creating an estimated value of a variable for someone who does not respond to a particular question (e.g., income) by developing a model for those who do respond—correlating the variable of interest with other reported characteristics (i.e., income as a function of age, education, family structure, etc.). The resulting parameters of a model for responders are then used to impute (predict) the missing variable for non-responders (see Statistics Canada 2005, p. 99).

Data from the first release of LSIC have only recently been made available and there are a number of academic studies in progress but, to our knowledge, none have been published thus far; our investigation and another article in this issue of the *Journal*, therefore, offer important first considerations of the value of LSIC for urban inquiry. In this paper, we use first-wave LSIC data to provide a descriptive portrait of the Canadian housing experiences of recently arrived immigrants. We also make use of housing-related information presented in a preliminary statement by Statistics Canada outlining the findings of LSIC (Chui 2003), and the newly-published benchmark summary of results (Statistics Canada 2005). Note that preliminary findings have already been incorporated into a comparative analysis of the Australian and Canadian longitudinal surveys (Richardson and Lester, 2004). All of the material that follows in this paper refers to the situation of LSIC respondents approximately 6 months after landing in Canada. Our preliminary findings are presented in the form of five key insights on the nature of immigrants' early experiences adapting to Canada's urban housing markets; each insight addresses rather simple questions about immigrants' settlement trajectories that, until recently, were impossible to answer in any systematic way. LSIC provides a valuable first glimpse into these dynamics.

Results

1. Entering the housing market

Our first finding is that most immigrants acquire housing remarkably quickly, and their success in the housing market hinges on the strength and quality of social ties. Our study provides some nationwide evidence that corroborates the interpretations of Murdie (2002), who analyzed two visible minority groups in Toronto and argued that social networks have important effects on group housing outcomes. We found that four out of five immigrants had made arrangements

for housing prior to arriving in Canada, and nearly one quarter reported that they had never actually looked for housing; most of those not engaged in formal housing search, not surprisingly, entered as Family Class immigrants. (In this paper, we utilize the admissions category nomenclature employed in Statistics Canada's [2005] benchmark report of LSIC results, to allow readers to relate our housing market analysis to other components of the survey.[2]) Yet among those who did search for housing after their arrival, more than three-fifths reported no difficulties whatsoever when asked, "What problems or difficulties have you had in finding housing in Canada?" (Table 1). For those who did encounter problems, the most important (arranged by the prevalence of answers to this question) were cost, the lack of a co-signer or credit history, and difficulties in finding the kind of housing needed. Yet for those who sought and received help in the housing search (two-fifths of all who reported problems) social networks proved crucial. More than three-fifths of those receiving help obtained it from friends, and another one-fifth received assistance from relatives or household members; only one in eleven reported getting help from settlement organizations.

The importance of friends and relatives, and the role of prior arrangements in the housing market, conform well to the theme of networks in the transnationalism literature. As Michael Peter Smith (2001, p. 153) has observed, "Substantial numbers of today's transnational migrants actively maintain and are sustained by widely spatially dispersed social networks." Charles Tilly (1990, p. 83) goes even further, suggesting that it is not people who migrate but networks; in general, he says, migration does not "draw on isolated individual decisionmakers but on clusters of people bound together by acquaintance and common fate." The evidence suggests, however, that the extent and material significance of social networks vary considerably among different groups. Four-fifths of East Asian immigrants who sought and received help during their housing search indicated that they had approached friends—substantially more than Blacks (43 percent), West Asians (47 percent), and Southeast Asians and Filipinos (51 percent) (Table 2). Conversely, Blacks who encountered difficulties in the housing search were almost five times as likely as non-visible minorities to seek and receive help from a settlement service organization (19 percent compared with 4 percent) (Table 3). Care should be exercised in interpreting these percentages, because the number of cases they represent is in fact relatively small. Nonetheless, this latter set of differences may be explained by the fact that Blacks are an aggregated category that includes immigrants from a large number of disparate origins, including Caribbean and Sub-Saharan African nations that do not always have a history of migration to Canada. If, as normally expected, the social networks of immigrants from these newer source countries are weak, settlement service organizations become indispensable, particularly in a housing context where the most important difficulties experienced by newcomers reflect a decidedly sellers' market (Table 1). Support

Table 1. Difficulties in Housing Search and Sources of Assistance

			Percentages
Immigrants who looked for housing after arrival in Canada		125,050	
Without difficulties, or did not provide information		77,910	62.3
With difficulties		47,140	37.7
	Total	125,050	100.0
Most serious barrier	Cost	14,750	31.3
	No guarantor or co-signer	10,670	22.6
	No adequate housing	5,050	10.7
	Other, or did not provide information	16,670	35.4
	Total	47,140	100.0
With difficulties, but who did not get help needed		11,580	24.6
With difficulties, but did not seek help or did not provide further information		16,440	34.9
With difficulties, sought and received help		19,120	40.6
	Total	47,140	100.0
With difficulties, sought and received help			
Source of help	Friends	11,970	62.6
	Relatives or household members	4,140	21.7
	Settlement organizations*	2,170	11.3
	Other, or did not provide information	840	4.4
	Total	19,120	100.0

*Includes ethnic or cultural groups, religious groups, immigrant or refugee serving agencies, and community organizations.

Note: Adapted from tables published in Statistics Canada (2005).

Table 2. Getting Help in the Housing Search from Friends, by Visible Minority Group

Visible Minority Group	Immigrants with Housing Search Difficulties who Sought and Received Assistance	Percentage Receiving Help from Friend
East Asian	5,350	80
Arab	1,510	64
Non-Visible Minority	4,280	59
Latin American	790	57
South Asian	3,630	55
Southeast Asian or Filipino	1,420	51
West Asian	1,210	47
Black	800	43
Total*	18,990	63

*Note: Totals from different tables may not match due to rounding and non-response. All cell entries reporting numbers of immigrants denote weighted estimates rounded to the nearest 10.

Table 3. Getting Help in the Housing Search from Settlement Service Organizations

Visible Minority Group	Immigrants with Housing Search Difficulties who Sought and Received Assistance	Percentage Receiving help from Settlement Service Organization
Black	790	19
West Asian	1,210	12
All other Visible Minorities	12,700	4
Non-Visible Minorities	4,270	4
Total*	18,970	5

*Note: Totals from different tables may not match due to rounding and non-response. All cell entries reporting numbers of immigrants denote weighted estimates rounded to the nearest 10.

for housing search assistance programs that specifically target groups with weak social ties would certainly help these newcomers navigate a difficult market, but the more pressing supply issues would remain. This has important implications in the areas of integration and housing policy, to which we turn in the concluding section of this paper.

Most arrivals, however, report no difficulties in the housing search. Moreover, nearly one-fifth (18 percent) of immigrants live in owner-occupied housing only six months after landing (Table 4). This figure is an encouraging sign of newcomers'

rapid adjustment, although it must be considered carefully: an estimated 29,700 immigrants in the LSIC subject population are living in owner-occupied homes, but this includes spouses and dependents, as well as Family Class immigrants who arrived and joined established homeowners. These factors—as well as variations in household structure and family size—are responsible for notable differences in the rates of ownership across admissions categories. Immigrants and their spouses and dependents entering under both the Family and Other Economic categories are more likely to live in owner-occupied homes (37 percent and 38 percent, respectively) than those admitted under the Skilled Worker and Refugee categories (10 percent and 3 percent, respectively). Research has shown that within a few years, immigrants in general achieve higher rates of homeownership than non-immigrants (Laryea 1999), but until now it has been impossible to determine whether admissions class makes a difference. Results from the first wave of LSIC provide a very early picture; for policy purposes, the second and third waves will offer crucial tools in monitoring the tenure trajectories of different newcomers.

Three-quarters of all surveyed immigrants lived in rental units, and nearly three-fifths said yes when asked if they plan to buy a home "in the next few years." About one in twelve (8 percent) of respondents, however, were still living in temporary accommodation six months after landing.

It would seem, therefore, that Canada's urban housing markets permit rapid adjustment for newcomers. Within the short time span of half a year, most immigrant families have found a place to live, and many have the security and foothold on possible wealth accumulation offered by homeownership. Clearly, a large number of immigrants arrive with financial resources. But LSIC also highlights the importance of social networks. Immigrants who join family members already in Canada, and those who are able to build rich social networks, obtain better housing, more quickly, than other immigrants.

Table 4. Housing Tenure by CMA of Residence

	Number of Immigrants					
Housing Tensure at Time of Survey	Montreal	Toronto	Vancouver	Rest of Canada	Total	National Percentages
Owners, with mortgage	900	10,600	3,450	8,150	23,100	14.2
Owners, without mortgage	300	2,350	1,400	2,550	6,600	4.1
Renters	18,800	54,600	17,800	28,700	119,900	73.9
Other (hotel/motel, home of employer, etc.)	1,400	6,850	1,550	2,750	12,550	7.7
Total*	21,400	74,400	24,200	42,150	162,150	100.0

Contingency coefficient: 0.165 (P<0.001).

*Note: Figures do not include immigrants who did not know or state tenure status.

2. The range of housing outcomes

Our second finding concerns the remarkable diversity in the housing trajectories of recent immigrants. Consistent with the literature on immigrant housing tenure, our evidence suggests that one important dimension of such variability involves the interwoven differences of national origin, race, and ethnicity (Balakrishnan and Wu 1992; Laryea 1999; Ray and Moore 1991; Skaburskis 1996) (Table 5). Moreover, our analysis reveals that after six months in Canada, individual and family circumstances range across the full spectrum of housing market opportunities and problems. At the top end, nearly 30 thousand immigrants were living in owner-occupied housing, and more than a fifth of these were living in homes free of any mortgage debt obligation. As noted earlier, this figure includes spouses and dependents, as well as newcomers settling with established owner-occupied families. Nevertheless, it is clear that regional housing markets are now closely intertwined with the rhythms of national immigration policy (Table 4). Precisely one-fifth of recent immigrants in Vancouver live in owner-occupied units, compared with 17 percent in Toronto and fewer than 6 percent in Montreal; ownership rates exceed one quarter across the rest of the nation. These are encouragingly high figures, even when considering the inclusion of spouses and children. Moreover, the results remain heartening even when we focus on the householder as the unit of analysis. We examined the case of Vancouver, the nation's costliest ownership market among Canada's three largest cities. An estimated 4,850 of all 24,200 surveyed immigrants in Vancouver live in owner-occupied homes (20 percent), but if we exclude Family and Refugee Class immigrants, and all spouses and dependents, the ownership rate for principal applicants in the Skilled Worker and Other Economic categories remains over 15 percent (1,300 out of 8,400). These findings underscore the need for careful investigation of the next wave of LSIC data when they are released (permitting analysis of rent-to-own transitions), particularly in light of Haan's (2005) observation that the homeownership rates of immigrants compared with non-immigrants were lower in 2001 than in 1981.

In any case, these findings, showing the variegated fortunes of immigrants only six months after their official landing in Canada, add important insights to earlier studies, such as Ray and Moore's important census-based analysis, where they argue that housing tenure remains "an important, though largely neglected, issue with respect to immigrant life in Canadian society" (1991, p. 1). More recent studies of particular cities, immigrant communities, and housing submarkets, including Ray et al. (1997), and Carter (2005), seek to document the crucial role of immigration in reshaping local property relations—and, conversely, the role of tenure and property in the lives of immigrants. LSIC data provide a systematic backdrop to these investigations of specific groups and cities.

The corollary to ownership and security, however, is rental insecurity—and the coalescence of immigration and global-city real estate inflation in Canada's

largest metropolitan regions (Carter 2005) puts many households in precarious situations. A composite measure of housing expense burdens and family savings indicates that more than half of all immigrant renters face some level of housing stress (Table 6). For about one in six, housing stress is moderate and most likely manageable: these families pay more than 30 percent of their income for rent; and they have a small savings cushion (equivalent to more than 3 months rent, but less than 12 months). Yet nearly a quarter of all renters (24 percent) devote more than half their family income to rent and have little or no accumulated savings. The vulnerability of these immigrants is cause for concern; as Peressini and McDonald (2000, p. 525) asked several years ago in a review of homelessness in Canada, "what about the housed poor whose economic circumstances are such that a missed paycheque or a health problem would result in the loss of their housing? ... shouldn't people whose situation is so precarious be considered as nearly homeless?" These pointed questions are directly relevant to the situation of a large number of newcomers to Canada.

Table 5. Housing Tenure, by Visible Minority Group

Visible Minority Group	Owners	Percentage	Tenants	Other	Total
East Asian	7,560	17.3	33,250	2,850	43,660
South Asian	8,930	21.5	28,200	4,330	41,460
Filipino	1,900	18.3	7,130	1,350	10,380
Arab	520	5.4	8,650	490	9,660
Black	940	11.4	6,500	790	8,230
West Asian	860	11.5	6,230	380	7,470
Latin American	770	17.2	3,360	350	4,480
Southeast Asian	510	24.2	1,270	330	2,110
Non-Visible Minority	7,230	21.9	24,210	1,500	32,940
Total	29,220	18.2	118,800	12,370	160,390

Note: Totals from different tables may not match due to rounding and non-response. All cell entries reporting numbers of immigrants denote weighted estimates rounded to the nearest 10.

3. The importance of the immigrant selection system

Divergent trajectories in local housing markets are closely interwoven with national immigration policies. Our third finding is that admissions class is closely associated with contrasts in housing outcomes. Until now, Census-based studies have been unable to capture this dimension of difference (Balakrishnan and Wu 1992; Haan 2005; Laryea 1999; Ray and Moore 1991). In turn, admissions categories reflect and reinforce sharp differences in household and family structure (Figure 1), creating a diverse range of individual and family needs for various

Table 6. Housing Stress

		Number of Immigrants		
Housing Stress Category	Definition	Renters	Other Accommodations (hotel/motel, home of employer, etc.)	Total
None	Savings equivalent to more than 12 months rent	29,570	1,810	31,380
None	Paying less than 30 percent of family income for rent. Savings equivalent to less than 12 months rent	19,390	1,060	20,450
Moderate	Paying 30 percent or more of family income for rent. Savings equivalent to more than 3 months rent, less than 12 months	17,030	820	17,850
High	Paying 30 to 49 percent of family income for rent. Savings equivalent to less than 3 months rent	14,220	450	14,670
Severe	Paying 50% or more of family income for rent. Savings equivalent to less than 3 months rent	25,250	880	26,130
Total		105,460	5,020	110,480

Note: Figures exclude homeowners and immigrants who did not know or did not state tenure status and/or savings remaining at time of interview.

kinds of accommodation. Consider first the experience of immigrants in the Skilled Worker Class (including spouses and other family members), who account for three-fifths of all LSIC respondents. Most arrive as traditional nuclear families—married couples with children account for 57 percent, and when childless couples are included, the share rises to nearly three-quarters—and nine-tenths are below the low-income cutoff six months after landing (Table 7). More than four-fifths are renters, and three-fifths live in apartments (Table 8). Of all categories, Skilled Worker Class immigrants have the lowest incidence (13 percent) of large households living in crowded situations. Yet many cope with extremely high housing expense ratios: approximately 51,200 out of all 89,200 renters in the Skilled Worker Class (57 percent) pay at least half of their family income for housing (Table 8).

Other Economic Class arrivals also enter as nuclear families—nearly four-fifths are married couples with children (Table 7)—but they bring greater financial re-

sources that permit easier access to homeownership (Table 8). Six months after landing, 37 percent of business-class and Other Economic Class immigrants are living in owner-occupied homes, and 43 percent are living in single-family detached houses. Moreover, the incidence of housing crowding is no higher than that for Skilled Worker Class immigrants (20.9 percent versus 19.9 percent, much lower than for the remaining categories). Nevertheless, immigrant tenants admitted under the Other Economic Class have the highest incidence of housing expense over 50 percent of family income. Overall, for these new Canadians, the ratio of housing cost to income does not seem to be the major issue: many seem to be able to draw on savings in order to quickly attain a foothold in homeownership.



Figure 1. Household Composition by Class of Entry.

Refugees, not surprisingly, have a starkly different experience. Although many arrive as nuclear families, this group has the highest proportion (12 percent) of lone-parent families (Table 7). After living in Canada for six months, 96 percent

have poverty-level incomes, 92 percent live in rental homes, and more than seven of ten live in apartments (Table 8). Refugee Class arrivals have the highest incidence of large households living in crowded circumstances (38 percent). They do not endure the highest housing expense-to-income ratios, but their low incomes, small cushion of savings, and greater reliance on social assistance attest to a more precarious housing market situation. Only 14 percent of Refugee Class renters can be considered free of housing stress. More than 45 percent are in the most

Table 7. Immigrant Characteristics by Class of Entry

	Number of Immigrants, by Class of Entry				
	Family	Skilled Workers	Other Economic	Refugees	Total
Family income					
Less than LICO	33,250	87,300	8,800	9,400	138,750
100-199% of LICO	7,000	7,150	600	150	14,900
2x LICO or more	3,600	4,150	1,000	200	8,950
Total	43,850	98,600	10,400	9,750	162,600
Contingency coefficient: 0.181 (P<0.001).					
Household type					
One-family household, married couple with children	9,760	56,780	8,260	5,730	80,530
One-family household, childless married couple	11,220	17,270	550	380	29,420
One-family household, lone-parent	2,150	1,750	450	1,170	5,520
One-person household	1,910	11,630	290	620	14,450
One-family household, with unrelated persons	4,350	3,870	390	720	9,330
Multifamily household	14,760	7,710	520	1,200	24,190
Total	44,150	99,010	10,460	9,820	163,440

Note: Married couples include persons in common-law marriages.
Contingency coefficient: 0.422 (P<0.001).
Note: Totals do not match due to rounding. All cell entries denote weighted estimates rounded to the nearest 10.

distressed housing situation—spending more than half of their family income on shelter and down to a savings reserve worth less than three months' rent.

Immigrants who come to Canada to join other family members (the Family Class) are also quite distinct in terms of their housing consumption. This group, by a large margin, has the highest likelihood of living in multiple-family dwellings (Figure 1). David Ley (1999) has suggested that this form of crowding may actually be a household strategy adopted by newcomers to speed up homeownership attainment. That is, immigrants share housing costs in an effort to either

Table 8. Housing Outcomes by Class of Entry

	Number of Immigrants, by Class of Entry				
	Family	Skilled Workers	Other Economic	Refugees	Total
Tenure					
Own	16,060	9,430	3,850	300	29,640
Rent	23,690	80,730	5,890	8,960	119,270
Other (hotel/motel, home of employer, etc.)	2,880	8,470	630	520	12,500
Total	42,630	98,630	10,370	9,780	161,410

Contingency coefficient: 0.331 (P<0.001). Figures exclude immigrants who did not know or did not state tenure status.

Dwelling type					
Single-family detached house	18,490	24,120	4,490	1,150	48,250
Double	3,380	5,390	730	570	10,070
Row or terrace housing	2,390	6,450	650	580	10,070
Duplex	2,080	3,290	340	390	6,100
Low-rise apartment (<5 stories) or flat	6,700	22,850	1,300	4,170	35,020
High-rise apartment (5 or more stories)	10,100	34,970	2,790	2,850	50,710
Total	43,140	97,070	10,300	9,710	160,220

Contingency coefficient: 0.246 (P<0.001). Figures exclude immigrants living in motor homes, hotels, and other types of dwelling.

Crowding (persons per room)					
More than 1.0 (1-3 person households)	1,120	6,680	220	220	8,240
More than 1.0 (4+ person households	10,380	12,550	1,720	3,650	28,300
1.0 or fewer (1-3 person households)	19,610	53,870	2,900	3,270	79,650
1.0 or fewer (4+ person households)	9,890	23,350	4,430	2,550	40,220
Total	41,000	96,450	9,270	9,690	156,410

Contingency coefficient: 0.241 (P<0.001). Figures for immigrants living in dwellings with more than four rooms were imputed using LSIC information on the number bedrooms in the respondent's dwelling. However, it was not possible to impute figures for approximately 7,100 immigrants living in dwellings with more than four bedrooms.

Housing cost as proportion of family income (excludes homeowners)					
Family lodged for free	1,560	2,580	370	150	4,660
Less than 30%	10,200	15,180	1,010	1,170	27,560
30%-49.9%	5,140	15,710	580	3,550	24,980
50.0% and over	6,710	51,220	3,990	4,030	65,950
Don't know, refused, not stated	2,950	4,510	590	590	8,640
Total	26,560	89,200	6,540	9,490	131,790

Contingency coefficient: 0.329 (P<0.001).

Housing stress (excludes homeowners)					
No housing stress	11,270	35,780	3,430	1,190	51,670
Moderate to high housing stress	5,170	22,850	720	3,550	32,290
Extreme housing stress	5,320	16,050	680	3,950	26,000
Total	21,760	74,680	4,830	8,690	109,960

Contingency coefficient: 0.225 (P<0.001). Figures exclude tenants who did not know or did not state tenure status and/or remaining savings at time of interview. The "Moderate to High" category includes tenants spending 30-49 percent of family income on rent with savings worth less than 12 months of rent, as well as tenants spending 50 percent or more on rent with savings worth between three and 12 months of rent. The "Extreme" category constitutes tenants spending 50 percent or more of the family's income on rent, with savings below three month's worth of rent.

Note: Totals do not match due to rounding and non-response. All cell entries denote weighted estimates rounded to the nearest 10.

accumulate sufficient capital for a down payment, or to afford to pay a mortgage once they have purchased a dwelling. Verification of this hypothesis would raise crucial questions regarding the sacrifices and opportunity costs that many newcomers endure in order to achieve their goals of homeownership. This issue merits closer scrutiny by housing researchers and policymakers.

4. The importance of metropolitan context

Public discussions of immigration typically emphasize national policies, transnational linkages, or the intensely local experiences of particular neighborhoods. Although each of these scales is critically important, they all interact with the distinctive historical context and contemporary development trajectory of a metropolitan housing market. Our fourth key insight reveals significant contrasts across Canada's largest cities, each of which serves as a prominent immigration gateway. In Montreal, a majority of immigrants settle in low-rise apartments (57 percent), whereas in Toronto, the modal dwelling type is high-rise apartments (49 percent); in Vancouver, a plurality of newcomers (37 percent) lives in single-family detached dwellings. To some degree, such contrasts emerge from an interplay between the regional stock of affordable housing and the family structure of arrivals (Montreal has somewhat more single-person households, Vancouver has more nuclear families). Divergent streams by admissions class are also important: Skilled Worker Class immigrants account for most arrivals in all three cities, but Vancouver's share of Other Economic Class admissions is three times that of Montreal or Toronto.

Clearly, all of these factors interact in complex ways, and any attempt to evaluate causal hypotheses would require a careful multivariate analysis. Here, we simply draw attention to the remarkable divergence in the fortunes of immigrants adjusting to the housing constraints and opportunities of Canada's national metropolises. After six months, only one in twenty newcomers to Montreal are living in owner-occupied housing, and a third of tenants are faced with extreme housing stress (Table 9). The Toronto area seems to provide greater opportunity for immigrant ownership (17 percent versus 5 percent in Montreal), but other indicators are mixed: the nation's largest metropolitan area posts the highest share of tenants paying more than half their family income on rent (56 percent), and the highest rates of housing crowding; but when immigrants' savings are considered, Toronto's incidence of housing stress is lower than that for Montreal (24 percent versus 34 percent) (Table 9). Vancouver presents the most complex picture. Although several indicators are unremarkable compared with Montreal and Toronto, other measures reflect the arrival of Other Economic Class immigrants with substantial assets. One-fifth of newcomers to Vancouver are living in owner-occupied homes six months after arrival—a share in line with the national average, but substantially above Toronto's rate and more than three times that for Montreal. Nearly

three-fifths of immigrant tenants in Vancouver have no housing stress. On these measures, this seems to be a rather open, accommodating market. On the other hand, more than half of all immigrant tenants in Vancouver are devoting 50 percent or more of total family income for housing costs, including those who spent more than their entire family income on housing; this figure is slightly lower in Montreal (where 49.6 percent devote at least half of their income to housing) and substantially higher in Toronto (55.8 percent).

5. Immigrants' interpretation of their housing situation

Lastly, we turn to the final (and perhaps most perplexing) of our main findings. As we now know, an appreciable proportion of the surveyed population had pre-arranged 'permanent' accommodation at the time of arrival (24 percent), but nonetheless, the large majority had engaged in some form of housing search by the time that the first wave of LSIC interviews took place. We have also noted that 74 percent of the immigrants in the survey were housed in rented accommodations, and a substantial proportion of these tenants were experiencing crowding and/or housing stress relative to family income and savings (23 percent and/or just over 50 percent, respectively). In this context, one would expect a vast majority of respondents to report facing some form of difficulty in finding housing. But as we mentioned earlier, only 37 percent of those who had to look for housing said that this was the case. Why did such a relatively small proportion of these immigrants complain about housing rental costs? How do we account for such an apparently contradictory finding?

One possible explanation is that while housing is certainly an important factor in shaping the settlement experience, immigrants appear to assign higher priority to the labour market and to education, as Hiebert et al. (1998) found in the case of Greater Vancouver. Indeed, LSIC suggests that respondents were considerably more concerned with the pronounced level of difficulty experienced in finding employment: 70 percent of the 116,700 immigrants who tried to enter the labour market reported at least one difficulty in this field. More research would be necessary to determine whether this is a displacement of concerns or not. Regardless, when difficulties and barriers are experienced in the initial stages of settlement by immigrants and especially by refugees, their response is to "make do" by engaging in a variety of strategies of compromise. Other research has shown that such trade-offs include sharing smaller dwellings in crowded conditions (Miraftab 2000; Murdie 2002) and pooling together household incomes (Ley 1999), likely to help achieve family goals such as a home purchase or sponsoring relatives. LSIC results suggest that immigrants and refugees undertake these sorts of measures at a very early stage in their settlement trajectories.

Table 9. Housing Outcomes by Metropolitan Area

	Number of Immigrants				
	Montreal	Toronto	Vancouver	Canada	Total
Tenure					
Owners, with mortgage	900	10,600	3,450	8,150	23,100
Owners, without mortgage	300	2,350	1,400	2,550	6,600
Renters	18,800	54,600	17,800	28,700	119,900
Other (hotel/motel, home of employer)	1,400	6,850	1,550	2,750	12,550
Total	21,400	74,400	24,200	42,150	162,150
Contingency coefficient: 0.165 (P<0.001).					
Housing cost as proportion of family income					
Family lodged for free	600	2,200	600	1,300	4,700
Less than 30%	4,400	9,600	3,950	9,850	27,800
30%-49.9%	4,450	11,100	3,250	6,450	25,250
50.0% and over	10,050	34,300	9,900	11,800	66,050
Don't know, refused, not stated	750	4,200	1,700	2,050	8,700
Total	20,250	61,400	19,400	31,450	132,500
Contingency coefficient: 0.198 (P<0.001).					

	Percentages		
	Montreal	Toronto	Vancouver
Immigration Category			
Family	21.2	26.4	27.6
Skilled workers	69.5	65.7	54.7
Other economic	3.6	4.6	13.6
Refugees	5.7	3.3	4.1
	100.0	100.0	100.0
Housing stress (excludes homeowners)			
No housing stress	40.3	43.1	58.2
Moderate to high housing stress	26.0	33.2	24.7
Extreme housing stress	33.7	23.7	17.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
Crowding indicator (more than 1 person per room)	20.2	26.9	24.1
Multiple-family households	13.8	22.0	18.7

Note: Totals do not match due to rounding and non-response. All numerical entries denote weighted estimates rounded to the nearest 10.

Conclusions

Public discussion of immigration and housing centers on simple, aggregate questions: how do newcomers to Canada fare in the housing market? What are the primary barriers to successful integration? Our preliminary investigation offers provisional yet valuable new insights on these questions. Nearly one quarter of immigrants did not even need to search for housing after their arrival in Canada; among those who did search for housing, more than three-fifths reported no problems or difficulties. Among those who did encounter problems, the most common were cost or the lack of a guarantor or co-signer. Nevertheless, only six months after landing, almost one-fifth of all immigrants are living in owner-occupied homes. Moreover, many immigrants arrive with substantial savings, and thus enjoy a measure of security and time to adjust to the opportunities and challenges of competitive metropolitan markets; 47 percent of renters either live in affordable accommodations or have a savings reserve equivalent to more than a year's rent payments. These findings suggest that most immigrants are able to adjust quite rapidly to Canada's housing markets. Yet this optimistic generalization conceals enormous variation. Nearly one quarter of all newcomer tenants are facing severe stress, for instance—paying more than half of their family income for rent, and able to fall back on a savings cushion worth less than three months' rent. Financial stress, along with overcrowding and other problems, presents significant barriers to many newcomers in particular housing submarkets.

Taken together, our insights paint a complex portrait of housing dynamics in the initial stages of settlement in Canada. Generalized optimism must be tempered with a recognition of diversity and wide variations in individual and family experiences. The relationship between immigration and housing, therefore, must be understood as contingent. This word is not simply a nod to unexpected or curious findings; it is recognition of the importance of drawing clear distinctions between *necessary* and *contingent* social relations. Necessary relations are fundamentally rooted in social structures and social processes: just as the concept of employee necessarily requires that of employer, and renter is defined in relation to landlord, the social category of "immigrant" is fundamentally bound up with societal definitions of nation, border, and citizenship. Yet the specific outcomes and experiences associated with particular social relations are contingent (from the Latin *contingere*, "to touch"), referring to "any process that mediates between the operation of a general, necessary mechanism and a particular context" (Jones and Hanham 1995, p. 195; cf. Sayer 1992). In the case of immigration and housing markets, our findings should be understood in light of two sources of contingency. First, the sedimented history and evolving development of the Canadian urban system in a period of dramatic national and transnational restructuring (Simmons and Bourne 2003) helps to shape the efforts of immigrants to find suitable homes. Each of Canada's three largest cities has its distinct history of development, modified by contemporary variations in the age

and structural features of the housing stock and the matrix of rents and prices confronting new immigrants (Carter 2005; Ray 1999). The surprisingly large number of new immigrant homeowners may be seen as cause for optimism. But we must recognize the dual (and sometimes contradictory) functions of housing. On the one hand, it is a use value, fulfilling non-monetary needs for living space, security, and a setting for family and community life; on the other hand, it is an exchange value, with capitalized values determined by competitive bidding as well as regional, national, and transnational forces of economic growth and interest rates. In some cases, exchange value is at odds with use value: older homeowners on low, fixed incomes, for example, often feel forced to sell when their homes skyrocket in value (thus bringing corresponding increases in property taxes). These sorts of dilemmas between use value and exchange value have intensified in recent years with the confluence of economic growth, low interest rates, and intensified locational competition in Canada's roster of globalizing cities (Carter 2005; Murdie and Teixeira 2003). The clearest expression of these shifts is apparent in Vancouver, which has the highest rate of ownership among Canada's largest cities for LSIC immigrants, but which also suffers the most ferocious bidding over housing as a financial asset and investment vehicle. This competition has made Vancouver Canada's least affordable city, according to a recent consultant's international survey, generating the predictably alarmed local headlines (Anderson, 2006). Such inflation calls to mind the analysis of Canada's housing appreciation trajectory by Carter (2004, p. 35), who offers "cautious optimism, but owning a home in the future is unlikely to be the valued investment that it was for many in the past."

The speed of most newcomers' housing adjustment reflects a second main source of contingency. Government policy in the twin areas of newcomer selection and integration play crucial roles. The priorities that federal and in some case provincial governments define for categories of admission help to condition the selectivity of immigration, and the resulting distribution of human capital, financial wealth, and housing needs of entering individuals and families. Similarly, the process of integration is affected by evolving policy decisions in the fields of education, health, and of course affordable housing (Bunting, Walks, and Filion 2004). Some policy priorities shape programs specifically targeting newcomers, while others have indirect effects through broader safety net provisions geared towards all needy populations.

The availability of housing suitable for the needs of newcomers is an important factor in the successful settlement of Canada's immigrants and refugees (Ley et al. 2001; Murdie and Teixeira 2003). At least in the short term, Canada's urban system and its relation to transnational immigration networks cannot be modified to create more favorable housing outcomes. But it is both possible and wise for various levels of government to adjust policy—through settlement programs, support for non-market housing, and broader social-welfare provisions—to smooth the housing trajectory of a diverse population of new Canadians.

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Notes

[1] The target population accounts for just under two-thirds of the 250,000 people admitted to Canada during this period; the remaining third (some 80,000 people) include children as well as immigrants who went through the landing process from within Canada. An estimated 5,200 immigrants landed from abroad during the reference period but subsequently left the country. See Statistics Canada (2006).

[2] This estimate is based on a rough inference form the 4,850 LSIC immigrants living in owner-occupied homes (and who landed between September 2000 and October 2001) and the total residential sales volume of 28,176 properties in the year 2001.

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Urban Diversity: Riding Composition and Party Support in the Canadian Federal Election of 2004[1]

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Abstract
Analysis of results, for the general election of 2004, reveals that the ethnic and immigrant composition of ridings affects levels of support for the Liberal, Conservative, and New Democratic parties as well as for the Bloc Québécois. Regression analyses at national and regional levels reveal that riding characteristics—percent immigrant and percent visible minority (which are highest in our major urban centres)—have impacts on party support that persist when social class composition—measured by average family income and percent with university degrees—is taken into account. The positive relationship between ethno-racial diversity and Liberal support, especially in Ontario, helps to explain the strength of the Liberal hold on Toronto area ridings. The implications of these findings for the outcome of the 2006 federal election are also considered.

Keywords: Immigration, diversity, politics, federal parties

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It is no secret that Liberals depend, for their electoral success, on the multicultural or diverse ridings of Canada's major metropolitan areas. Newspaper columnists and academics make this assertion with some regularity: "Liberals depend on multicultural votes" (Simpson 2005); in her Hamilton riding, Sheila Copps "had strong ties to the large immigrant community, which traditionally supported the Liberal Party" (Campbell and Christian 1999, 103); recent immigrants tend to support the Liberals (Pelletier 1991, 145). Nonetheless, in 1997, Stasiulis pointed to "a dearth of research in Canada focused specifically on the electoral experiences of immigrants and ethnocultural minorities in electoral politics and the political process at various levels" (cited in Siemiatycki and Saloojee 2002, 242). A major concern, of those conducting research in this area, is that of the extent to which ethnocultural and visible minority communities field candidates and win elections at federal, provincial or municipal levels—or, more concisely, access to the political process through minority representation (Dhillon 2005; Pelletier 1991; Simard 1991; Stasiulis and Abu-Laban 1991; Siemiatycki and Matheson 2005). Electoral success by minority candidates requires the mobilization of a supportive ethnocultural vote (in ridings where there is sufficient residential concentration of minorities) and substantial voter turnout.[2] Most of the discussion of electoral success by minority candidates is non-partisan, in that they are selected and elected in all of the major political parties. Bird (2005, 82) notes that, in 2004, the Liberals won in each of the nineteen most diverse ridings of the Greater Toronto Area—despite the fact that they ran only four minority candidates there, "while the Conservatives and the NDP each ran six."

Less frequently studied are the party preferences or voting patterns of immigrant or visible minority individuals and communities. While the link between immigrant or visible minority status and support for the Liberal party is frequently reported, it is seldom the focus of the research. A recent and notable exception is analysis by André Blais (2005, 823-834), who collapsed all Canadian Election Studies (since 1965) to examine the relationship between religion or ethnicity and voting Liberal. He confirmed that "religion and ethnicity are important determinants of voting behaviour, and that Catholics and Canadians of African, Asian or Latino origin are strong supporters of the Liberal party." The Liberals won most of the elections from 1968 to 2004 "thanks to the strong support of Catholics and Canadians of non-European origin." In effect, "the Liberal party would *not* dominate in Ontario in the absence of the strong support it enjoys among Catholics and visible minorities."

The link between ethnicity or race and social class—as a vertical mosaic (Porter 1965) or a rainbow class structure (Frideres 2005)—has been well established in the literature. Using the rainbow analogy, Frideres points out that class differentiation once based on ethnicity is being reconstituted on the basis of race or colour as recent immigrants (largely visible minorities) face discrimination, blocked aspira-

tions and a downward spiral. Less well-defined is the relationship between social class and voting behaviour. It has been long accepted that Canada is low on class voting because of multiple social cleavages—based on region, language and religion (Lambert and Curtis 1993).[3] Gerber (1986, 127-8) shows clear class effects on party preference in an aggregate- or riding-level analysis that avoids regional cleavages by dealing with Ontario alone: that analysis reveals greater NDP support in highly unionized ridings and greater Liberal support in more affluent and well-educated ridings. In Quebec as well, the wealthy prefer the Liberals (Bernard 2001, 143).

Two studies of class voting have particular relevance for this one. Fletcher and Forbes (1990) looked into the impacts of education and occupation on the NDP vote. Predictably, they found that people of lower occupational status vote NDP more than those of higher occupational status. Education, it seemed, had a weak effect—but, contrary to expectations, they noticed that the *most* educated respondents were the ones most likely to vote NDP. Nakhaie and Arnold (1996) introduce the concept of a "New Class" to account for the tendency of the more highly educated to vote NDP. These people have university degrees (often in the social sciences and humanities), work in social-scientific, artistic and literary fields, and are "more interested in social rather than economic radicalism" (1996, 187).

Carty and Eagles argue that "politics is local" and that riding characteristics (including percent immigrant) provide the context within which constituency battles take place. Their "bottom-up perspective on Canadian politics" recognizes the fact that "local diversity creates a richly varied field for the practice of democratic politics" (2005, 172). If immigrants and visible minorities are to affect election results and elect minority politicians, they need to be concentrated in specific ridings (Dhillon 2005; Siemiatycki and Matheson 2005) which indeed they are. Describing the situation in the late 1980s, Stasiulis and Abu-Laban point out that "the striking feature of the majority of 'ethnic ridings' is their location in urban centres, with the Metropolitan Toronto area having the largest number" (Stasiulis and Abu-Laban 1991, 18). Newcomers to Canada are attracted to specific locations by good economic conditions and the presence of large concentrations of earlier immigrants—the result being that they end up in the major metropolitan areas of Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal (McDonald 2004). There they find well-established ethnic minorities—with high levels of institutional completeness (Breton 1964)—that can provide new immigrants with valuable resources and social support.

Roughly "three-quarters of our most recent immigrants now come from Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Central and South America and fall largely within the category of visible minorities": this shift from historical migration patterns has "introduced the issue of visible minority into ethnic relations" and created a "rainbow underclass" that faces discrimination and other barriers to integration

(Frideres 2005) as well as barriers to political participation. It is now the case that about 40 percent of new immigrants to Canada settle in the Greater Toronto Area. So great is the tendency to go where ethnic communities are already established, that Scarborough has been recognized (by the World Health Organization) as the world's most ethno-racially diverse community (McKenzie 2006).[4.]

The primary unit of analysis, in this study, is the riding rather than the individual voter. This kind of aggregate or ecological analysis, where variables are measured at the riding level—political ecology (Gerber 1986, 120; Stasiulis and Abu-Laban 1991, 19); electoral geography (Carty and Eagles 2005, 5)—has been used infrequently in political studies, but is integral to the approach taken by Carty and Eagles in *Politics is Local* (2005). Political behaviour and outcomes are analyzed in the context of riding characteristics.

Socioeconomic data from Census 2001 are available in the form of electoral district profiles in Statistics Canada's B2020 series: census variables were compiled for each riding, converted to percentages and rates, and merged with the results of the federal election of 2004—as the percentage voting for each party—to provide the data base for the following analyses. Regression analysis is used to measure the impacts of socioeconomic variables (independent variables) on support for the Liberals, Conservatives, NDP and Bloc Québécois (the dependent variables).

The measures of ethnic or racial diversity chosen for this analysis are the proportion of the riding population claiming to be immigrant ('percent immigrant') and the proportion classified as visible minority by census definition ('percent visible minority'). Since these two variables are highly correlated (.940) they are not included in the same models (or regression analyses): separate and parallel analyses are conducted using percent immigrant and percent visible minority as the key diversity measures. The two indicators of class or socioeconomic status, income and education, are 'average family income' for the riding and proportion of the riding population with university degrees ('percent university graduate').

Two regression models—including the immigrant and visible minority measures respectively—are applied, first at the national level and then at regional levels, in recognition of Canada's regional political cultures (Cooper 2002; Clarke et al, 2002) as well as the heightened regionalism of party politics after the pivotal federal election of 1993 (Cross 2002, 117). By conducting separate analyses for the Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia regions, one can pick out patterns that are unique to each one.

In regression analysis, the effect of each variable in the model is measured while the other variables are controlled. Our two socioeconomic variables (average family income and percent university graduate) appear in the models together, exhibiting divergent effects on voting behaviour. The Beta coefficient measures the effect of education while income is controlled (and *vice versa*). Weakly correlated variables may exhibit strong impacts once the effects of other variables in

the model are considered in regional analyses. (The strongest effects, with Beta coefficients of at least plus or minus **.400**, appear in bold: percent variance refers to the amount of variation in party support explained by the three variables in each model.)

Table 1 reveals the range of values for each of the independent and dependent variables—for Canada, the provinces and ridings—suggesting enough variation to facilitate analysis. The concentration (or non-random distribution) of types of individuals among the 308 ridings is evident in that fifty-eight are over 30% immigrant, forty-two are over 30% visible minority, sixty-two have average family incomes of $75000 or more, and in forty-eight more than 25% of adults are university graduates. The electoral district with the largest immigrant and visible minority components is Scarborough-Rouge River; the one with the highest average family income is Don Valley East in Toronto: and the most highly educated ones are Westmount-Ville-Marie (in Montreal) and Vancouver Quadra.

Table 1: Range of Values in Independent and Dependent Variables*

Variable	Canada	Provincial Range	Riding Range
% Immigrant	18.4%	1.6% NL to 26.8% ON	0.4 to 66.8%
% Visible Minority	13.4%	0.8% NL to 21.6% BC	0.2 to 84.6%
Av. Family Income	$66,160	$49679 NL to $73849 ON	$41513 to $136032
% University Grad.	16.9%	10.5% NL to 19.2% ON	6.0 to 49.1%
% Voting LPC	36.7%	22.0% AB to 52.5% PE	7.7 to 75.6%
% Voting CPC	29.6%	8.8% QC to 61.6% AB	2.5 to 80.1%
% Voting NDP	15.7%	4.6% QC to 26.5% BC	1.8 to 56.5
% Voting BQ	12.4%	48.8% QC	7.0 to 71.2%

* Calculations based on data from Election2004 and Census2001 (electoral district profiles from B2020 files).

Table 2 reveals that—at the national level—immigrant (left column) and visible minority (right column) composition have substantial impacts on the Liberal vote: the larger the proportion immigrant *or* visible minority, the higher the level of support for the Liberals. Furthermore, each diversity variable has mild postitive effects on the NDP vote. The Quebec and Ontario analyses reveal that immigrant and visible minority composition have powerful positive effects on Liberal support as well as substantial negative effects on the Conservative vote: in Quebec, we observe strong negative effects on Bloc support. In the Atlantic region, both diversity measures have negative effects on the Liberal vote—but percent immi-

Table 2: The Impacts of Immigrant and Visibile Minority Composition on Party Support in Canada and the Regions (Election 2004)

	Percent Immigrant				Percent Visible Minority			
Canada (308)	LPC	CPC	NDP		LPC	CPC	NDP	
% Immig./Vis. Min.	0.410	-0.008	0.183		0.345	-0.023	0.101	
Av. Fam. Income	-0.002	0.581	-0.270		0.053	0.576	-0.259	
% Univ. Graduate	0.171	-0.547	0.120		0.195	-0.537	0.167	
% variance	27.5	16.7	6.0		24.9	16.7	4.4	
Atlantic (32)	LPC	CPC	NDP		LPC	CPC	NDP	
% Immig./Vis. Min.	-0.372	0.471	-0.184		-0.258	-0.572	0.777	
Av. Fam. Income	-0.178	0.326	-0.348		-0.228	0.446	-0.429	
% Univ. Graduate	0.297	-0.833	0.746		0.229	-0.066	0.027	
% variance	8.0	11.4	12.2		6.9	17.1	31.9	
Quebec (75)	LPC	CPC	NDP	BQ	LPC	CPC	NDP	BQ
% Immig./Vis. Min.	0.875	-0.384	0.073	-0.634	0.834	-0.378	0.076	-0.597
Av. Fam. Income	0.364	0.061	-0.370	-0.254	0.409	0.037	-0.364	-0.284
% Univ. Graduate	-0.366	0.164	0.949	0.024	-0.344	0.164	0.946	0.000
% variance	64.6	9.8	59.4	54.8	62.5	9.9	59.5	53.1
Ontario (106)	LPC	CPC	NDP		LPC	CPC	NDP	
% Immig./Vis. Min.	0.812	-0.413	-0.300		0.776	-0.340	-0.362	
Av. Fam. Income	0.274	0.492	-0.699		0.311	0.503	-0.753	
% Univ. Graduate	-0.151	-0.469	0.567		-0.101	-0.542	0.613	
% variance	64.2	43.0	20.8		63.2	40.2	23.8	
Prairie (56)	LPC	CPC	NDP		LPC	CPC	NDP	
% Immig./Vis. Min.	0.118	-0.044	-0.008		0.146	-0.076	0.005	
Av. Fam. Income	-0.674	1.104	-0.998		-0.653	1.092	-0.997	
% Univ. Graduate	0.907	-1.014	0.584		0.896	-0.999	0.578	
% variance	36.4	47.4	41.0		37.2	47.8	41.0	
British Columbia (39)	LPC	CPC	NDP		LPC	CPC	NDP	
% Immig./Vis. Min.	0.020	0.084	-0.125		0.149	-0.061	-0.087	
Av. Fam. Income	-0.004	0.642	-0.723		0.088	0.544	-0.704	
% Univ. Graduate	0.670	-0.896	0.495		0.552	-0.754	0.448	
% variance	46.0	32.5	21.8		47.2	32.4	21.5	

Note: The figures in the body of each subtable are Beta coefficients. The region, British Columbia, includes the three territorial ridings. (##) refers to the number of ridings in each region.

grant substantially *increases* Conservative support while percent visible minority *decreases* it.[5] In the Prairies and BC, neither diversity measure has strong effects on support for any of the parties.

Thus, the positive effects of immigrant and visible minority composition on Liberal support, at the national level, are largely the result of the powerful impacts that we see in Quebec and Ontario. Their negative effects on Conservative support are specific to Ontario and Quebec as well. Clearly, the powerful effects of immigrant and visible minority composition provide the explanation for Liberal success in averting the Conservative threat within the Toronto and Montreal regions.

Nationally, and in all regions but Quebec, average family income (our measure of affluence) has positive—sometimes powerful—effects on support for the Conservatives and negative effects on the NDP vote. In the Prairie region, one observes the most powerful positive effects on the Conservative vote—coupled with strongly negative effects on Liberal and especially NDP support. This pattern, apparent in both immigrant and visible minority models, is what one would expect on the basis of the policies or respective right-left leanings of the Conservative and New Democratic parties. In Quebec, a different picture emerges: average family income has no effect on Conservative support, a substantial *positive* effect on the Liberal vote and negative effects on NDP and Bloc support. The impacts of affluence in Quebec are very similar in both the immigrant and visible minority models.

Across most of the country, high income ridings support the Conservatives—and this is especially true in the prairies. Only in Quebec does the affluent vote go to the Liberals.

The effects of percent university graduate on voting behaviour are noteworthy—particularly in their regional manifestations. Nationally, and outside Ontario and Quebec, higher education (when income is controlled) is associated with increased Liberal support. In Ontario and particularly in Quebec, the effect of increased education is the opposite, meaning that it *reduces* Liberal support. Higher education levels, everywhere but in Quebec, have negative effects on the Conservative vote with the most powerful impacts being in the Prairie and BC regions. (In Quebec, education has a mild positive impact on the Conservative vote.) With one exception (in the Atlantic visible minority table), the larger the percent university graduate the greater the support for the NDP, the effect being most dramatic in Quebec.

Here we find that higher income, for the most part, leads to greater support for the Conservatives—while our other measure of social class, education, is positively related to *NDP* support. We are confronted with the same paradox that led Nakhaie and Arnold (1996) to identify the New Class of university-educated social radicals. The fact that the same pattern is apparent at individual and aggregate

levels suggests that we are observing something "real."

Note that the effects of specific variables on voting behaviour are stronger in some of the regional models than in the national ones: also, larger amounts of variance were explained within most regions than in the national models. Overall, the Atlantic region provided the lowest levels of variance explained, the notable exception being for the NDP vote in the visible minority model. Election promises, party policies (Clarkson 2001, 21) and loyalty to individual candidates may account for unexplained variance in the Atlantic provinces. Conceivably, variation in the internal dynamics of the models and changes in variance reveal the impacts of regional political cultures.

The empirical analysis presented here confirms that *riding composition*—in terms of ethnic diversity, affluence and education—and *region* are powerful predictors of voting patterns. In general, multicultural ridings do support the Liberals and wealthy ones the Conservatives, while both reject the Bloc (suggesting that "money and the ethnic vote"[6] do affect voting behaviour). The two diversity variables (percent immigrant and percent visible minority) are largely interchangeable—except in the Atlantic region. Furthermore, the effect of university education on the vote (when affluence is controlled) is to move it to the left—to the Liberals (except in Ontario and Quebec) and especially the NDP. As measured here, diversity, class and region do predict or explain voting patterns at the electoral district level.

Just before our most recent federal election, Cowan (2006) wrote an item in the *National Post* explaining "Why Toronto is Liberal Bedrock." Pointing out that only "one place in Canada appears safe," he suggests that the primary explanation lies in Toronto's large population of "recent immigrants and cultural minorities." On election day, we learned that Toronto was indeed safe but that much of the rest of Ontario had turned blue.

A few days later, Howlett (2006) noted: that the election results "exposed a sharp split between rural and urban Ontario, with the Tories picking up most of their support outside the city"; that Toronto and many other cities "remained staunchly Liberal"; and that the Tories would have their work cut out for them if they hoped to appeal to urban voters in the future. On the same day, January 28th, the lead editorial in the *National Post* was entitled "The myth of Liberal cities": "There is no urban-rural divide in Canadian politics. There might be a metropolis-versus-the-rest-of- the-country split. But it is not true that the Conservatives are popular predominantly in the rural areas, while the Liberals dominate Canadian cities." Whereas the Conservatives failed to win any seats in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver, many other Canadian cities did elect Conservatives. Ottawa elected five of them and "Quebec City, our seventh largest metropolitan area, sent four Conservatives, two Bloc Québécois and an independent, but not a single Liberal."

A comparison of the results of elections 2004 and 2006 in the Greater Toronto

Area sheds light on the apparent rural-metropolitan divide. In Ontario, Conservative support rose by a mere 3.6 percentage points—to 35.1 percent—from 2004 to 2006, while Liberal support fell by 5 points. Compared with Ontario as a whole, *two thirds* of the GTA ridings experienced above average Conservative gains (from 4 to 11 percentage points): in contrast, half of the GTA ridings reduced their support for the Liberals by more than the Ontario average. It is significant that Mississauga-Erindale dropped 11 points in Liberal support (to 44.8% of the vote), *but still returned a Liberal to Ottawa*: Eglinton-Lawrence, Beaches-East York and St. Paul's each dropped 8 points in Liberal support, while Oakville dropped 9—without unseating their Liberal incumbents. The significant thing for the urban-rural divide argument is that, contrary to expectations, in the GTA, Conservative support rose and Liberal support dropped more than in the province as a whole.

As one might expect, based on the analysis of 2004 election results, the GTA ridings in which Liberal support dropped the most (8 to 11 points) have immigrant and visible minority levels[7] that are low to moderate by GTA standards. The five multicultural Scarborough ridings, comprising the most ethno-racially diverse community in Canada—and indeed in the world—continues to be deep Liberal red.[8] Liberal support dropped a mere 1 to 4 points in four of those ridings—and *increased* by 8 points in the most diverse of all ridings, Scarborough-Rouge River. At the same time, increases in *Conservative* support within three of the five Scarborough ridings came in *above* the Ontario average of 3.6 points—at 4, 6 and 7 points. Surprisingly, in Scarborough-Rouge River—where Liberal support rose by 8 points—*Conservative* support was also up 7 points from 13.8 to 20.4 percent. This bastion of Liberal support—up 8 points—was *also* open to the Conservative message—up 7 points. Clearly, the Conservatives made headway (above the Ontario average) in three of our five highly multicultural Scarborough ridings. So, yes, Toronto is Liberal bedrock, especially in its most ethnically diverse ridings, but the Conservatives did manage to chip away and win increased support in the most diverse and most Liberal ridings.

One can argue that the 2006 Conservative sweep outside Toronto itself was confined to ridings that began their swing to the party in 2004. Four GTA ridings, Burlington, Halton, Oshawa and Whitby-Oshawa, did elect Conservatives but they started from 2004 support levels of 33 to 38 percent. Considering the huge Liberal leads in Toronto—especially in its most diverse ridings—it is not surprising that the Conservatives were shut out of the city in 2006 (at least as measured by wins).

All of this suggests that Conservative advances in Ontario could be considered "normal"; in contrast, the outcome in Quebec was astounding. At the provincial level, popular support for the Conservatives increased from 8.8 to 24.6 percent—up *16 points*—mirroring substantial declines in Liberal and Bloc support.[9] The

magnitude of that movement surprised everyone. Stephen Harper's Conservatives went from *no* Quebec seats to ten, in an election where three or four would have been seen as a major breakthrough. From 2004 to 2006, the rural riding of Beauce increased its Conservative support by an incredible 50 percentage points—from 17 to 67 percent. Urban ridings, in and adjacent to Quebec City, swung by 21 to 27 points, sent Conservatives to Ottawa and challenged the myths of Liberal cities and the urban-rural divide. Since nine of the ten ridings that elected Conservatives are either in or around Quebec City[10], that part of the province exhibits a remarkable degree of urban-rural consensus.

None of the urban ridings in the Quebec City area can be described as ethnoracially diverse—since neither immigrant nor visible minority composition rises above 2.7 percent. Quebec City may have been a Liberal stronghold in the past, but this time Harper's Conservatives took each of its urban ridings from the Bloc Québécois. Harper was able to reach "conservative-minded people in Quebec" while dealing "a serious blow to the Bloc Québécois"—in large part because people "were thirsty for an honourable federalist alternative to the hated Liberals" (Gagnon 2006). On the other hand, the Conservatives were shut out of Montreal where immigrant and visible minority levels approach 50 and 40 percent respectively in a number of ridings.

Stephen Harper has an opportunity to make further inroads into our major metropolitan areas, despite their immigrant, visible minority and educational levels. After all, members of each category are known to vote for all of the major political parties. Harper made an attempt to reach out to the immigrant population on same-sex marriage, Air India, recognition of credentials and recruitment of minority candidates. Some media pundits assumed that he failed, because the Conservatives did not win those multicultural urban seats—but they are ignoring significant gains by the Conservatives in deep red ridings like Scarborough-Rouge River. Hyder (2005) recognizes that the visible minority community has traditionally aligned itself with the Liberals, but senses that "opportunities are appearing for other parties to capture the fastest-growing demographic in Canada's cities—the minority vote." Although the minority communities have special interests in immigration and foreign policy, their other interests are the same as those of mainstream Canadians: health care, education, taxes, justice and the environment, jobs and a robust economy. As well, the second generation tends to be more conservative with respect to economic policies. Bird (2005) also feels that the Conservative "ethnic outreach strategy" can be effective and that the immigrant community needs to be reminded that the highest levels of immigration were reached under the leadership of Conservative prime minister, Brian Mulroney. At a more general level, Harper should remember that the Conservatives made incremental gains in Ontario (including Toronto) and massive ones in Quebec. He needs to make further gains in multicultural ridings, but recent ones

suggest this is not impossible.

Nothing in the results of the 2006 election negates the analysis based on 2004. Regional variation aside, it is clear that—at the electoral district level—increasing ethno-racial diversity is associated with higher levels of Liberal support.[11] While the ethnically diverse metropolitan areas of Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver failed to elect any Conservatives, voting behaviour in smaller cities across the country suggests that, in the absence of diversity, there is no rural-urban divide.

Notes

[1] An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association in June, 2005. A companion paper, which includes the variable "percent bilingual" appears in *Canadian Ethnic Studies* (forthcoming).

[2] Siemiatycki and Matheson (2005, 71) point out that visible minority politicians are elected more readily in Toronto's suburbs than in the city core—because of dramatic visible minority population growth and residential concentration as well as greater efforts on the part of political parties to attract candidates in the suburbs rather than the central city. Given a critical mass of potential supporters, higher rates of home ownership in the suburbs contribute to higher voter turnout in these areas. Lapp (1999) argues that voter turnout in Montreal varies by ethnic group and depends on the types of arguments their leaders use in mobilizing the vote (duty, pride, having an impact) and kinds of political systems (democracies, dictatorships) and voting requirements they experienced before moving to Canada. Tossutti (2005) points out that Chinese and Black residents, whether Canadian-born or foreign born, have lower voter turnout rates than their South Asian counterparts. Bird (2005: 83) agrees that political activism varies widely across minority communities and points out that the political performance of the South Asian community—which elected ten MPs in 2004—is impressive.

[3] Lambert and Curtis (1993) approach the question of class voting from a new angle and show that it is more marked when you let the voter define the class orientation of the parties, and when the parties are perceived to differ. They found, as well, that class has more of an effect on least-liked parties than on preferred parties.

[4] The five Scarborough ridings range from 51 to 69 percent immigrant and from 43 to 85 percent visible minority. Scarborough-Rouge River comes out on top by both measures. To the extent that "politics is local", these ridings provide unique settings for "ethno-politics" that set them apart from the rest of Canada.

[5] The probable explanation for the divergent voting patterns is that about half of the visible minority population of Nova Scotia consists of Black descendents of Loyalists who came at the time of the American Revolution and are therefore not immigrants (or their immediate descendents).

[6] In an analysis of Quebec referendum results, Gerber (1992) found that ridings with high levels of support for sovereignty tend to vote Parti Québécois in provincial elections. Later, Bloc Québécois support would exhibit similar patterns. This suggests that ethnicity and income are negatively correlated with support for sovereignty. Thus Quebec Premier Jacques Parizeau may have been right, though politically incorrect, regarding factors that contributed to the 1995 referendum loss.

[7] These range from 27.4 and 10.8 percent in Oakville to 35.6 and 29.4 in Beaches East York.
[8] Scarborough gave the Liberals 49.5 to 64.1 percent support in 2004 and 47.8 to 65.6 support in 2006.
[9] The surge in Conservative support within Quebec knocked the Liberals down 13 percentage points and the Bloc down 7.
[10]These ridings start north of the city and stretch south to the United States border.
[11] Future analyses based on the election of 2006 may reveal slightly weaker effects of diversity on Liberal support because (across the country) the Conservatives have chipped away at Liberal support, making gains even in ridings that were considered to be invulnerable.

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